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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Background and aim 
The series of recent terrorist attacks, as well as the various foiled and failed terrorist plots 
on European soil, have more than ever reinforced the popular awareness of the 
vulnerabilities that go hand-in-hand with the open democracies in the European Union 
(EU). The fact that these attacks followed each other with short intervals, but mostly due to 
the fact that they often did not fit the profile and modus operandi of previous attacks, have 
significantly contributed to the difficulty for security agencies to signal the threats as they 
are materialising. The modi operandi used showed a diversity of targets chosen, were 
committed by a variety of actors including foreign fighter returnees, home-grown jihadist 
extremists, and lone actors, and were executed with a variety of weapons or explosives. 
Furthermore, another complicating factor is the trend towards the weaponisation of 
ordinary life in which a truck or a kitchen knife already fulfils the purpose.  
Governments, policy-makers, and politicians in most EU Member States feel the pressure of 
the population who call for adequate responses to these threats. Similarly, the various 
actors of the EU on their own accord, or the European Council driven by (some) Member 
States, have stressed the importance of effective responses to these increased threats, and 
have specifically underlined the importance of sharing of information and good cooperation. 
Very illustrating in this respect are the conclusions adopted during the European Council 
meeting of 15 December 2016, in which the European Council stressed the importance of 
the political agreement on the Counter-Terrorism Directive, emphasised the need to swiftly 
adopt the proposals on regulation of firearms and anti-money laundering, as well as the 
implementation of the new passenger name record (PNR) legislation.1 The European 
Council furthermore welcomed the agreement on the revised Schengen Borders Code, and 
stressed the importance of finding agreement on the Entry/Exit System and the European 
Travel Information and Authorisation System.2 
Although the easy way to satisfy the call for action by the national populations seems to be 
to just take action for the sake of it, the responsibility lies with the relevant actors, in line 
with the objectives and principles of the EU Treaty and the values the EU represents3, to 
actually assess the security situation, and implement, amend or suggest (new) policies that 
are adequate, legitimate, coherent and effective in the long run. It is with that objective in 
mind that this study, commissioned by the European Parliament, has made an assessment 
of the current policy architecture of the EU in combating terrorism, particularly looking into 
loopholes, gaps or overlap in policies in areas ranging from international and inter-agency 
cooperation, data exchange, external border security, access to firearms and explosives, 
limiting the financing of terrorist activities, criminalising terrorist behaviour and prevention 
of radicalisation. This study furthermore looks into the effectiveness of the implementation 
of policies in Member States and the legitimacy and coherence of the policies.  
                                                 
 
1 European Council, Conclusions of the European Council meeting of 15 December 2016, EUCO 34/16. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Since the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, according to article 6 of the Treaty of the European Union, the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights are part and parcel of the mandate of the EU. 
The European Union’s Policies on Counter-Terrorism. Relevance, Coherence and Effectiveness 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 15 
Seven major policy themes were selected and addressed in depth by this study: 
 Measures and tools for operational cooperation and intelligence/law enforcement 
and judicial information exchange; 
 Data collection and database access and interoperability; 
 Measures to enhance external border security;  
 Measures to combat terrorist financing; 
 Measures to reduce terrorists’ access to weapons and explosives; 
 Criminal justice measures; 
 Measures to combat radicalisation and recruitment. 
The research team has assessed the degree of implementation of EU counter-terrorism 
measures under these seven themes in a selection of seven Member States: Belgium, 
Bulgaria, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Slovakia and Spain. This study sets out policy 
options for the future direction of EU counter-terrorism policy. The focus of policy options is 
on future threats and developments, and on developing creative yet feasible policy 
solutions. 
 
Main findings 
 
Trend analysis and future developments 
The EU’s counter-terrorism agenda has been to a large extent ‘crisis-driven’, and was 
heavily influenced by four major shock waves: (1) 9/11; (2) the Madrid and London 
bombings; (3) the Syrian civil war and rise of ISIS, the foreign (terrorist) fighters 
phenomenon, and the attacks on Charlie Hebdo, the Bataclan and Brussel/Zaventem; (4) 
the Nice and Berlin attacks and a series of small-scale attacks, featuring the rise of the lone 
actors and the weaponisation of ordinary life. Since these shocks were all related to Islamic 
terrorism, this has been the main EU counter-terrorism focus. 
The past ten years have shown a steady increase in the number of terrorist attacks in 
Europe. Attacks by separatist and left-wing extremist movements have been on a steady 
decline, whereas these last years show an increase in right-wing and jihadist extremism. 
Researchers agree that lone-wolf terrorism is on the rise, facilitated by increased 
availability of information on the internet that can be used for terrorist acts and calls upon 
Muslims in Western countries to commit lone-actor attacks in their countries of residence 
by Al-Qaeda and more recently ISIS. 
One prominent researcher has estimated that one in 15 to 20 returnees poses a security 
risk. This was based on foreign fighters who travelled to the conflict zone before 2011, and 
it is very likely that the risks with regard to those who left after 2011 is higher. Due to 
increased military pressure on ISIS both the number of returnees and the relative risk 
associated with their return are expected to increase. 
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Mapping the EU Counter-terrorism policy architecture 
Prior to 11 September 2001, cooperation in the field of counter-terrorism was informal and 
not officially part of the institutional structure of the then European Community. In 
response to the bombings in London on 7 July 2005, the United Kingdom (UK), holding the 
Presidency for the second half of the year, drafted what was ultimately adopted in 
December 2005 as the ‘European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy’. The added value of 
the 2005 EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy and particularly its coherence with the plethora of 
overarching (e.g. the EU’s internal and external security strategies) and sub-strategies 
(e.g. on countering radicalisation and recruitment, countering terrorist finance, protection 
of critical infrastructure and customs) are unclear. It was concluded that counter-terrorism 
is a ‘composite’ policy area with challenges related to coordination, coherence and 
consistency, and that it is not always clear who is in charge of these processes. However, 
more recently, there were two additional initiatives to improve cooperation regarding 
internal security. The ‘European Agenda on Security’ was launched in 2015 in order to 
“bring added value to support the Member States in ensuring security” by improving 
information sharing and the prevention of radicalisation.4 Following the attacks in Brussels 
in March 2016, the concept of a ‘Security Union’ was launched as a way to “move beyond 
the concept of cooperating to protect national internal security to the idea of protecting the 
collective security of the Union as a whole” and to this extent, again, emphasising the need 
to improve information sharing.5 
Currently, too many actors are involved in the design and implementation of this policy 
area, the tasks of the individual actors at times overlap. This is notably the case when it 
concerns strategies that can be issued by the European Council, the Council of the EU and 
by the Commission, making it unclear who is in the lead. The recently appointed 
Commissioner for the Security Union and the delimitation of his competences vis-à-vis the 
EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator furthermore complicates the questions concerning 
coordination.  
Certainly not helpful to this situation is the lack of clarity on the scope of the term ‘internal 
security’, and the extent to which Member States are willing to call on that exceptional 
clause in order to give priority to their national competences. This seems to be at odds with 
the otherwise regularly expressed conviction that the nature of the threat of terrorism has 
a cross-border character, and therefore merely a sum of national actions would fall short to 
address the true nature of the threat. 
 
Observations concerning relevance, coherence and effectiveness 
The highly dynamic environment and asymmetric counter-terrorism strategy development 
require a policy architecture that allows policymakers to – collaboratively – respond fast to 
today’s challenges, while taking sufficient time to prepare for the evolution that takes place 
in society to be able to meet tomorrow’s challenges equally well. From the perspective of 
the latter, ensuring long-term counter-terrorism capacity and capabilities on all levels, and 
                                                 
 
4 European Commission, “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: The European Agenda on Security”, 
COM (2015) 185 final, 28 April 2015. 
5 European Commission, “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council 
and the Council – delivering on the European Agenda on Security to fight against terrorism and pave the way 
towards an effective and genuine Security Union”, COM (2016) 230 final, 20 April 2016, pp. 2 and 9. 
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conducting strategically vital research on which measures are most effective, are some key 
elements the EU can contribute to. 
The EU policy architecture in the way it is organised at the moment does not include a 
regular centralised update on the threats the EU and its Member States are dealing with, 
and the way threat assessments have implications for the various policies in place. Also, 
future foresight studies addressing longer-term developments (5-10 years in the future) 
are currently not part of the EU’s policy-making instruments. Both Europol and the EU 
Intelligence and Situation Centre are dealing with threat assessments, but not in an 
integrated manner, and lacking the regularity needed to meet the constantly changing 
threats, and lacking the general public outreach to inform multiple stakeholders at the 
same time. 
The counter-terrorism agenda primarily reflects the security concerns of Western and 
Northern European Member States around jihadism. Threat perceptions and counter-
terrorist ‘legacies’ in Central and Eastern European Member States might be different. 
Moreover, the potential for political violence does not solely rest with jihadists as the attack 
by Anders Behring Breivik in Norway in 2011 showed.  
The EU’s counter-terrorism policy architecture would benefit from making both its 
objectives and its underlying assumptions more explicit. In fact, the EU has been ‘widening 
the net’ of counter-terrorism, by increasingly criminalising preparatory acts in the context 
of the new EU Directive on Countering Terrorism. This is considered ineffective by the 
experts consulted for this research. 
Counter-terrorism measures can have higher legitimacy – and therefore overall 
effectiveness – if critical human rights organisations are involved in the policy-making 
phase, rather than making measures vulnerable to their criticism after implementation. 
Because of the risk of harming human rights, better oversight is justified. This could be 
achieved for instance through a modified mandate of the Fundamental Rights Agency, the 
European Parliament (‘s LIBE committee) or through an independent reviewer comparable 
to the one in the UK. 
In spite of assurances regarding more involvement of citizens in the preparation of new 
initiatives, of the 88 legislative initiatives regarding counter-terrorism since 2001, in merely 
three cases a public consultation was performed. Only one quarter of the legally binding 
measures adopted since 2001 were subjected to Impact Assessments. Particularly striking 
is the lack of an Impact Assessment where the new Directive on Combating Terrorism that 
is to replace Framework Decision 2002/475 is concerned. None of the Council initiatives 
have been accompanied by an Impact Assessment. The lack of public consultations and ex 
ante assessments is not compensated by ex post reviews or evaluations. 
One of the recurring issues amongst practitioners and experts alike is the apparent lack of 
trust between services within and between Member States, accompanied by complex legal 
boundaries that hinder effective sharing of information. Particularly, the Commission’s call 
upon the Member States to “facilitate an information exchange hub based on the 
interaction between the law enforcement community and the intelligence community, 
within the framework of the CTG and the ECTC, in accordance with relevant EU and 
national rules and arrangements” (COM (2016) 602 final) is one the findings of this study 
would support. 
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Conclusions and recommendations 
 
When assessing the developments with regard to the terrorism threats as well as the policy 
design and implementation over time, the question of whether one has moved ahead of the 
informal and non-official network for cooperation that was set up during the Trevi process 
comes to mind. In areas of data exchange and judicial and police cooperation, the 
subsidiarity principle still applies, as well as the exception clause related to issues 
concerning internal security, allowing Member States to call upon their national sovereignty 
and deviate from the EU policy line.  
Considering the plethora of sub-strategies, action plans, an overlapping policy fields with 
multiple measures, the question arises whether the EU counter-terrorism strategy indeed 
brings the strategic “conceptual guidance” and the framework to tie all the sub policy fields 
together, meanwhile ensuring coherence and consistency and to serve both the short and 
long-term security concerns in an effective manner in order to stay relevant. Instead, the 
effect of the sub-strategies (as well as the action plans) is to break up counter-terrorism in 
a number of ‘composite’ parts and to embed them across a range of different policy fields, 
ranging from amongst others the social domain, the financial sector, law enforcement, 
critical infrastructure, and border security. It is important to go back to the drawing table 
and redesign the entire policy field, to start with a clean slate and reassess what works and 
what does not.  
Meanwhile, the overarching strategies have performed a similar function by linking counter-
terrorism with the EU’s CFSP and by stressing not only the linkages across international 
borders and thereby blurring the line between internal and external security as well as with 
other insecurities such as (organised) crime. This brings up questions of where the 
boundaries are of the counter-terrorism domain. It is for instance difficult to clearly 
distinguish between counterterrorism measures, other security measures and measures 
with counterterrorism objectives. In fact, most measures included in this study could not be 
designated as 100% counterterrorism measures, but are counterterrorism ‘relevant’ or 
counterterrorism ‘related’.6 It seems sometimes the case that the counterterrorism 
relevance of a measure is emphasised in policy debates leading up to the adoption of the 
measure. In other words, measures may sometimes be introduced as a silver bullet for 
counterterrorism purposes, whereas in practice these measures are only used in a minor 
portion of the cases for counterterrorism purposes7. It should be emphasised that this is 
not always the result of deliberate ‘spinning’ or coherent action. For instance, the 
introduction of the European Arrest Warrant was already underway (in fact, the decision 
was taken at the Tampere Council in 1999) when it was introduced just after ‘9/11’ and 
presented as a measure that “ … greatly contributes to speeding up the prosecution of 
terrorists and other serious criminals operating within EU territory” in the Commissions 
‘stock-taking’ exercise8. 
 
                                                 
 
6 A remark that was also made in 2011 by PwC, Estimated costs of EU counterterrorism measures, report for the 
Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs of the European Parliament, accessed at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/join/2011/453181/IPOL-LIBE_NT(2011)453181_EN.pdf. 
7 This has been one of the outcomes of the counter-terrorism evaluation in the Netherlands, see 
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2011/07/22/5682945-antiterrorismemaatregelen-in-
nederland-in-het-eerste-decenium-van-de-21e-eeuw. 
8 Commission staff working paper ‘Taking stock of EU Counterterrorism Measures. Accompanying document to 
the communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council The EU Counterterrorism 
Policy: main achievements and future challenges, COM(2010) 386 final, p.17. 
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However, the constantly evolving security environment, which requires a simultaneous 
short-term and long-term responsiveness, requires the EU to show qualities of 
ambidexterity. For that to work out, it would at least be necessary to know who is in the 
lead of the overall strategy and coordination of activities, but the current situation rather 
shows a very crowded market place with too many actors involved in the design and 
implementation of the various policies, and at times with even overlapping mandates.  
When looking at effectiveness in terms of cooperation, it became clear from the interviews 
that there is a formal channel to cooperate, as well as an informal channel and that the 
latter is extremely important and hence should be strengthened, rather than creating yet 
another framework for cooperation or data sharing.  
Below, this study’s recommendations with regard to the policy architecture’s relevance, 
coherence and effectiveness are given. The full recommendations, with more clarifying text 
and concrete suggestions, are presented in chapter 6 of this report. The policy 
recommendations on the seven policy fields can also be found in chapter 6. 
 
Recommendations and policy options for improving the policy cycle 
and effectiveness of EU counter-terrorism policies 
 
1. In general, the EU should also invest in the tools it already has in place and connect 
the different stakeholders and dots, such as the crime-terror nexus. The EU should 
prefer evidence-based policy and law-making, involvement of citizens and 
stakeholders and transparency throughout the process. This implies quality over 
quantity, meaning for example that it should improve data exchange rather than 
support the collection of more data. 
2. The EU is recommended to commission annual future foresight studies (five-ten years 
ahead) that assess the possible development of certain risks and threats, as well as 
its underlying driving factors.  
3. Since the potential for political violence and terrorist attacks does not rest exclusively 
with jihadists, the EU is advised to keep an open attitude to other forms of political 
violence and the differentiated manner in which this manifests across the Union.  
4. A system is recommended that issues quarterly public threat assessments that 
combine the intel and information gathered by Europol and INTCEN. 
5. Calls for new policy measures should be properly and thoroughly scrutinised to ensure 
that there is indeed a gap or lacuna in the existing policies that needs to be 
addressed. 
6. The EU is advised to reflect on its objectives and underlying assumptions before 
adopting new policies, legislation, or other kinds of measures. In this process the EU 
is recommended to make explicit what the specific counter-terrorism objectives are 
for the various policies, and to formulate them in a SMART manner, so that its 
effectiveness – and not just its effects – can be measured. 
7. It is recommended that a multidisciplinary and geographically spread pool of experts 
and practitioners is consulted as part of the expert consultations that contribute to 
the qualitative part of the threat assessments and future foresight analysis, as well as 
the assessment of the relevance of certain policies. 
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8. European institutions, and especially the European Parliament (‘s LIBE Committee), 
are recommended to actively involve – at the earliest stage possible –a pool of 
experts and practitioners in the design of new counter-terrorism policies, legislation 
and measures to increase its legitimacy and overall effectiveness. 
9. The EU needs to invest in its own oversight system. It is considered worthwhile to 
explore the possibility of modifying the mandate of the Fundamental Rights Agency, 
increase the role of the European Parliament (‘s LIBE committee) or through the 
appointment of an independent reviewer comparable to the one in the UK. 
10. It is paramount that the EU sets up an institutionalised system to regularly monitor 
and evaluate the policies and measures in place. For economic policies, a system for 
monitoring already exists in the form of the European Semester. A similar approach 
could be applied to counter-terrorism policies. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The series of recent terrorist attacks, as well as the various foiled and failed terrorist plots 
on European soil, have more than ever reinforced the popular awareness of the 
vulnerabilities that go hand-in-hand with the open democracies in the EU. The fact that 
these attacks followed each other with short intervals, but mostly due to the fact that they 
did not fit the profile and modus operandi of previous attacks, have significantly contributed 
to the difficulty for security agencies to signal the threats as they are materialising. The 
modi operandi used showed a diversity of targets chosen, were committed by a variety of 
actors including foreign fighter returnees, home-grown jihadist extremists, and lone actors, 
and were executed with a variety of weapons or explosives. Furthermore, another 
complicating factor is the trend towards the weaponisation of ordinary life in which a truck 
or a kitchen knife already fulfils the purpose.  
Governments, policy-makers, and politicians in most EU Member States feel the pressure of 
the population who call for adequate responses to these threats. Similarly, the various 
actors of the EU on their own accord, or the European Council driven by (some) Member 
States, have stressed the importance of effective responses to these increased threats, and 
have specifically underlined the importance of sharing of information and good cooperation. 
Very illustrating in this respect, are the conclusions adopted during the European Council 
meeting of 15 December 2016, in which the European Council stressed the importance of 
the political agreement on the Counter-Terrorism Directive, emphasised the need to swiftly 
adopt the proposals on regulation of firearms and anti-money laundering, as well as the 
implementation of the new passenger name record (PNR) legislation.9 The European 
Council furthermore welcomed the agreement on the revised Schengen Borders Code, and 
stressed the importance of finding agreement on the Entry/Exit System and the European 
Travel Information and Authorisation System.10 
Although the easy way to satisfy the call for action by the national populations seems to be 
to just take action for the sake of it, the responsibility lies with the relevant actors, in line 
with the objectives and principles of the EU Treaty and the values the EU represents11, to 
actually assess the security situation, and implement, amend or suggest (new) policies that 
are adequate, legitimate, coherent and effective in the long run. It is with that objective in 
mind that this study has made an assessment of the current policy architecture of the EU in 
combating terrorism, particularly looking into loopholes, gaps or overlap in policies in areas 
ranging from international and inter-agency cooperation, data exchange, external border 
security, access to firearms and explosives, limiting the financing of terrorist activities, 
criminalising terrorist behaviour and prevention of radicalisation. This study furthermore 
looks into the effectiveness of the implementation of policies in Member States and the 
legitimacy and coherence of the policies. During the period of research for this study, the 
proposals for the Security Union were tabled, and a Commissioner for the Security Union 
was nominated. The objectives behind the establishment of the Security Union in some 
ways run parallel with this study’s analysis of the situation as it still is, and in some ways 
might lead to recommendations that go beyond its ambitions formulated so far.  
                                                 
 
9 European Council, Conclusions of the European Council meeting of 15 December 2016, EUCO 34/16. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Since the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, according to article 6 of the Treaty of the European Union, the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights are part and parcel of the mandate of the EU. 
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1.1. Objectives and research questions 
The overall aim of this study is, as pointed out in the subsection above, to provide a 
comprehensive assessment of the EU’s counter-terrorism policy architecture, identifying the 
various actors, the relevant policies, the gaps and overlaps in those policies, and the overall 
relevance, coherence, legitimacy and effectiveness of the policies and their implementation 
in Member States. Where possible, this study has identified some good practices in various 
policy fields in different Member States that could inform future policy development. 
However, due to reluctance from the side of practitioners in the field, and the confidential 
nature of many of the work in the area of counter-terrorism, the number of good practices 
is limited and it remains difficult to assess to what extent practices are in fact successful. A 
stocktaking of practices and an assessment of their effects and effectiveness requires much 
more time and resources and almost full access to data and information that is now 
inaccessible for such research. In particular, this report covers the following aspects:   
 It outlines the current status quo of the EU counter-terrorism policy, including the 
legal framework governing EU counter-terrorism policy and the nexus between EU 
and national competences. In this respect, the report considers in depth seven 
policy themes that cover major counter-terrorism policy initiatives of the past ten 
years. The research team’s analysis shows how this policy has developed over the 
past decade and it maps the most relevant counter-terrorism measures that have 
been put in place by the EU and those that are under development in each of these 
seven areas: 
a) Measures and tools for operational cooperation and intelligence/law enforcement 
and judicial information exchange (including notably the Europol  and Eurojust 
reforms, the proposed Directive on the European Criminal Records Information 
System (ECRIS) and existing tools such as Joint Investigation Teams (JITs)); 
b) Data collection and database access and interoperability (notably use of relevant 
Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) and Interpol databases, as well as the new 
Passenger Name Records (PNR) Directive and bilateral PNR agreements the EU 
has with Australia, Canada and the US); 
c) Measures to enhance external border security (including the above-mentioned 
proposals on systematic checks on EU citizens entering EU territory against 
relevant databases, the European Border and Coast Guard (EBCG) and on a new 
Entry-Exit System (EES));  
d) Measures to combat terrorist financing (including the Anti-Money Laundering 
Directive (AML(D)) and the Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme (TFTP), as well 
as measures envisaged in the above-mentioned terrorist financing action plan); 
e) Measures to reduce terrorists’ access to weapons and explosives (including the 
proposed revision of the Firearms Directive); 
f) Criminal justice measures (including the new Directive on combating terrorism); 
g) Measures to combat radicalisation and recruitment (notably the work of the 
Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) and some of the best practices that 
have been identified on, inter alia, prisons, online radicalisation, youth 
engagement and community policing). 
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 Where relevant, the report also maps agreements in place between the EU and third 
countries (especially the US) and international organisations (Interpol etc.) in the 
field of counter-terrorism and how these contribute to EU counter-terrorism policy. 
 The research team has assessed the degree of implementation of EU counter-
terrorism measures in – as well as the design and implementation of operational 
cooperation and information sharing, and whether existing mechanisms work (and if 
not, why not) in – a selection of seven Member States.12 The aim of this part of the 
study is to understand as clearly and with as much detail as possible how Member 
States implement EU counter-terrorism policy on the ground and how they 
cooperate on counter-terrorism.  
 On the basis of the mapping exercise and the assessment of current 
implementation, the research team has assessed the loopholes, gaps and overlaps 
in EU counter-terrorism policy and evaluate the extent to which, collectively, the 
measures in place or in the pipeline meet operational counter-terrorism aims, 
achieve policy coherence and provide consistent and robust fundamental rights 
safeguards.  
 This study sets out policy options for the future direction of EU counter-terrorism 
policy, looking specifically at how operational, technical and legislative tools could be 
optimised and how information exchange could be enhanced. This includes 
developing a more direct EU response in line with calls either for a European 
intelligence agency or for enhanced powers for existing organisations, such as 
Eurojust, Europol, including its recently-established European Counter Terrorism 
Centre (ECTC), the nascent European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), or the EU 
Intelligence and Situation Centre (IntCen). The focus of policy options is on future 
threats and developments, and on developing creative yet feasible policy solutions. 
1.2. Outline of the report 
This report is set out under the following headings: 
 
 Chapter 2 describes the scoping of the study and serves as a theoretical framework 
for the assessment of the policies’ effectiveness. 
 Chapter 3 presents an overview of the interplay between the EU as a policy-making 
institution and the policy realm of counter-terrorism. It shows how the EU has 
responded to threats from terrorism during the 2001-2016 research period. 
 Chapter 4 contains a mapping of the EU’s counter-terrorism policy architecture, 
including its strategies, actors and mandates and the measures that have been 
identified for each of the seven themes under study. For each of these themes, this 
chapter contains the research team’s key observations, based on a detailed 
factsheet drafted for each theme, which are included in Annex I. 
 Chapter 5 presents this study’s general observations on policy coherence and 
effectiveness in the EU policy arena. 
 Finally, chapter 6 presents the concluding remarks, general recommendations and 
policy options. 
 
The report also contains the following annexes: 
                                                 
 
12 See Annex III to this report for the selection process. 
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 Annex I contains factsheets on each of the seven themes covered by the study. 
 Annex II contains a mapping of the measures the research team has identified that 
together form the EU’s policy architecture on counter-terrorism. 
 Annex III describes the methodology applied in the study in more detail, including 
the reasons for selecting the seven EU Member States covered in more detail in this 
report. 
 Annex IV provides an overview of the interviews conducted and presents the main 
outcomes of the policy lab workshop that was held on 9 November 2016 as a part of 
this study. 
 Annex V presents the data used to compile the graphs in figures 2, 12 and 13 and 
explains why a selection has been made. 
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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
2.1. Theoretical framework for the assessment of the effectiveness 
of the EU policy architecture on counter-terrorism 
In an ideal world, the design of a policy architecture would be the result of an analysis of a 
societal problem (in this case a terrorist threat analysis), a policy needs assessment, policy 
design based on formulated objectives, an implementation of these policies, followed by 
monitoring and evaluation, and subsequent adjustment if needed (see cycle below). 
However, the current EU counter-terrorism policy architecture is arguably the result of an 
incremental process (see more elaborate on this section 5.3). This has resulted in a myriad 
of EU policies, strategies, action plans, legal and other policy measures, bodies, units and 
agencies. As such, the policy architecture is not necessarily a top-down coordinated and 
coherent structure, but rather the ex-post interpretation of what could be considered 
important initiatives at the EU level to combat terrorism. Worthwhile to mention in this 
respect is that the first attempt within the EU to introduce a balanced policy cycle dynamic 
consisted of only four-steps: “policy preparation on the basis of risk assessment; political 
policy setting by the Council through the identification of priorities as well as the 
development of multi-annual strategic plans for each priority; the development and 
implementation of operational action plans aligned with the defined strategic goals; the 
evaluation of the policy cycle.”13 
Figure 1: The EU Policy Cycle for counter-terrorism policy development 
 
Source: PwC and ICCT. 
                                                 
 
13 See for a more elaborate analysis, see European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy 
Department C, Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, The EU Internal Security Strategy, The EU Policy Cycle 
and the Role of (AFSJ) Agencies; Promise, Perils and Pre-requisites, Study for the LIBE Committee (2011), p. 4. 
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The purpose of this study is nevertheless to assess the EU counter-terrorism policy 
architecture, and to recommend on possible ways forward to improve its relevance, 
coherence and effectiveness. According to the ‘Evaluation Standards’ of the European 
Commission (EC) an “[e]valuation involves a judgement of interventions according to their 
results, impacts and needs they aim to satisfy. It is a systematic tool which provides a 
rigorous evidence base to inform decision-making and contributing to making Commission 
activities more effective, coherent, useful, relevant and efficient.”14 In a footnote in the 
same document, the Commission continues to explain that “[t]he evaluation question 
should reflect the following evaluation issues whenever relevant: effectiveness, 
efficiency/cost-effectiveness, relevance, coherence, sustainability, utility and/or community 
added value, and where relevant the contribution to broader strategic objectives.”15 
Notwithstanding these guidelines, and in line with the terms of reference for this study, the 
current assessment is a little less ambitious, and does not qualify as a full-fledged 
evaluation, but should at least demonstrate whether the counter-terrorism policy 
architecture is a coherent policy architecture which, using the terms used in the European 
Parliament’s terms of reference for this evaluation, prevents “loopholes, gaps or duplication 
of effort”.16 This study will thus be aimed at an assessment of the relevance and coherence 
of the policy architecture. The focus will be on certain aspects of the policy’s effectiveness. 
In general, the public debate on the effectiveness of counter-terrorism policies often seems 
to be obscured by the lack of proper definition of what one is evaluating, lack of properly 
formulated policy objectives, policies based on assumptions that do not follow from 
evidence and analysis and good standards applied to value the so-called effectiveness. It is, 
for instance, not possible to measure the effectiveness of repressive and punitive measures 
in the same way that one should measure effectiveness of preventive measures, because, 
for one thing, the timeframe in which one can expect any results varies substantially 
between short-term results and long-term results. Furthermore, it would be a mistake to 
measure the effectiveness of policies by simply looking at the development of the threat 
levels, the number of terrorist attacks or casualties or economical damage. The causal link 
between the measure and/or policy is never that direct. In other words, the art of 
measuring effectiveness is not one that one can easily master.  
Since the term effectiveness often lacks a proper definition as to its scope and meaning, it 
is important to elaborate on this term and to explain the way in which it will be used in this 
assessment study.  
In general, a distinction can be made between formal effectiveness and material 
effectiveness. Ultimately, the objective of policies is to effectively impact reality as it has 
been assessed prior to the design of the policy. Formal effectiveness can be achieved if a 
policy has been adopted (following the right procedure), is in line with the powers allotted 
to the EU organs (according to mandate), does not undermine the principles (including 
fundamental and human rights principles) of the EU, is subsequently adopted and 
implemented in the national jurisdictions of the EU Member States, and is coherent and 
does not undermine any other policies. The various elements that contribute to the formal 
effectiveness of a measure, moreover, contribute to the measure’s (perception of) 
legitimacy, which Franck explains as a function that contributes to a pull to compliance of 
                                                 
 
14 European Commission, Annex to the Internal Charter for the Evaluation Function in DG ECFIN, March 2016, p. 
9. 
15 Ibid., p. 9, footnote 8. 
16 See Annex VI. 
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the rules.17 Others have pointed to principles of good governance, which might include 
concepts as accountability, transparency, and procedural and substantive fairness as core 
principles that contribute to the legitimacy of the policy.18 The material effect – the impact 
a policy has on reality – could be positive or negative to the underlying objective of a 
policy. Whether a policy can be considered to indeed possess material effectiveness 
depends on whether the policy furthermore provides a proper response to the underlying 
objective of the policy, which is based on a proper evidence-based needs assessment that 
spurred the adoption of the EU policy in the first place (relevance).  
Measuring material effectiveness is very challenging and something that – to its full extent 
– falls outside the scope of this study. It would require, in the first place, a comprehensive 
analysis of the various aspects of the threats the EU and its Member States are facing, an 
analysis of the underlying assumptions that have inspired the design of the various policies, 
and an analysis on whether the objectives of these policies are meeting the requirements of 
a theory of change tailored to the context of the specific interventions at Member State 
level, preferably with a SMART (Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, Time-bound) 
measuring system. The extent to which this study can therefore assess the overall 
relevance of the EU counterterrorism policy is thus limited. 
This study will henceforth focus on evaluating the formal effectiveness of EU measures and 
policies and questions such as: “Have the measures and policies followed the right EU 
procedure at adoption, taking into account fundamental rights?” “Have measures/policies 
been implemented/adopted by Member States?” “Do the new measures/policies fit well in 
the national systems, not providing any controversies?”19 For the related questions on 
coherence, this study will also look into overlap and gaps. In order to make an assessment 
of the gaps in the policies and the relevance of the policies adopted, the next chapter will 
first elaborate on the threat development throughout the recent years and how that has 
dictated the policy agenda. Taking the above into account, this study’s approach is 
therefore aimed at determining: 
1. which EU policies, strategies, action plans, legal and other policy measures, bodies, 
units and agencies have been created on each of the seven themes covered by this 
study, since 2001; 
2. which agreements exist between the EU and third countries in the field of counter-
terrorism; 
3. whether the EU measures have been implemented in the legal and institutional 
structures of the seven focus Member States and, if so, how; 
4. to what extent the EU measures are implemented in the national practice of Member 
States; 
5. which loopholes, gaps and duplications of effort have arisen in the implementation at 
Member State level;  
                                                 
 
17 T.M. Franck, The power of legitimacy among nations, (New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press 1990), pp. 41-
49. 
18 See for example Curtin, D.M & Dekker, I.F., ‘Good Governance: The concept and its application by the European 
Union’, in: Curtin D.M. and Wessel R.A. (eds.), Good Governance and the European Union; Reflections on 
Concepts, Institutions and Substance (Intersentia: Antwerp/Oxford/New York 2005), pp. 3-20;  
Wouters, J. and Ryngaert, C., “Good Governance: Lessons from International Organizations”, in: D.M. Curtin D.M. 
and Wessel R.A. (eds.), Good Governance and the European Union; Reflections on Concepts, Institutions and 
Substance (Intersentia: Antwerp/Oxford/New York 2005), pp. 69-104 and Woods, N.,‘Good Governance in 
international organisations’, Global Governance, Jan-March 1999, Vol. 5, Issue 1, pp. 39-52. 
19 Beatrice de Graaf calls this “measuring performance” (Tansey, R., Evaluating an Evaluation: The EU Counter-
Terrorism Policy: Main Achievements and Future Challenges, QCEA Briefing Paper 13 (October 2011, p. 7). 
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6. what experiences practitioners –as retrieved through conducted interviews- have with 
cooperation between counter-terrorism agencies within and between Member States, 
and with the relevant EU agencies; and 
7. what recommendations can be made in terms of policy options for the future direction 
of EU counter-terrorism policy, looking specifically at how operational, technical and 
legislative tools could be optimised and how information exchange could be enhanced. 
With the first five points this study will therefore look into the formal effectiveness of the 
EU counter-terrorism policy architecture, as well as its coherence. The sixth point refers to 
a more subjective assessment of the relevance of the measures and policies as perceived 
by various practitioners based on the outcomes of the interviews conducted. Finally, and as 
mentioned in the seventh point, the research team has formulated policy recommendations 
to enhance the coherence and the relevance of the EU counter-terrorism policy architecture 
with the aim to improve both its formal and material effectiveness. Beyond that, this study 
will link the recommendations to outcomes of the future foresight analysis based on the 
trend analysis in the next chapter.  
2.2. Scope of the study 
2.2.1. Policy measures 
In order to limit the scope of this research project/evaluation exercise, the research team 
has limited itself to mapping out the current policy architecture and the policies and 
measures applicable to: 
 Terrorism; 
 Countering radicalisation towards violent extremism; 
 Foreign (terrorist) Fighters (FF); 
 Returning Foreign (terrorist) Fighters (RFF); 
 Travel and border control to the extent that these are used to prevent terrorism; 
 Judicial and intelligence data exchange, and judicial cooperation and law 
enforcement; 
 Cooperation with third states and institutions. 
For these topics, the research team has both looked at the policies and measures adopted 
by the EU, and – as mentioned before – the way in which implementation of these 
measures by the Member States has been realised (formal effectiveness). The team has 
only touched upon the question whether and in what way Member States have 
implemented these measures and policies. With regard to the issues of data exchange and 
judicial cooperation, the team has solely focused on the implementation in seven Member 
States (see Annex I). 
2.2.2. Focus on binding measures 
EU counter-terrorism policy and measures encompass both legally binding and non-binding 
measures. Binding measures encompass regulations, directives, framework decisions, 
decisions and international agreements. In terms of scope of this study, it was decided to 
put the focus on these binding EU measures and their implementation in the selected EU 
Member States. Non-binding measures, also referred to as soft law (as opposed to the hard 
law, binding measures) are for example action plans, recommendations, and sharing of 
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best practices. Whenever relevant, attention is also devoted to non-binding measures, 
notably to sketch the background for the binding measures or to explain what the EU does 
to tackle particular challenges where it does not have the powers to adopt binding 
measures. 
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3. THE EU AND COUNTER-TERRORISM: THREATS, TRENDS 
AND ITS IMPACT ON POLICY DEVELOPMENT 
 
KEY FINDINGS 
 The EU’s counter-terrorism agenda has been to a large extent ‘crisis-driven’, and 
was heavily influenced by various major shocks: 9/11; the Madrid and London 
bombings; and the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and; the 
terrorist attacks in France of 2015 and 2016; and the attacks in Brussels and Berlin 
in 2016. Since these shocks were all related to Islamic terrorism, this has been the 
main EU counter-terrorism focus. 
 The past ten years have shown a steady increase in the number of terrorist attacks 
in Europe. Attacks by separatist and left-wing extremist movements have been on a 
steady decline, whereas these last years show an increase in right-wing extremism 
and jihadist extremism. 
 Researchers agree that lone-wolf terrorism is on the increase, facilitated by 
increased availability of information on the internet and calls upon Muslims in 
Western countries to commit lone actor attacks in their countries of residence by Al-
Qaeda and more recently ISIS. 
 One researcher has estimated that 1 in 15 to 20 returnees poses a security risk. 
This was based on foreign fighters who travelled to the conflict zone before 2011, 
and it is very likely that the risks with regard to those who left after 2011 is higher. 
This risk assessment in combination with the expected increase in returnees due to 
the potential defeat of ISIS, makes the risk that returnees pose to the security in 
the EU a very substantial one, and certainly one that needs to play a prominent role 
when assessing the needs for new or revised policies.  
3.1. The EU and counter-terrorism: a historical perspective on 
threat perceptions  
This section will give a concise overview of EU terrorist threat perceptions, its impact on 
counter-terrorism policies and the reality of terrorism over time. Understanding the nature 
of a threat is crucial for successful counter-terrorism: if plots or actual attacks are 
misdiagnosed by intelligence agencies, “governments are less likely to invest to pre-empt 
future threats”.20 Understanding the developments in the past, the various different trends, 
and how things are constantly evolving, hopefully contributes to a better judgement in the 
future.  
The EU’s counter-terrorism agenda has been to a large extent ‘crisis-driven’, and was 
heavily influenced by several major shocks: 9/11; the Madrid and London bombings; the 
rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS); the terrorist attacks in France of 2015 
                                                 
 
20 Omand, D., “Keeping Europe Safe: Counterterrorism for the Continent”, Foreign Affairs (August/September 
2016), pp. 83-93. 
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and 2016; and the attacks in Brussels and Berlin in 2016.21 The compiled data in figure 2 
show the number of strategies, action plans and measures etcetera adopted in each year, 
clearly showing a steep increase in the years 2001, 2005/2006, 2008, and 2015/2016, 
illustrating the fact that the EU has a tendency to be crisis-driven in its policy response. The 
increase in adoption of measures, strategies etcetera in 2008 seems to be an exception, 
but can be explained by the number of revisions of earlier measures and strategies. Since 
the aforementioned shocks were all related to Islamic terrorism,22 this has been the main 
EU counter-terrorism focus. 
Figure 2: Strategies, action plans, measures etc. adopted per year, 1996-2017 
 
 
Source: PwC and ICCT. The years 1996-2000 are included to demonstrate the increase that started in 2001. 
                                                 
 
21 Data and information for this study was collected from 1 July 2016 to 15 December 2016. The attack on the 
Berlin Christmas Market happened after this date, as have other events and policy actions - these were not 
included in the analysis. 
22 See figure 3 (Global Terrorism Database) for an overview of terrorism-related casualties in the EU between 
2001-2015. The attacks in Madrid, London, and France (Charlie Hebdo and Bataclan) stand out: they were 
important catalysts in changing EU perceptions of and policies towards terrorism. Since the Brussels/Zaventem 
attack took place in March 2016, the Nice attack in July 2016, and the Berlin attack in December 2016, these 
numbers are not included in this figure, since the Global Terrorism Database still needs to compile all data over 
2016. 
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Figure 3: Number of deaths by terrorism in EU, 2001-2015  
 
 
Source: Global Terrorism Database. 
 
3.1.1. 9/11: terrorism as an external threat 
When the World Trade Centre (WTC) and the Pentagon were hit on 11 September 2001, 
terrorism was hardly a priority on the common EU agenda. 9/11 proved to be a turning 
point: a mere ten days after the attacks, in an extraordinary meeting, the European Council 
(EC) declared the fight against terrorism to be an EU priority objective. The attacks have 
allowed the EU to become an important actor in the fight against terrorism.23 24  
The terrorist threat at that time was perceived to be of an external nature and the Council’s 
Action Plan of 2001 reflected this, stating that “the fight against the scourge of terrorism 
will be all the more effective if it is based on an in-depth political dialogue with those 
countries and regions of the world in which terrorism comes into being”.25 Still, against the 
backdrop of the attacks of 9/11, the EU adopted the Framework Decision that criminalised 
certain offences in relation with terrorist activity, including the financing of terrorism.26 
Despite the gradually converging threat perception regarding terrorism within the EU post-
9/11, it was not until 2004 and 2005, when Madrid and London were hit by terrorist 
attacks, that a more coherent EU counter-terrorism policy would take shape, modelled on 
the “structures and processes of the most concerned and active states – namely the UK 
and France”.27  
                                                 
 
23 Bures, O., EU Counterterrorism Policy: A Paper Tiger? (Routledge: London 2011). 
24 European Council, Conclusions and Plan of Action of the extraordinary European Council Meeting on 21 
September 2001 (2001). 
25 Ibid. 
26 Council of the European Union, Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism (2002/475/JHA). 
27 Meyer, C., “International terrorism as a force of homogenisation? A constructivist approach to understanding 
cross-national threat perceptions and responses”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs 22 4 (2009), p. 662. 
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3.1.2. Madrid and London: the threat of home-grown terrorism and terrorism as an 
internal threat 
The Madrid and London bombings of 2004 and 2005 prompted the EU to develop initiatives 
to better understand the root causes of terrorism, ultimately leading to a singling out of 
radicalisation as the main focal point in combatting terrorism.28 The attacks did not “show a 
clear link with Al-Qaeda or any other global Salafi network”.29 In the London case, the 
jihadi terrorists were home-grown and to a large extent operated independently. This self-
organisation of jihadist terrorist groups, operating without consent or financial and 
operational support from a central terrorist organisation, brought about “an important 
change in the perception of the terrorist threat in Europe, moving from the almost 
exclusive focus on Al-Qaeda prevalent after the 9/11 attacks to home-grown terrorism as a 
product of intra-EU radicalisation processes and terrorist recruitment”.30 
Measures that were taken after the Madrid attack included the improvement of border 
control, judicial cooperation, and information exchange, as well as the appointment of an 
EU counter-terrorism coordinator (2004). The new Revised Plan of Action of 2004 sought to 
change counter-terrorism policy at the strategic level, by including a focus on the root 
causes of terrorism and radicalisation in the EU and the world. However, little would be 
done in this field until the London attacks in 2005.31  
Until the London attacks, the EU’s response to terrorism was “largely ad hoc and reactive in 
its nature, whereby a major terrorist attack provided the impetus for a sudden proliferation 
of counter-terrorism measures, only to be followed by decelerations and inertia once the 
memories of the attack began to fade”.32 ‘London’ brought about an EU Counter-Terrorism 
Strategy and parallel Strategy for Combatting Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism 
in 2005, which, while acknowledging that “much of the terrorist threat to Europe originates 
outside the EU”,33 reflected the reality of a ‘leaderless jihad’, emphasising the need to 
understand why people become involved in terrorism, as well as “identify and counter the 
ways, propaganda and conditions through which people are drawn into terrorism and 
consider it a legitimate course of action”.34 New in this strategy was its focus on preventive 
actions such as the disruption of networks and individuals who draw people into terrorism. 
EU counter-radicalisation efforts were to be extended beyond the EU, for “development 
assistance can help erode the support base for terrorist networks and movements”.35 The 
amendment of the Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA in 2008,36 adding several more 
activities to the list of criminalised activities, also showed a shift towards criminalising 
preparatory acts as well as incitement to terrorism, thereby underlining the refocus to 
taking preventative action, albeit of the punitive sort this time. In 2011, and following the 
adoption of the ‘EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a more secure 
                                                 
 
28 Coolsaet, R., “EU counterterrorism strategy: value added or chimera?”, International Affairs 86 4 (2010), p. 
869. 
29 Bakker, E., “Jihadi terrorists in Europe: their characteristics and the circumstances in which they joined the 
jihad: an exploratory study”, Clingendael Institute (December 2006). 
30 Bures, O., EU Counterterrorism Policy: A Paper Tiger? (Routledge: London 2011). 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Coolsaet, R., “EU counterterrorism strategy: value added or chimera?”, International Affairs 86 4 (2010), p. 
869. 
34 European Council, The European Union Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism 
(14781/1/05 REV 1) (24 November 2005). 
35 Bures, O., EU Counterterrorism Policy: A Paper Tiger? (Routledge: London 2011). 
36 Council of the European Union, Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA of 29 November 2008 amending Framework 
Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism (2008/919/JHA). 
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Europe’, the EU Radicalisation Awareness Network was launched as an umbrella network 
connecting first line practitioners from various EU Member States.37 
Until 2013, the EU counter-terrorism agenda would not change substantially. The Syrian 
civil war, the rise of ISIS and the Charlie Hebdo and Bataclan attacks, however, would 
prompt the EU to reconsider its counter-terrorism policies due to yet again a change in the 
threat perception. 
3.1.3. The Syrian civil war and ISIS, the foreign (terrorist) fighters phenomenon, and the 
attacks on Charlie Hebdo, the Bataclan and Brussel/Zaventem 
The civil war in Syria and rise of ISIS have attracted a large number of foreign fighters 
from all over the world, including the EU. While in June 2014 about 2500 European foreign 
fighters had travelled to Syria, this number has risen to more than 5000 as of November 
2015 according to Europol (other reports come to different numbers though, see for 
instance the Foreign Fighters Report by the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – 
The Hague (ICCT).38 The great majority of these fighters have joined extremist groups and 
about 30% of them have returned to Europe.39 While not all of these returnees will be 
terrorists,40 many of them have been exposed to sustained radicalisation and violence. 
Furthermore, even small numbers of experienced fighters can pose a significant threat to 
their homelands.41 Not only the situation in Syria poses a threat to EU Member States; 
developments in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, such as political unrest in 
Libya, enable ISIS to gain a foothold in countries bordering the EU.42 The nexus between 
internal and external security has with these developments become more prominent. As 
Figure 4 - based on the Fragile State Index - shows, Europe is surrounded by fragile states 
with low(er) levels of stability and facing various internal pressures.43 
                                                 
 
37 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, The 
EU Internal Security Strategy in Action : Five steps towards a more secure Europe (COM (2010) 673). 
38 Van Ginkel, B. and Entenmann, E. (Eds.), “The Foreign Fighters Phenomenon in the European Union. Profiles, 
Threats & Policies”, The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague 7, no. 2 (2016). 
39 Ibid. 
40 Hegghammer, T., “Will ISIS ‘weaponize’ Foreign Fighters?”, CNN Opinion (17 October 2014); Hegghammer, T., 
“Should I stay or should I go? Explaining Variation in Western Jihadists’ Choices between domestic and foreign 
fighting”, American Political Science Review (February 2013), p. 10.  
41 The Soufan Group, Foreign Fighters in Syria (2014) and Foreign Fighters: An Updated Assessment of the Flow of 
Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq (2015). 
42 See figure 2 for a map of Europe and its ‘ring of instability’, which constitutes a breeding ground for terrorism 
(Fragile State Index, 2014). 
43 See http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/. 
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Figure 4: Europe’s fragile neighbourhood, 2016  
 
 
 
Source: Fragile State Index44. Darker colours red indicate a higher ranking in the Fragile State Index. 
 
This threat from foreign fighters has been exemplified by two terrorist attacks in France in 
2015. The Charlie Hebdo attackers reportedly received terrorist training in Yemen, while 
some of the Bataclan perpetrators were EU citizens that had returned from Syria.45 The 
attack on Charlie Hebdo in January 2015 led the EU JHA Council to issue the ‘Riga 
Statement’,46 qualifying terrorism, radicalisation, recruitment and terrorist financing among 
the main threats to EU internal security.47 Clearly the threat is no longer merely perceived 
as an internal threat, but rather as a threat with three dimensions: internal, inside out and 
outside in. The investigations that followed these attacks showed the transnational aspects 
of the operative cells that prepared the attacks and the international support networks 
related to that. In response to the developments, the Commission in December 201548 
issued a proposal for the adoption of new Directive on combating terrorism, which was 
supposed to replace the previous mentioned Framework Decisions. This proposal intends to 
strengthen the Framework Decisions and add new criminal offences that address the 
foreign terrorist fighters phenomenon, including the receiving of terrorist training, travelling 
and attempting to travel abroad for terrorism, and funding or facilitating such travel. It is 
                                                 
 
44 Fragile State Index (2016), http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/. The Fragile State Index focuses on the indicators of 
risk and is based on thousands of articles and reports. A state that is fragile has several attributes, and such 
fragility may manifest itself in various ways. Nevertheless, some of the most common attributes of state fragility 
may include: the loss of physical control of its territory or a monopoly on the legitimate use of force; the erosion 
of legitimate authority to make collective decisions; an inability to provide reasonable public services; the inability 
to interact with other states as a full member of the international community.  
45 European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), Foreign fighters – Member State responses and EU action 
(2016). 
46 European Justice and Home Affairs Ministers, Riga Joint Statement, (2015). 
47 Europol, European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) 2016. 
48 European Commission, “Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on combating 
terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism”, 2 December 2015, 
COM (2015) 625 final, 2015/0281 (COD). 
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interesting to note that the explanatory memorandum accompanying the proposal for the 
Directive states that “this proposal is exceptionally presented without an impact 
assessment”.49 
The perpetrators of the attacks in Brussels in March 2016 also appeared to be connected to 
the earlier mentioned international support networks, though no conclusive evidence could 
be found in open sources. The sense of urgency with regard to improving the mechanisms 
of data exchange and mutual legal assistance were clearly felt, and the EU took further 
steps in proposing and adopting measures and policies related to the prevention of 
radicalisation, detection of travel for suspicious purposes, the criminal justice sector, and 
cooperation with third countries.50 Furthermore, the EU Internet Referral Unit was 
established and placed under Europol’s European Counter Terrorism Centre,51 as well the 
launch of the EU Internet Forum52 and the Syria Strategic Communications Advisory Team53 
(now renamed the Strategic Communication Network) to deal with the ever increasing use 
of the internet and social media by recruiters and extremist terrorist organisations. 
Moreover, and the day after the attacks of the Brussels metro station, and airport 
Zaventem, the President of the Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, launched the idea of a 
‘Security Union’.54 The objective of this new idea, which was subsequently put on the 
agenda by the Commission in April 2016, was to improve the coordination within the EU’s 
internal security domain particularly vis-à-vis transnational threats such as terrorism, in 
order to create the necessary infrastructure for national authorities to work effectively 
together, to close operational loopholes and gaps, and provide an environment in which 
national police forces will develop an automatic reflex to share relevant information with 
colleagues in other Member States.55 
3.1.4. The Nice and Berlin attacks and a series of small-scale attacks: rise of the lone 
actors and the weaponisation of ordinary life 
The attack in Nice in July 2016, as well as the series of small-scale attacks in inter alia 
Rouen and Germany that followed in the same month, have been second latest shocks for 
the EU and its counter-terrorism community, the latest shock was the attack on the 
Christmas Market in Berlin in December 2016. These attacks seemed to exemplify a shift in 
the threat assessments to the citizens of the EU: the rise of the lone wolf and the 
weaponisation of ordinary life. 
While there certainly remain gaps in the research on lone-wolf (or: lone-actor) terrorism,56 
there is a general consensus that “not only is it re-emerging, but current trends suggest an 
increasing threat”57 (see also figures 5-7). The lone-actor terrorist is not new. However, 
internet has made it easier for terrorists to not only disseminate extremist material at a 
                                                 
 
49 Ibid. 
50 European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), Foreign fighters – Member State responses and EU action 
(2016). 
51 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council 
and the Council, Delivering on the European Agenda on Security to fight against terrorism and pave the way 
towards an effective and genuine Security Union (COM (2016) 230 final), paragraph 2.2. 
52 Ibid. 
53 European Parliament, Answer given by Mr Avramopoulos on behalf of the Commission, EP Parliamentary 
questions (2011). 
54 Barigazzi, J., “Jean-Claude Juncker: EU needs ‘a security union”, Politico (23 March 2016).  
55 European Commission, “European Agenda on Security: Paving the way towards a Security Union”, Commission 
Press Release (20 April 2016).  
56 See inter alia De Roy van Zuijdewijn, J. and Bakker, E., “Lone-Actor Terrorism, Policy Paper 1: Personal 
characteristics of Lone-Actor Terrorists”, Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism Series No. 5, p. 4. 
57 Pantucci, R. et al., “Lone-Actor Terrorism: Literature Review”, Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism Series No. 1 
(2015), p. 2. 
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fast rate, thereby leading to radicalisation of lone actors, but also to more easily find 
already radicalised individuals and inspire them to launch attacks in their home countries. 
Conversely, it is easier for (potential) lone actors to find radicalising material and guidance 
for conducting attacks.58 The increase in lone actor attacks can be attributed to the change 
in tactics of Al-Qaeda, who after the death of Osama bin Laden in 2011 called upon Muslims 
in Western countries to commit lone actor attacks in their countries of residence.59 The call 
by ISIS at the beginning of 2015 echoed the same request.60  
Figure 5: Lone wolf attacks in Europe, 2004-2015 
 
 
 
Source: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), Global Terrorism 
Database 2016. This figure shows a steady increase in the number of terrorist attacks by lone wolves.  
 
                                                 
 
58 Ibid., pp. 2-6. 
59 Europol, European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) 2016, p. 26.  
60 Pantucci, R. et al., “Lone-Actor Terrorism: Literature Review”, Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism Series No. 1 
(2015). 
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Figure 6: Average number of deaths per terrorist attack worldwide, lone wolves 
vs. multiple perpetrators, 2004-2015 
 
 
 
Source: Global Terrorism Database (GTD) 2016. This figure shows that in the period of 2004-2015, lone wolf-
attacks on average have been more deadly than those perpetrated by multiple actors.   
 
The rise in lone-actor threats may very well be attributed to the effectiveness of counter-
terrorism efforts, pressuring terrorists to ‘tactically adapt’: the isolation of lone actors, 
acting without true guidance from and communications with a terrorist organisation, make 
them more difficult to detect and disrupt.61 In any case, the numbers suggest that lone 
actor attacks are on average more deadly than attacks committed by multiple perpetrators 
(figures 5-6), explaining the rise in concern with the various national security agencies. 
Adding to that concern is the infinite access to weapons if potential terrorists are no longer 
dependant on the criminal networks that need to supply arms and explosives, but can 
simply look into their kitchen drawer or turn to a car rental service to rent a truck, thereby 
weaponising ordinary life.  
To improve the cooperation between police and judicial agencies within the EU and the data 
exchange between Member States, the European Counter Terrorism Centre was launched in 
January 2016. In June 2016, under the Presidency of the Netherlands, the Council 
produced a ‘Roadmap to enhance information exchange and information management 
including interoperability solution in the Justice and Home Affairs area’.62 Finally, and 
although the Security Union still has to materialise, the Council of the European Union 
already appointed a new Commissioner for the Security Union, Sir Julian King.63 
                                                 
 
61 Pantucci, R. et al., “Lone-Actor Terrorism: Literature Review”, Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism Series No. 1 
(2015). 
62 Council of the European Union, Roadmap to enhance information exchange and information management 
including interoperability solutions in the Justice and Home Affairs area, 9368/1/16 Rev 1, (6 June 2016). 
63 European Council and Council of the European Union, Julian King appointed new commissioner for security 
union, Press release 515/16 (19 September 2016). 
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3.2. Long-term trends and future developments 
 
An analysis of the past ten years shows a steady increase in the number of terrorist attacks 
in Europe (figure 6), as well as in the number of deaths.64 The same goes for Europe’s 
direct neighbourhood and the rest of the world, but there the increase is more profound. 
The terrorist surge in Europe’s ‘ring of fragility’ (figure 2) – especially MENA – has had and 
will continue to have implications for Europe. Firstly, because of the rising number of 
refugees towards Europe, especially since 2015,65 but secondly because of the stream of 
foreign fighters moving to and returning from MENA, battle-hardened and having been 
exposed to sustained radicalisation. Attacks by separatist and left-wing extremist 
movements have been on a steady decline, whereas these last years show an increase in 
right-wing extremism and jihadist extremism.66  
 
Figure 7: Number of terrorist attacks in EU, 2001-2016 
 
 
 
Source: Global Terrorism Database 2016. 
 
Experts and security services expect these past developments, in particular the ones of the 
last two years, to predict a trend that will continue into the future for the coming five years 
with an expected increase of attacks. This is inter alia related to the fact that over a longer 
period of time, a very diffuse picture appears when it comes to the targets chosen by 
terrorists (see figure 8): although vital infrastructure as a potential target shows a constant 
pattern, targets such as the private sector, civil society, government or civilian locations 
                                                 
 
64 While in 2014 four people died in the EU due to terrorist attacks, in 2015 this number rose to 151. See Europol, 
European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) 2015, p. 8 and Europol, European Union Terrorism 
Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) 2016, p. 10. 
65 Data from Eurostat show that the number of asylum applicants in the EU surged from 626,960 in 2014 to 
1,322,825 in 2015. From January to September 2016, 944,275 refugees applied for asylum, outpacing the 2015 
numbers. 
66 The number of jihadi attacks in the EU increased from four in 2014 to 17 in 2015. While no right-wing terrorist 
attacks took place in 2014, in 2015 nine attacks were classified as such. See Europol, European Union Terrorism 
Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) 2016, pp. 22 and 41. 
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seem to be interchangeable with a decrease in one being compensated by an increase in 
another target. The same diffuse pattern comes up when looking at the historical 
differences in choice of weapons or means of attack (see figures 9 and 10). In a recently 
published report, Europol also signalled these trends and warned for emerging modus 
operandi, changes in target selection, and changes in profiles of perpetrators.67 In addition, 
Europol warms for the interest shown by ISIS in the use of chemical and/or biological 
weapons and the strong terrorism-organised crime nexus.68  
 
Figure 8: Terrorist targets in the EU, 2004-2015 
 
 
 
 
Source: Trend analysis by PwC and ICCT, based on the Global Terrorism Database (2016). 
 
And finally, the trends with regard to organisational background and patterns of 
preparation and planning, including the increase of lone-actor attacks (see figure 5) also 
show that the degree of variation among them is increasing. All of this makes it extremely 
difficult for security agencies to detect and intervene at an early stage in order to prevent 
these attacks from happening. 
                                                 
 
67 “Changes in modus operandi of Islamic State (IS) revisited”, Europol Press Release (2 December 2016).  
68 Ibid.  
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The relative success of the ISIS and Al Qaida inspired recent attacks on EU soil, in general, 
could encourage other potential perpetrators to follow in the predecessor’s footsteps in the 
coming years. In addition, the increasing military pressure on ISIS and the potential defeat 
of their strongholds in Syria and Iraq and the Middle East/North African region (MENA) in 
the coming years will likely trigger yet two other developments. From historical research it 
is known that increased military pressure on a militant organisation at first triggers more 
terrorist attacks in the conflict region itself and in other countries that are considered to be 
adversaries.69 Europol is also warning for this fall-out effect of the enhanced military 
pressure on ISIS.70 
 
Figure 9: Type of terrorist attacks, 2004-2016 
 
 
 
Source: Trend analysis by PwC and ICCT, based on the Global Terrorism Database (2016). 
And secondly, the potential defeat of ISIS in its current strongholds in Syria, Iraq and the 
MENA region in the coming years has immediate implications for the thousands of foreign 
fighters, including between 4000-5000 from the EU, that travelled to the region to join the 
ranks of ISIS and other extremist jihadist organisations. If they are still alive, what will be 
                                                 
 
69 For instance, the conflict Chechnya, the pressure on Hezbollah, the PKK, and the FLN. See also, A. Kurth Conin, 
A., “How al-Qaida ends; The decline and demise of terrorist groups”, International Security, 31 (1) 1 (2006), 
pp30-31; Frish, H., “Strategic Change in Terrorist Movements; Lessons from Hamas”, Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism, 32 (12) (2008), pp. 1049-1065. 
70 Europol, European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) 2016, p. 26. 
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their pathways?71 Will they stay in the region? Will they get arrested and prosecuted? Will 
they travel on to the next conflict or safe haven where what is left of the jihadist 
organisation will set up its camp? Or will they return to their countries of origin? So far, and 
as mentioned before, an estimate of 30% of the European foreign fighters have returned.72 
And if the latter is the case, with what intentions do they come back? Based on earlier 
cases, Hegghammer estimates that approximately one in 15-20 of the returnees pose a 
security risk.73 His research was based on those foreign fighters that travelled to the 
conflict zone before 2011, and it is very likely that the risks with regard to those who left 
after 2011 is higher. This risk assessment in combination with the expected increase in 
returnees due to the potential defeat of ISIS, makes the risk that returnees pose to the 
security in the EU a very substantial one, and certainly one that needs to play a prominent 
role when assessing the needs for new or revised policies.  
 
Figure 10: Type of weapons used in terrorist attacks, 2004-2016 
 
 
 
Source: Trend analysis by PwC and ICCT, based on the Global Terrorism Database (2016). 
                                                 
 
71 Bakker, E., Reed, A. and de Roy van Zuijdewijn, J., “Pathways of Foreign Fighters: Policy Options and Their 
(Un)Intended Consequences”, The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism- The Hague 6 no. 1 (2015). 
72 Van Ginkel, B. and Entenmann, E. (Eds.), “The Foreign Fighters Phenomenon in the European Union. Profiles, 
Threats & Policies”, The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague 7, no. 2 (2016). 
73 Hegghammer, T., “Will ISIS ‘weaponize’ Foreign Fighters?”, CNN Opinion (17 October 2014); Hegghammer, T., 
“Should I stay or should I go? Explaining Variation in Western Jihadists’ Choices between domestic and foreign 
fighting”, American Political Science Review (February 2013), p. 10. 
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4. MAPPING OUT THE EU COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICY 
ARCHITECTURE 
KEY FINDINGS 
 Prior to 11 September 2001, cooperation in the field of counter-terrorism was 
informal and not officially part of the institutional structure of the then European 
Community (EC). In response to the bombings in London on 7 July 2005, the United 
Kingdom (UK), holding the Presidency for the second half of the year, drafted what 
was ultimately adopted in December 2005 as the ‘European Union Counter-
Terrorism Strategy’. The Strategy has not been updated since 2005. 
 The added value of the 2005 EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy and its coherence with 
various overarching (the EU's internal and external security strategies) and sub-
strategies (e.g. on countering radicalisation and recruitment, countering terrorist 
finance, protection of critical infrastructure and customs) are unclear. It was 
concluded that counter-terrorism is a ‘composite’ policy area with challenges related 
to coordination, coherence, and consistency, and that it is not always clear who is in 
charge of these processes. 
 Currently, too many actors are involved in the design and implementation of this 
policy area, the tasks of the individual actors at times overlap. This is notably the 
case when it concerns strategies that can be issued by the European Council, the 
Council of the EU and by the Commission, making it unclear who is in the lead. The 
recently appointed Commissioner for the Security Union and the delimitation of his 
competences vis-à-vis the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator furthermore 
complicates the questions concerning coordination.  
 Certainly not helpful to this situation is the lack of clarity on the scope of the term 
‘internal security’, and the extent to which Member States are willing to call on that 
exceptional clause in order to give priority to their national competences. This 
seems to be at odds with the otherwise regularly expressed conviction that the 
nature of the threat of terrorism has a cross-border character, and therefore merely 
a sum of national actions would fall short to address the true nature of the threat. 
 In spite of assurances regarding more involvement of citizens in the preparation of 
new initiatives, of the 88 legislative initiatives regarding counter-terrorism since 
2001, in merely three cases a public consultation was performed. Only one quarter 
of the legally binding measures adopted since 2001 were subjected to Impact 
Assessments.  Particularly striking is the lack of an Impact Assessment where the 
new Directive on Combating Terrorism that is to replace Framework Decision 
2002/475 is concerned.  None of the Council initiatives have been accompanied by 
an Impact Assessment. The lack of public consultations and ex ante assessments is 
not compensated by ex post reviews or evaluations. 
 Seven themes are prominent in the EU policy architecture and explored in more 
detailed in this chapter.  
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This chapter outlines the EU counter-terrorism policy architecture. It begins by exploring 
the role and the place of the 2005 Counter-Terrorism Strategy and related documents in 
terms of the gaps these documents seek to fill and the overlap they might create. A similar 
question is posed with regard to the actors and their mandates in relation to counter-
terrorism. The chapter ends with an exploration of the developments on the seven themes 
as outlined in the introduction in terms of implementation and effectiveness. 
4.1. Counter-terrorism strategy as presented in general 
communications of the EU 
The EU refers to its approach of counter-terrorism as a ‘comprehensive’ approach.74 This 
section introduces and reflects on the place the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy has in the 
general communication of the EU with regard to security policies. This section begins with 
contextualising the need for a counter-terrorism strategy by discussing several earlier 
initiatives, both before and after the attacks on 11 September 2001. It continues to outline 
the components of the Strategy itself. It then situates the Strategy in relation to 
overarching strategies that place concerns about terrorism in a broader context of 
insecurities as well as sub-strategies on tackling terrorist financing and radicalisation. This 
section ends with reflections on this constellation of documents that together constitute 
counter-terrorism as a so-called composite policy area. The focus is on the official 
representation and not so much on how intentions played out in practice. 
4.1.1. Predecessors 
The EU adopted a formal Counter-Terrorism Strategy in December 2005. It is worthwhile to 
briefly revisit some of the broader historical context in order to understand that its standing 
as a distinct policy domain was not given (and neither will it be in the future). Counter-
terrorism was discussed among the Member States in the so-called Trevi-framework (1975-
1993).75 This concerned the exchange of information and best practices among police and 
judicial officials in the Member States. Cooperation was informal and not officially part of 
the institutional structure of the then European Community (EC). The Trevi-initiative is the 
first step of the European Community/EU in the field of internal security. The formalising of 
police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters under Title VI of the Maastricht Treaty in 
February 1992 referred to terrorism as one of the areas of concern.76 However, actual 
policy development in the context of what became known as ‘Justice and Home Affairs’ 
(JHA) focused on tackling organised crime, drug trafficking, and illegal migration.77 
Terrorism was, at least on the level of policy communications (European Council 
Conclusions), often seen as part of organised crime. The ‘Action Plan to Combat Organized 
Crime’ is a case in point.78 
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Matters changed in response to the attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States. At 
the end of an informal and extraordinary meeting of the European Council in Brussels, the 
Belgian Presidency presented ‘Conclusions and [a] Plan of Action’ which prioritised several 
themes: ‘Solidarity and Cooperation with the United States’, ‘The Union’s involvement in 
the world’ which linked efforts to tackle terrorism with the EU’s Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP), and ‘World economic prospects’ about ensuring economic and 
financial stability.79 The most elaborate theme was ‘The European policy to combat 
terrorism’, the first high-level EU intention to work towards an EU approach to countering 
terrorism. It focused on implementing the policy agenda on police and judicial cooperation 
formulated at the European Council meeting in Tampere, Finland, in October 1999. In 
addition, it asked for the implementation of international legal instruments on counter-
terrorism, highlighted the need to take action on the ‘funding of terrorism’, a strengthening 
of air security, and to coordinate EU policies regarding counter-terrorism. The approach 
focused mostly on the implementation of existing policies. 
4.1.2. The 2005 Counter-Terrorism Strategy 
After the bombings in Madrid on 11 March 2004 the European Council adopted a 
‘Declaration on combating terrorism’ which both called for the implementation of existing 
measures as well as the development of new ones.80 The Declaration was accompanied by 
an ‘EU Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism’, a long table or ‘roadmap’ for the purposes 
of monitoring implementation and creating an overview, and listing measures, the 
competent bodies, and deadlines.81 This roadmap was structured according to seven so-
called Strategic Objectives. These focused on: (1) international cooperation, (2) terrorist 
financing, (3) the detection, investigation, prosecution, and prevention of terrorist attacks, 
(4) transport security and border control, (5) adequate response capacity after a terrorist 
attack, (6) support for and recruitment into terrorism, and (7) a focus on priority Third 
Countries in terms of external action.82 The roadmap was structured according to these 
seven objectives. The seven objectives also show how the approach to counter-terrorism 
became more fine-grained and specialised into distinct topics. 
The organisation of the roadmap according to the seven objectives turned out to be short-
lived. In response to the bombings in London on 7 July 2005, the United Kingdom (UK), 
holding the Presidency for the second half of the year, drafted what was ultimately adopted 
in December 2005 as the ‘European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy’.83 It was the first 
time EU public policy documents of this nature began referring to ‘countering’ rather than 
‘combating’ terrorism. This might suggest a broader interpretation of what was needed to 
deal with terrorism as well as perhaps a more institutionalised approach since ‘combating’ 
carries a more ad hoc connotation. The Strategy was closely modelled on the UK’s own 
strategy and consisted of four so-called ‘pillars’: prevent, protect, pursue, and respond. 
Prevent concerns policies to anticipate people from “turning to terrorism and to stop the 
next generation of terrorists from emerging”.84 Protect is about better defending against 
attacks and the impact of attacks. Improvements with regard to (external) border security, 
and transport and other critical infrastructure is central under this pillar. Pursue refers to 
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“disrupt terrorist activity and pursue terrorists across borders” and revolves around the 
strengthening of capabilities for improved police and judicial cooperation.85 Police and 
judicial cooperation as well as countering terrorist financing are key aspects here. Respond 
involves dealing with the consequences of terrorist attacks and refers to crisis management 
arrangements. The Strategy has not been updated since 2005. 
The Strategy settles on the scope of counter-terrorism, but also positions it in relation to 
the values, goals and institutional procedure that governs it. The four pillars are preceded 
by a ‘strategic commitment’ that sets out the values and goals of the strategy: “To combat 
terrorism globally while respecting human rights, and make Europe safer, allowing its 
citizens to live in an area of freedom, security and justice”.86 The role and responsibilities of 
the EU as a counter-terrorism actor is then outlined. It clarifies that Member States have 
the primary responsibility for counter-terrorism, and that the EU mainly serves in a 
supporting role. This role is envisaged as (1) the “strengthening [of] national capabilities” 
through the sharing of information and best practices, (2) “facilitating European 
cooperation”, (3) “developing collective capability”, both in terms of understanding and EU 
policy responses, and (4) taking international action in the context of the United Nations 
and with third countries.87 These four strands are ‘priorities’ and not necessarily obligations 
for the Member States to follow. It brings up the question what role the strategy fulfils: is it 
an ‘inspirational sketch’, a ‘mission statement’, or a ‘basic reference point’ for policy-
makers?88 
The Strategy then outlines how ‘political oversight’, i.e. democratic procedure and 
accountability, is administered. The European Council should maintain political oversight. A 
‘high-level political dialogue on counter-terrorism’ between the Council, the European 
Parliament, and the Commission should meet every half-year to discuss inter-institutional 
relations. The Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), in conjunction with 
the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator and the Commission, is tasked with keeping an eye 
on the progress on the Strategy.89 
4.1.3. Overarching and sub-strategies 
The EU’s counter-terrorism policies are also part of a broader architecture concerning 
security. How does the 2005 Counter-Terrorism Strategy as well as affiliated sub-strategies 
fit within the broader EU security architecture and what does this mean in terms of overlap, 
gaps and effectiveness? There are several strategies (and action plans) that break up and 
situate the task of counter-terrorism across a range of fields. Documents detail the relation 
between counter-terrorism and critical infrastructure protection, customs, explosives, 
transport and air cargo security, and a security industry to mention a few. Perhaps the 
most important sub-strategies are those on countering radicalisation and recruitment, and 
countering terrorist finance. A ‘Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to 
Terrorism’ appeared in 2005 and with updates in 2008 and 2014. This involves to “prevent 
people from becoming radicalised, being radicalised and being recruited to terrorism and to 
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prevent a new generation of terrorists from emerging”.90 The emphasis is on acting before 
the threat materialises and the strategy stresses the participation of non-traditional 
security actors such as social workers and civil society organisations, and traditional 
security actors in a new role such as community police officers. Countering terrorist finance 
is expected to “make a powerful contribution to the fight against terrorism”.91 A strategy on 
countering terrorist financing appeared in October 2004, before the general Counter-
Terrorism Strategy in December 2005, and a revision appeared in July 2008, after which 
the Commission published an action plan in February 2016.92 Tackling terrorist financing 
involves the financial sector in reporting suspicious or usual activities to the authorities and 
underlines the need for these authorities to cooperate and share information with the 
intelligence and security services and law enforcement authorities.93 The sub-strategies 
work out in more detail specific aspects of the 2005 general Counter-Terrorism Strategy. 
Counter-terrorism is in this sense a ‘composite’ policy area; it brings together a number of 
different fields, ranging from amongst others the social domain, the financial sector, law 
enforcement, critical infrastructure, and border security.94 This brings up three questions. 
First, since there are many sub-strategies or action plans, issues of coordination, 
coherence, and consistency emerge as pressing matters. Second, who is in charge of these 
processes (see section 4.2 on the mapping of the various actors)? Three, what function 
does the 2005 Counter-Terrorism Strategy have in this regard?  
Similar concerns exist with regard to the overarching strategies. The EU’s policy activity in 
the field of security is structured according to an internal (within the EU) and external 
domain (outside the EU). Externally, the ‘European Security Strategy’ appeared in 2003, its 
successor - the ‘Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe’ – in 2016.95 Both 
documents listed terrorism among several other concerns. For instance, the 2016 strategy 
places terrorism alongside “hybrid threats, climate change, economic volatility and energy 
insecurity”.96 Internally an ‘Internal Security Strategy’ (ISS) was published in 2010 with a 
renewed version in 2015.97 Similar to the external strategies, both ISSs outline a broader 
insecurity landscape of which terrorism is a part together with “serious and organised 
crime” and “cybercrime”; the 2010 ISS offered several other issues, including “violence 
itself” and “road traffic accidents”.98 More recently, there were two additional initiatives to 
improve cooperation regarding internal security. The ‘European Agenda on Security’ was 
launched in 2015 in order to “bring added value to support the Member States in ensuring 
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security” by improving information sharing and the prevention of radicalisation.99 Following 
the attacks in Brussels in March 2016, the concept of a ‘Security Union’ was launched as a 
way to “move beyond the concept of cooperating to protect national internal security to the 
idea of protecting the collective security of the Union as a whole” and to this extent, again, 
emphasising the need to improve information sharing.100 Despite their different focus, the 
documents on the internal and external dimension share two underlying assumptions. One 
is the interlinking of internal and external security.101 The other – of more importance here 
– is the insistence on a multidisciplinary approach in dealing with threats and conflicts.102 
The overarching strategies thus seek to address the apparent gap of stand-alone strategies 
such as the 2005 EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy. At the same time, this brings up the 
question what the added value is of the 2005 EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy? Does the 
Strategy serve to signal the importance of the theme of counter-terrorism? Does it 
highlight the values guiding EU counter-terrorism policies? Or does the strategy offer mere 
‘conceptual guidance’?103 The various overarching and sub-strategies do not seem to foster 
the coherence that might be needed to govern in a policy domain so taken by events such 
as counter-terrorism. 
4.2. Actors and mandates 
In the previous section, the EU counter-terrorism policy documents were discussed. It was 
concluded that counter-terrorism is a ‘composite’ policy area with challenges related to 
coordination, coherence, and consistency, and that it is not always clear who is in charge of 
these processes. In this section, the various EU actors and their mandates are examined. 
Attention is paid to the actors responsible for setting out strategies and policies, for 
adopting concrete measures, and for applying and enforcing these measures. The way the 
EU actors normally operate in other EU policy areas (i.e. other than the areas under which 
counter-terrorism is dealt with) will be contrasted with the special characteristics of the 
way in which the work on counter-terrorism is organised. For instance, overlapping 
competences and unclear mandates can make it difficult to establish who is in the lead of 
specific actions, who is in charge of coordination etc. Furthermore, attention is paid to the 
manner in which the actors abide by their own guidelines on evidence based policy making, 
public participation and better regulation.   
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The main EU actors are the EU institutions, notably the European Council,104 the Council of 
the European Union (the Council),105 the European Parliament, the European Commission 
(including, since September 2016, the Commissioner for the Security Union)106 and the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). Besides these official institutions, several 
other actors are also involved, such as the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator (CTC)107 
established by the European Council in 2004 and Europol’s European Counter Terrorism 
Centre (ECTC), which was created in January 2016. 
Any action from the side of the EU actors needs a basis in the EU Treaties, as the EU can 
act only within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the 
Treaties to attain the objectives set out therein.108 In principle, EU competences are either 
exclusive or shared with the Member States, but there also exist special competences. The 
ones on counter-terrorism are shared competences that can be found in the provisions 
dealing with the EU’s area of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ), and special competences 
where the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is concerned.109 Given the complex 
underlying causes and background of terrorism, its overlap with several other societal 
problems such as organised crime and arms trafficking, and the clear nexus between 
internal and external security, the way the overall EU mandate is divided over two separate 
main working areas is historically understandable. Once EU norms are in place, the Member 
States need to ensure that they act in line with those norms.110 As a general principle, even 
if it has the competence to act, the EU actors are to observe the subsidiarity principle.111 
This principle requires that the EU only adopt measures where EU-level initiatives will 
better secure the fulfilment of the objectives in the Treaties than Member State action. In 
spite of the general applicability of the subsidiarity principle to EU action in all the areas 
where the EU does not have exclusive competence, it is specifically underlined that the 
principle also applies in the AFSJ.112 Since the Union also does not have exclusive CFSP 
competences, in principle the subsidiarity principle applies here as well.113  
The mandates of the actors involved in shaping this counter-terrorism policy demonstrate 
specific features when compared to other EU policy areas, which might be among the 
reasons why this policy area is widely regarded as complex, even after the changes brought 
about by the Treaty of Lisbon.114 First of all, it can be noted that where the AFSJ is 
concerned, the Union is reminded that the different legal systems and traditions of the 
Member States are to be respected (art. 67(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU 
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(TFEU)). This provision underlines that the Union is not to aim at full harmonisation of 
issues like combatting terrorism. This is confirmed by art. 72 TFEU, where it is stipulated 
that the exercise of responsibilities incumbent upon Member States relating to the 
safeguarding of internal security is not to be affected. The provision has been explained to 
constitute a safeguard clause that allows Member States to deviate from common decisions 
adopted at EU level, to the extent that they can prove that law and order as well as internal 
security are affected by such an initiative or action.115 Additionally, art. 4(2) of the Treaty 
on European Union (TEU) stipulates that “national security remains the sole responsibility 
of each Member States”. Another author said the article means that “any action at EU level 
will be complementary and subject to the principle of subsidiarity”.116 Yet another author is 
of the opinion that art. 72 TFEU merely confirms that measures are to be implemented by 
the Member States, particularly as regards coercive sanctions.117 Whatever the exact 
meaning of these Treaty provisions is, it seems clear that the area of combatting terrorism 
(notably where AFSJ is concerned) does not form an ordinary shared competence, but 
rather one in which the EU depends heavily on the willingness of Member States to move 
forward and the way that Member States interpret the term ‘internal security’, and want to 
call upon that exception.  
Normally speaking, the European Council is responsible for providing political impetus for 
the development of the EU. Where security is concerned, it is assigned more concrete 
tasks. In the AFSJ, it is to “define strategic guidelines and operational planning within the 
area of freedom, security and justice” (art. 68 TFEU). As for external security, it is to 
identify the strategic interests and objectives, where need be in the form of a thematic 
approach (art. 22 TEU). Hence, the treaties seem to designate that the European Council 
should be the lead EU institution where strategic matters of combatting terrorism are 
concerned. However, the Council also adopts conclusions setting out strategies and 
measures that need to be adopted in order to fight terrorism. At times, the Commission 
also adopts strategies on this topic.118 This overlap can lead to confusion regarding the 
question who is in charge of the strategies. 
Once strategic guidelines, interests and objectives are set out by the European Council 
and/or the Council, or at times by the European Commission, normally speaking concrete 
proposal for binding legislation are to be proposed by the European Commission. 
Extraordinarily, in the AFSJ, a quarter of the Member States can also initiate proposals. In 
all other cases, the Council (by a simple majority) can only request the Commission to 
submit a proposal (art. 241 TFEU); in a similar vein, the European Parliament can, by a 
majority of its component Members, request the Commission to submit a proposal (art. 225 
TFEU).  
The category of relevant stakeholders who need to be consulted in the process of Impact 
Assessments constitute an often overlooked and undervalued other actor in EU counter-
terrorism policy. In spite of assurances regarding more involvement of citizens in the 
preparation of new initiatives, of the 88 legislative initiatives regarding counter-terrorism 
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since 2001, a public consultation was performed in merely three cases.119 Impact 
Assessments should accompany any major initiative and describe impacts of initiatives, 
alternative options, and costs and benefits etc.120 These assessments can contribute to a 
more evidence-based approach in EU policy and law making. Unfortunately, in the area of 
counter-terrorism, the Commission has also not been forthcoming in subjecting its 
proposals to Impact Assessments. Only one quarter of the legally binding measures 
adopted since 2001 were subjected to Impact Assessments.121 Particularly striking is the 
lack of an Impact Assessment where the new Directive on Combating Terrorism that is to 
replace Framework Decision 2002/475 is concerned.122 None of the Council initiatives have 
been accompanied by an Impact Assessment.123 The lack of public consultations and ex 
ante assessments is not compensated by ex post reviews or evaluations.124 The fact that 
better regulation guidelines regarding ex ante Impact Assessments of new proposals, and 
review and evaluation of the functioning of existing measures have often not been 
observed, does not help in working towards a more coherent and effective approach. 
In the pre-Lisbon period, the European Parliament did not yet act as co-legislator in 
matters of counter-terrorism. As a result, some three quarters of the EU legislative 
measures adopted since 2001 were adopted without the European Parliament operating as 
co-legislator. Often, the institution was only consulted. However, after the adoption of the 
Lisbon Treaty, generally speaking the European Parliament received full co-decision powers 
in the AFSJ, with exceptions in cases related to specific and sensitive subject matters.125 
Where the Council is concerned, it was already mentioned that it meets in different 
configurations and that for each of these, the work on counter-terrorism is carried out with 
the help of numerous different working groups.126 Within the Foreign Affairs configuration of 
the Council alone, for instance, three different Working Groups contribute to the 
preparation of legislation: the Working Party on Terrorism (International Aspects) (COTER), 
the Working Party on the Application of Specific Measures to Combat Terrorism (COCOP), 
and the Working Party of Foreign Relations Counsellors (RELEX). Within the JHA Council 
Configuration, no less than five Working Groups help out.  
The Commission is normally in charge of executive tasks, but in the area of counter-
terrorism these tasks are often assigned to the Council. The Commission has divided its 
tasks over various Directorates General (DGs). The bulk of the Commission’s involvement 
with counter-terrorism lies with DG Home, but given the complex nature of the subject, 
other DGs are regularly involved as well.127 As of 1 December 2014, its regular task of 
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checking whether Member States abide by EU law norms was expanded to measures in the 
field of police cooperation and judicial cooperation adopted before the entry into force of 
the Treaty of Lisbon (13 December 2007).128 With the appointment of the new 
Commissioner for the Security Union, Sir Julian King, as of September 2016, with a 
mandate to strengthen the overall effort to combat terrorism, prevent radicalisation and 
strengthen the cooperation and data exchange ambitions, it will have to be seen how this 
actor will relate to the other actors on the marketplace of counter-terrorism, and to what 
extent he can take a leading and coordinating role. 
To complete the mapping of the various actors involved in counter-terrorism, one can add 
the position of the CTC, created in 2004 by the European Council as mentioned earlier in 
this subsection. It was declared that a comprehensive and strongly coordinated approach is 
required in response to the threat posed by terrorism, but it turned out that the mandate of 
the CTC is nevertheless limited. For instance, while the CTC is to maintain an overview of 
all the instruments at the Union’s disposal with a view to regular reporting to the Council 
and effective follow-up of Council decisions,129 he is neither entitled to oblige Member 
States to provide information to the EU bodies nor coordinate individual Member States’ 
national counter-terrorism structures or operations – though the CTC is able to name and 
shame laggard Member States.130 Clear improvements brought about by the CTC are 
lacking, according to some of the participants of this project’s Policy Lab workshop and 
others.131 In a study commissioned by the LIBE Committee in 2011 entitled ‘Developing an 
EU Internal Security Strategy, fighting terrorism and organised crime’, the authors already 
pointed out that it was not clear how the work of the CTC would relate to the work of COSI 
or the EEAS for that matter.132 More recently, however, others have pointed out that, 
despite the limitations inherent in his post, the CTC has made significant progress in the 
process of establishing himself as a fully-fledged counter-terrorism actor on the 
international stage, and concluded that the CTC is increasingly considered an important 
component of the external dimension of EU counter-terrorism policy by both Member 
States and third states and bodies.133 How the division of tasks and responsibilities between 
the CTC and the new Commissioner for Security Union will play out, was not yet clear when 
writing this study. 
In conclusion, when examining the actors and their mandates in the area of EU counter- 
terrorism policy and law, it is generally felt that the situation after the Treaty of Lisbon did 
not bring about more clarity. Currently, too many actors (see figure 11 below) are involved 
in the design and implementation of this policy area, and the tasks of the individual actors 
at times overlap. This overcrowding of EU counter-terrorism policy is especially clear when 
it concerns strategies that can be issued by the European Council, the Council as well as by 
the Commission, making it unclear who is in the lead. Furthermore, it is at times unclear 
                                                 
 
128 I.e. five years after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, in line with art. 10 Protocol 36 to the Treaty of 
Lisbon. 
129 Council of the European Union, Declaration on combatting terrorism, 7906/04, 29 March 2004. 
130 Wahl, T., “The European Union as an actor in the fight against terrorism”, in: Wade, M. and Maljevic, A., A war 
on terror? The European stance on a new threat, changing laws and human rights implications, Springer, New 
York Dordrecht Heidelberg London (2010), pp. 107-170. 
131 See Annex E. Also critical are Hayes, B. and Jones, C., Taking stock: the evolution, adoption, implementation 
and evaluation of EU counter-terrorism policy, in: De Londras, F. and Doody, J., The impact, legitimacy and 
effectiveness of EU counter-terrorism, Routledge, London and New York (2013), pp. 13-39, at 35 and 36.  
132 European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy Department C, Citizens’ Rights and 
Constitutional Affairs, Developing an EU Internal Security Strategy, fighting terrorism and organized crime, Study 
for the LIBE Committee (2011), pp. 72-73. 
133 Mackenzie, A., Bures, O., Kaunert, C. and Léonard, S., “The European Union Counter-terrorism Coordinator and 
the external dimension of the European Union counter-terrorism policy, Perspectives on European Politics and 
Society”, 14(3) (2013) pp. 325-338. 
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which responsibilities individual actors have, what the limits of their competences are, in 
which manner their interactions are to take place and who is in charge of coordination. 
Certainly not helpful to this situation is the lack of clarity on the scope of the term ‘internal 
security’, and the extent to which Member States are willing to call on that exceptional 
clause in order to give priority to their national competences. This seems to be at odds with 
the otherwise regularly expressed conviction that the nature of the threat of terrorism has 
a cross-border character, and therefore merely a sum of national actions would fall short of 
addressing the true nature of the threat. Furthermore, the dynamic of the six months 
rotation of the EU Presidency implies that expectations as to the European Council’s or the 
Council’s capabilities – driven by the ambitions of the various Presidencies – to design and 
follow-up on a long-term vision, strategy and implementation of action plans need to be 
limited.  
 
Figure 11: Selected actors in EU counter-terrorism policy 
 
 
 
Source: PwC and ICCT 
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4.3. Exploring the policy developments on seven themes  
The EU counter-terrorism policies cover a range of specific areas. There have been a series 
of legislative and policy proposals on: 
 border security; 
 terrorist financing; 
 firearms; 
 criminal records exchange; and 
 re-defining terrorist offences.  
In addition, the European Parliament identifies efforts to improve EU work on radicalisation 
and recruitment, notably through the Radicalisation Awareness Network, as an interesting 
area in EU counter-terrorism policy. Finally, the Parliament points to the challenge of 
improving information and intelligence sharing. 
While these seven themes can be analytically separated from one another, it is clear that 
they are also interlinked. Clear examples are the linkages between border security and 
information sharing, and between terrorist financing and re-defining terrorist offences. 
In the following section contains a short introduction as well as the research team’s key 
observations on each of the seven themes. In chapter 5, the team’s general observations 
will be presented, which include aspects above and beyond these individual themes. A more 
detailed analysis of each of the seven themes is included in the Factsheets for each theme 
in Annex I. 
4.3.1. Fora, measures and tools for operational cooperation and intelligence/law 
enforcement and judicial information exchange 
Various mechanisms have been developed at the EU level for engaging in operational 
cooperation and information exchange in order to assist in law enforcement or the 
management of migration. Most of these have not been developed specifically with a 
counter-terrorism purpose in mind. However, counter-terrorism is becoming a more 
prominent rationale in relation to cooperation and exchange.  
Following terrorist attacks, frequently political calls are risen for the need to share more 
information between the Member States. From the perspective of practitioners this is easier 
said than done. Sharing more information is not necessarily a good thing as it can produce 
data overflow. Of more importance in this respect is the capacity for analysis in the Member 
States to process the information. Several interviewees indicated that effective cooperation 
between Member States is dependent on how well different agencies (police, intelligence, 
security service, and judicial) within a Member State cooperate with each other. The degree 
of collaboration among agencies within the Member States varies across the EU. 
Another point raised is that the institutional and organisational set-up of police, intelligence 
and security services differs across Member States.134 Certain Member States have 
                                                 
 
134 See also European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy Department C, Citizens’ Rights 
and Constitutional Affairs, The EU Internal Security Strategy, the EU Policy Cycle and The Role of (AFSJ) Agencies. 
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gendarmerie-type police organisations (e.g. France, Spain and Italy) while others do not 
(e.g. the Netherlands and Germany). Certain Member States combine security and 
intelligence capabilities in one organisation (e.g. the Netherlands, Belgium, and Slovakia) 
while others have separate organisations (e.g. France, Germany, Bulgaria and Spain). 
Moreover, some security services are police organisations (e.g. Denmark) while in others 
they are not (e.g. the Netherlands and Germany). As a corollary, some Member States 
treat criminal intelligence (short cyclical) and security intelligence (long cyclical) as distinct 
processes (e.g. the Netherlands and Germany), while other Member States do less so. 
Moreover, agencies are bound by legal mandates which put limitations on what information 
can be shared with whom, in what form and under what circumstances. Effective 
collaboration between and among police, intelligence, and judicial agencies across borders 
therefore requires, first of all, a proper understanding of each other’s impossibilities. These 
requirements are exacerbated in terms organising such cooperation and exchange with 
third countries as they are generally not beholden to, for instance, the formal EU data 
protection framework and not regularly a part of the routinised structure of meetings that 
the EU context facilitates.  
Informal structures remain key in terms of information exchange and operational 
cooperation among member states, notwithstanding the formal policy architecture of the 
EU (EU databases and Europol). For intelligence and security services, as well as for police 
forces the most important information sharing platforms are informal non-EU structures: 
respectively the Counter Terrorist Group (CTG) and the Police Working Group on Terrorism 
(PWGT). The PWGT – in existence since 1976 – allows for the exchange of police 
information with a classification (Secret) that is not possible (yet) within EU structures, 
although SIENA was recently upgraded to allow for the exchange of information with the 
label Confidential.135  
Despite the existence of a formal policy architecture for operational cooperation and 
information exchange (see Factsheet A and B in Annex I for more details), trust 
engendered by personal contacts in other Member States remains an essential ingredient 
for effective cooperation. An interviewee gave the example of intelligence agencies who 
prefer to talk directly to the responsible police officer when sharing sensitive information 
rather than an administrative unit. Legal practitioners also use personal contacts to 
coordinate an approach to a particular case. The importance attached to trust and personal 
contacts puts limits on the extent to which information sharing and cooperation can be 
technologised through databases (see below). 
When it comes to implementation, informal channels remain important and are prioritised 
over EU information systems when speed and trust are needed most. In addition, there are 
differences in terms of how much data is shared with and how much use is made of these 
EU information systems, including Europol and Eurojust. The effectiveness of these 
cooperation and sharing mechanisms also relates to the Member States knowing each 
other’s limitations. 
                                                 
 
135 Council of the European Union, “Roadmap to enhance information exchange and information management 
including interoperability solutions in the Justice and Home Affairs area: - State of play of the implementation of 
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4.3.2. Data collection and database access and interoperability 
The EU has created multiple structures in order to facilitate operational cooperation and 
information exchange with regard to intelligence, law enforcement and justice. There is the 
recognition at the EU level that the plethora of different information systems is not helpful 
and interoperability is proposed as the way to increase more coherence.136 On the basis of 
the interviews it can be questioned whether the prominence attached to interoperability as 
a way to bring more coherence among the different EU information system forgoes several 
more fundamental questions. A 2011 study also highlighted these issues.137 
While interviewees reported that more use is made of systems such as Europol’s Secure 
Information Exchange Network Application (SIENA), not all Member States have the right 
infrastructure to operate the system. Moreover, in terms of implementation, the amount of 
information fed into these information systems also differentiated among the Member 
States. Another interviewee argued data sharing through these systems is mainly of 
reactive nature, e.g. in reaction to an attack. In addition, it has also been pointed out that 
SIS II and Focal Point Travellers (FPT) are useful for the purpose of investigation, but not 
well suited to, for instance, prevent the travel of (potential) foreign fighters. 
The information systems have been developed as a “solution for particular problems in 
specific areas”.138 An interviewee echoed this observation. Certain purposes for which, for 
instance the Schengen Information System II (SIS II), is now in demand (investigation and 
prosecution) were not foreseen at the outset. In addition, as can be observed on the basis 
of the legal mandates: certain systems have been designed explicitly for law enforcement 
goals (SIS II and the Passenger Name Records (PNR) system) while others have been 
repurposed for this end (European Dactyloscopy (EuroDac) and the Visa Information 
System (VIS)). Another aspect to this is the organisation of cooperation and exchange with 
third countries. Since EU information systems are designed to meet the demands of the 
Member States, need to facilitate the administration of common policies (e.g. in the context 
of migration), and are subject to EU data protection rules, cooperation with third countries 
will be a challenge.   
Moreover, several interviewees questioned the added value of certain systems (PNR) for 
the purposes of counter-terrorism. This means that in a changing context at different times 
different demands are placed on these systems. As a result, a continuous interplay ensues 
between system functionalities and the expectations they are required to meet. In terms of 
best practices as well as effectiveness, it is necessary to keep going an exchange between 
the users of these information systems in order to manage their expectations. 
4.3.3. Measures to enhance external border security 
Border management regards the entering of people and goods into the EU. In order to 
mitigate the risk of security risks such as terrorism cross the borders of the EU, border 
security controls are in place. The EU embraced the policy of performing risk based 
                                                 
 
136 Council of the European Union, “Draft Council Conclusions on an updated Information Management Strategy 
(IMS) for EU internal security”, 15701/1/14, 24 November 2014, p. 6. See also Council of the European Union, 
“Roadmap to enhance information exchange and information management including interoperability solutions in 
the Justice and Home Affairs area”, 9368/1/16 Rev 1, 6 June 2016, p. 2. 
137 European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy Department C, Citizens’ Rights and 
Constitutional Affairs, Developing an EU Internal Security Strategy, fighting terrorism and organised crime (2011), 
Study for the LIBE Committee, pp. 91-98. 
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controls, in order not to hinder the flows of travellers and goods too much. To facilitate the 
smooth traffic of people and goods, and with the availability of new ICT-solutions, 
possibilities are explored to perform a risk analysis as early as possible in the process of 
people travelling and goods shipping towards the EU. This is complemented by checks at 
the border.  
Most measures to enhance external border security are not solely developed for counter-
terrorism purposes, and the fight against terrorism is not even the main objective of these 
measures. Nevertheless, in many cases terrorist incidents or reference to the terrorist 
threat drove the development of many of the measures to enhance the security risk 
management of the EU borders for travellers and goods alike. The Advanced Passenger 
Information (API) Directive for instance helped combating illegal immigration and 
improving border control, but the (perceived or potential) effectiveness of API systems in 
enhancing border security and public order is less obvious. 
An important element of all measures to enhance external border management is the 
collection of advance data at EU-level and to perform risk analysis on persons and goods. 
The development of these systems is to a certain extent based on the assumption that 
Member States will use the data that is collected and/or generated in these border 
management systems to match with their own data. It is also based on the idea that 
Member States enter relevant data in EU systems (such as SIS II) so that an automated 
match can be made with data that is collected and/or generated in these border 
management systems. The underlying assumption is that Member States are able to risk 
analyse the data that is collected on people and on goods, preferably in an equal manner. 
This however presupposes that Members States possess the same data (in intelligence and 
police databases for instance) to match the data collected at EU level, and that they will 
come to the same conclusion regardless which Member States performed the analysis. In 
most of the impact assessments, however, these assumptions remain implicit, as remain 
the consequences if these assumptions prove not to be correct. Based on the feedback 
from experts and professionals in the Members States, this is not (yet) the case and is not 
foreseen in the nearby future. Most Members States have different databases, different 
legal regimes to collect and retain data and to match this data with other data or to share 
data with third parties, including to upload data in EU systems. Although a positive trend is 
recognised, the extent to which Member States are willing to upload data in EU systems is 
perceived to vary to a large extent. If EU systems contain far from all relevant risk 
information from all Member States, and if data collected at EU level is matched with 
databases that are incomplete of from various quality, then this gives rise to the idea that 
this effort is – in view of the objective to fight terrorism – not adding the value that it 
could. The effectiveness of all initiatives in the area of customs risk management thus still 
depend on interagency cooperation and information sharing between border management 
agencies, customs and other authorities at the Member States and EU level, and that has 
still to be developed. 
Experts and professionals in general do not call for additional systems to enhance external 
border security at this moment. They recognise the threat of returning foreign fighters, but 
they also believe with the current systems, a lot can be done already. One possible 
additional feature that could add value would be the possibility to collect biometrics (i.a. 
fingerprints) in SIS II and to be able to match these biometrics of for instance people 
entering the EU coming from countries like Syria and Iraq. In these countries, in places 
where ISIS was active, the coalition collected fingerprints from explosives and other 
military equipment potentially used by ISIS. These might be of use to identify returning 
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fighters in migration flows into the EU, and/or be used – if properly collected and treated – 
as evidence in court cases against foreign terrorist fighters.139 
4.3.4. Combating terrorist financing 
The EU policy regarding combating terrorist financing and sanctions aims at disrupting the 
flow of financial resources to and from terrorist organisations and individual terrorists. The 
two main strands of action are measures by which private entities that handle funds for 
clients are to ensure that suspicious transactions are reported to the authorities on the one 
hand, and the freezing of assets of persons involved in supporting terrorism (sanctions) on 
the other hand. Among the challenges in the oversight is the fact that there exist many 
financial means used by terrorists, from cash and cultural artefacts to virtual currencies and 
anonymous pre-paid cards, and that unnecessary obstacles to the functioning of payments 
and financial markets for ordinary, law-abiding citizens is to be avoided. 
The EU measures and national implementing measures regarding terrorist financing and 
sanctions, and their implementation in the Member States, were adopted in line with 
international FATF recommendations and Security Council decisions. Some EU member 
states and the Commission are members of the FATF.  Where cooperation with third 
countries is concerned, the EU-US Terrorist Financing Tracking Programme (TFTP) can be 
mentioned (discussed further under theme B). In December 2005, the Council of Europe 
Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism was signed by the Union. Furthermore, the EU 
announced it will provide technical assistance to Middle East and North African countries to 
fight against the trafficking of cultural goods, support these countries and South East Asia 
regions to monitor, disrupt and deny the financing of terrorism, deepen work to exchange 
information with third countries to make/sustain listings under EU autonomous measures to 
combat terrorism and will strengthen support to third countries in complying with Security 
Council legal requirements and FATF recommendations.  
Measuring the effectiveness of measures aimed at combatting terrorist financing is difficult, 
maybe because of the preventative nature of the measures. In the literature, a warning 
issued is that merely harvesting large amounts of data on transactions might form a 
disproportionate instrument, notably because of the costs it imposes on the private actors 
that are put in charge of identifying the transactions that might be linked to terrorist 
financing. The Commission concluded in its 2012 report on the application of the third Anti-
Money Laundering Directive (AMLD) that all Member States have implemented a national 
sanctioning regime applicable in cases of non-compliance with the provisions of this 
Directive, and that such sanctions are applied in practice. However, the variety in national 
penalty regimes was very large. Furthermore, the levels of reporting of suspicious 
transactions by some nonfinancial professions (in particular lawyers) were low compared to 
those of financial institutions, and the issue of under-reporting in some jurisdictions 
remained a concern, the report noted. Still, the framework appeared to work relatively well, 
and no fundamental shortcomings were identified. At the same time, in line with FATF 
work, it was concluded that improving the effectiveness of the rules formed an important 
challenge for the future.  
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Although the formal deadline for the implementation of the fourth Anti-Money Laundering 
Directive (AMLD) has not passed yet, it was decided that the effectiveness of these 
measures needs further strengthening. To this end, a new proposal has been presented by 
the European Commission. It aims at better accessibility and exchange of data, broadening 
the scope of the measures (e.g. virtual currency lower thresholds), improving the 
information on ultimate beneficial ownership and transactions with high risk countries. 
Where the latter are concerned, the Commission adopted a list of such countries with 
strategic deficiencies in their Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist financing 
measures that includes merely 11 states. In some Member States, it was discussed 
whether there exists a need to broaden the list. 
The fact that terrorism is relatively inexpensive means that terrorist financing measures 
that rely on specific amounts of money, even when that amount is lowered to 10,000 Euro 
per transaction or when entering or leaving the EU, might not be an effective means of 
countering terrorist financing. In that respect, the use of risk profiling might form a more 
effective instrument. Since the institutions that carry out the transaction monitoring are 
private entities whose primary focus is not combating terrorist financing, the further 
development of clear guidelines per sector is to be encouraged, as is the exchange of best 
practices throughout the EU. The need for information and guidelines is all the more 
important when rules are changed often within a short period of time (like is the case with 
the AMLD). 
4.3.5. Firearms and explosive weapons 
The Firearms Directive is the main acquis instrument on regulating firearms, creating an 
internal market for the sale, acquisition and possession of firearms. Member States enjoy 
discretion in regulation its specific details differently or more stringently.  
An increase is observed in the number of terror attacks involving the use of firearms. The 
EU regulation on firearms and explosives was driven by market regulation interests; it 
includes security concerns but does not sufficiently integrate the counter-terrorism 
paradigm. Available data on the size and scope of the illicit trade in and trafficking of 
firearms is not clear, the lack of which makes it difficult to assess the size and scope of the 
market and the impact and effectiveness of EU regulation. All Member States have 
implemented the Firearms Directive but details relating to administrative procedures 
concerning licenses, permits, background checks, age requirements, and also penal and 
administrative sanctions differ greatly. Amendments to the Firearms Directive is pending, 
the changes will introduce needed improvements, however the integration of a counter-
terrorism paradigm is questionable as the amendments focus on the stricter regulation of 
the legal firearms market. 
International cooperation does not fall within the ambit of the Firearms Directive. However, 
the EU does cooperate with third states on matters concerning this theme, most 
importantly in SEESAC to counter the proliferation of small arms in and from the Balkans. 
Best practices exchange relating to the Firearms Directive is unavailable; however, it is also 
questionable to what extend best practices could be suitably transposed under the current 
instrument. The EU firearms market and the policies on the export and transfer of firearms 
abroad are not aligned; this challenges both domestic regulation and foreign policy of the 
EU. 
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The introduction of guidelines on deactivation standards140 is a welcoming and much 
needed improvement, but a late development. The pending amendment of the EU Firearms 
Directive141 aims at introducing stricter rules on the certain types of firearms, marking of 
firearms and the trade and acquisition of firearms. While these additional rules may 
strengthen the regulation of the legal firearms market, it is questionable if these rules are 
able to curb the illicit trade in and trafficking of firearms. At best, it may reduce the flow of 
legal firearms into the illicit trade and trafficking. 
However, it remains a challenge to demonstrate the preventive effects of legislation. 
Furthermore there are already many unmarked and unregistered illegal firearms in 
circulation,142 which in practice may not be declared by their owners/possessors. The 
amendments reflect no measures on this matter. Hence it remains a question whether 
additional rules on the legal firearms market may reduce the illegal firearms that are 
already in circulation. Moreover it is unclear to what extent, if any, additional stricter rules 
would have a deterring effect on those involved in the illicit trade of firearms and the 
acquisition or possession of illicit and illegal firearms. Complicating the challenge of 
effective regulation is the fact that various data on the total number of registered firearms 
and licenses and estimations about the total number of firearms, including those 
unregistered and illicit, that are in circulation in EU Member States widely differ between 
reports143 and this may be caused by the many differences in definitions and the difficulty 
of assessing the scope of the black market in firearms. 
Furthermore, from the perspective of law enforcement on countering the illicit trade and 
trafficking of firearms, it may be the case that the EU internal market for firearms is mostly 
a legal assumption, but one failing in effect. The vast differences in definitions and 
procedural details144 challenges law enforcement and may induce forum shopping by 
firearms proliferators and traffickers.145 And underlined by one of the interviewed experts, 
legal acquisition of firearms is also a challenge as demonstrated by the fact that the firearm 
of one of the January 2015 Paris attackers and the magazines in the March 2016 Brussel 
attacked were acquired legally. Furthermore, the expert explained that culturally there is a 
divide between Western Europe and Eastern Europe that was formerly under communist 
control, as in the latter category countries firearm possession is seen as a form of freedom, 
in contrast to their rights under communist regimes when it was strictly prohibited. 
While the amendments of the Firearms Directive got on track after terrorist attacks in 
France, the current process has been driven by orientation of market regulation. The 
counter-terrorism paradigm and the use of additional policy-oriented measures to reduce 
firearms and to increase and improve law enforcement on this matter is not sufficiently 
addressed. The proposed amendment of the Firearms Directive may strengthen firearms 
regulation of the EU’s internal market for firearms, but it misses the opportunity, in the 
context of Better Regulation, to further standardise the definitions and details of the 
firearms regulation and to increase institutional cooperation between national agencies. 
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Moreover policy-oriented measures aimed at improving law enforcement are lacking, while 
they are much needed. To illustrate, one source reveals that in France between 2009 and 
2014 a reported number of 3910 firearms were seized by the state from a total number of 
1,900,000 unregistered and registered firearms.146 While this total number of firearms that 
are in circulation in France is not certain, it is improbable that the seized firearms cover a 
significant portion of the illicit and illegal firearms. In the same source figures collected 
from other Member States reveal similar low ratios, thereby indicating the challenges of law 
enforcement on this matter are endemic throughout the EU.  
Furthermore the drive to further regulate the internal market for firearms is in stark 
contrast with developments relating to the EU’s CFSP, as several EU Member States have 
started exporting/donating small arms and light weapons to non-state actors in the Middle 
East, most notably those in Syria and Iraq, thereby challenging, if not breaching, the EU 
Joint Action of 17 December 1998 on not transferring small arms to non-state actors.147 
The transfer of firearms to non-state actors in conflict zones may backfire as these arms 
may, in turn, feed the illicit trade and trafficking of firearms to and in Europe.148 This 
concern was also recognised by one of the interviewed experts on this subject matter, who 
stressed that many Member States have an arms industry and that such companies are 
increasingly more reliant on markets outside the EU as the EU has seen defence budget 
cuts. Hence there is a need to not only enhance external border control within the physical 
dimension, but also within the domain of policy by means of increasing compliance with the 
current policies and to further align CFSP and the internal firearms market. The interviewed 
expert stressed that former conflict zones are fertile sources for illicit and illegal trade in 
and trafficking of firearms. Furthermore, in the EU, cuts in the resources of law 
enforcement, in terms of manpower, budgetary or otherwise, may also be a source of 
challenge in countering illicit and illegal firearms as the expert stressed that the dilemma is 
in essence one of law enforcement capacity. In addition several experts underlined that the 
nexus between organised crime and terrorism poses a serious challenge, both in terms of 
financing the terrorists and feeding them with firearms. 
An increase is observed, as mentioned by one of the experts, in the use of firearms for 
terror attacks with Breivik in 2011, the Merah shooting in 2012, the Jewish Museum 
shooting in 2014, the failed Thalys train shooting in 2015, and the Paris attacks of 2015. At 
the immediate level it is necessary to integrate the counter-terrorism paradigm into the 
market governance orientation of the Firearms Directive. This can be achieved by seeking 
legislative amendments for the purpose of facilitating easier cooperation between law 
enforcement agencies. Such improvements may be achieved by further harmonising or 
standardising the procedural differences in licensing firearms possession and sales and in 
background checks, in improving legislation by means of more effective and less complex 
categorisation of firearms, and in exploring ways to harmonise or standardise criminal and 
administrative sanctions against violators. Use of policy-oriented measures, such as 
programmes calling for the registration of firearms, buying back unregistered firearms 
without criminal or administrative penalty, and other ways to reward illicit firearm 
                                                 
 
146 European Commission, Study to Support an Impact Assessment on Options for Combatting Illicit Firearms 
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Treaty of the European Union on the European Union’s contribution to combating the destabilizing accumulation 
and spread of small arms and light weapons, European Council, Joint Action of 17 December 1998 adopted by the 
Council on the basis of art. J.3 of the Treaty on European Union on the European Union’s contribution to 
combating the destabilising accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons (1999/34/CFSP) (L 9/1), 
art. 3(b). 
148 It is reported the weapons from former conflict zones may be the biggest source for illegal firearms. See for 
example Triebel, K., “Report: Impact Assessment on Firearms Directive”, Firearms United, (2016). 
Policy Department for Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 62 
possessors to register their firearms or to give them up, are warranted as only regulatory 
amendments would not suffice. Collaborative efforts with and internal checks by 
stakeholder groups, such as firearm manufacturers, shooting clubs, shooting sportsmen, 
hunters, collectors, museums, and other legal owners, may also facilitate the improvement 
of firearms control. Furthermore the internal market governance and the external CFSP 
need to be realigned to ensure that the EU policies are credible externally, effective 
internally, and to prevent blowbacks resulting from Member States small arms transfers to 
non-state actors. Finally, on the basis of the interviews, it is recommended that Member 
States analyse and register all incidents involving the use of firearms and explosives as 
such data is lacking, challenging thereby the ability for the Community to design tailored 
and measured risk mitigation measures. The crucial aspect of such measures would be to 
increase the procedural steps in the acquisition and possession of firearms, thereby 
increasing the opportunity and time for law enforcement agencies to detect, observe and 
intervene when (potential) terrorists seek to acquire firearms. 
Ultimately, however, it may also be necessary to reconsider the added value of pursuing 
and maintaining an internal market for private firearms, which is the main aim of the 
Firearms Directive. Amending the Firearms Directive is a welcoming pursuit, but one which 
requires reflection on a more structural and fundamental basis than what is presently the 
case. To treat firearms trade and possession as another form of market freedom is 
challenging and would not fit the international environment where proliferation of small 
arms continues and the number of destabilising states is increasing. Organised and lone 
wolf terror attacks in Europe furthermore amplify the concern. These developments warrant 
the EU to question what the added value is of the internal market for private firearms, how 
large and valuable this market is, what impact it has on stakeholders such as firearms 
manufacturers, shooting clubs, shooting sportsmen, hunters, collectors and other firearms 
owners, to what extent it burdens and blurs law enforcement, what the impact would be if 
the EU were to abandon such market altogether, what the alternatives are, and whether an 
alternative approach could decrease the illicit trade and trafficking of firearms within the 
Member States and facilitate better cooperation between them in retrieving illegal firearms. 
4.3.6. Criminal justice measures 
Criminal justice measures are the main repressive tool of counter-terrorism policies. They 
are used to punish, and increasingly to prevent, the commission of terrorist acts. In the EU, 
two Framework Decisions (2002/475/JHA and 2008/919/JHA), recently replaced by the new 
Directive on combating terrorism,149 require Member States to ensure that a number of 
behaviours in relation with terrorist activity are criminalised under national law. These 
include directing or participating in the activities of a terrorist group, inciting or aiding or 
abetting a terrorist offence, attempting to commit a terrorist offence, public provocation to 
commit a terrorist offence, recruitment for terrorism, and providing training for terrorism. 
Under the new Directive, further measures specifically address the phenomenon of foreign 
fighters by requiring Member States to criminalise travelling abroad for terrorism and 
                                                 
 
149 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on combatting 
terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combatting terrorism (COM/2015/0625 
final). On 16 February 2017, after the finalisation of the current study, the European Parliament approved the text 
of the new directive, see European Parliament, ‘Preventing terrorism: clampdown on foreign fighters and lone 
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room/20170210IPR61803/preventing-terrorism-clampdown-on-foreign-fighters-and-lone-wolves. The text of the 
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facilitating travelling abroad for terrorism. Other international instruments have also called 
for the adoption of similar measures (e.g. UNSC Resolution 2178, Riga Protocol), and as a 
result many states, in the EU and beyond, have adopted comprehensive sets of counter-
terrorism laws criminalising terrorism-related acts. 
Overall, EU measures on criminal justice are well implemented, and most Member States 
have criminalised terrorist behaviours in line with EU policy. Furthermore, many Member 
States have already implemented measures regarding travel as envisaged in the new EU 
Directive on Countering Terrorism and called for by other international instruments. 
One of the aspect which has been less well implemented is the definition of terrorism, as 
some Member States have not fully transposed the definition as formulated in the 
Framework Decisions. Besides, some Member States have been reluctant to implement 
specific measures on (indirect) public provocation to terrorism in view notably of concerns 
regarding freedom of expression. 
In terms of scope, criminal justice measures against terrorism include preparatory offences 
that are increasingly broad, so as to be able to intervene at an early stage and to 
apprehend new types of behaviours in relation to foreign fighters. While these measures 
could contribute to an effective repression of terrorism, the trend towards preventive uses 
of criminal law has also raised some concerns, as it can result in the overly broad 
criminalisation of acts that are far removed from actual terrorist attacks. 
In addition to criminal justice measures, some Member States are increasingly relying on 
administrative measures such as travel bans, exclusion orders, or assigned residence. 
These measures are sometimes used as an alternative to criminal justice measures in 
situations where prosecution would be difficult, for instance with regards to evidence, and 
can raise concerns when used to circumvent procedural guarantees associated with criminal 
prosecution.   
Cooperation regarding criminal justice is achieved within the EU through judicial and police 
cooperation (e.g. European Arrest Warrant, Joint Investigation Teams) and externally 
through bilateral agreements on mutual assistance and extradition. The EU entered such 
agreements with the United States, Japan, Iceland and Norway.  
4.3.7. Prevention of radicalisation 
Since one of the four pillars of the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy is the prevent pillar, 
prevention of radicalisation is considered an important aspect of the general approach of 
the EU to combat terrorism and countering radicalisation and violent extremism. Several 
strategies and programmes have been developed, which include inter alia a special EU 
Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism, a Media 
Communication Strategy, a Check-the-Web project, and an EU-wide Empowering Civil 
Society-programme. However, in terms of mandates, prevention of radicalisation is 
considered to be an area that falls under the sovereign authority of the Member States. At 
EU level, however, the various strategies and programmes, mechanisms, networks and 
platforms that are created are therefore merely to inspire and encourage Member States to 
develop policies and instruments on a national or local level. No mechanisms or reporting 
obligations are in place to monitor follow-up and implementation of the policy objectives 
that are formulated in the Strategy documents. In that sense it is impossible to measure 
the formal effectiveness in this policy field, let alone the material effectiveness. Introducing 
some form of a reporting system, would help increase transparency and enhance the 
exchange of good practices. Nevertheless, based on different overviews and compendia 
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laying out the various prevention programmes in place, one can in any case conclude that 
of the seven focus countries, only Slovakia does not have developed a dedicated 
comprehensive or specific counter-radicalisation strategy on state, regional or local level, 
and installed a specific task force or coordinating body concerned with these issues. 
The Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) Centre of Excellence (CoE) can be considered 
to be the main actor in place to give follow-up to the objectives of the EU and functions as 
a network to exchange experiences, collect good practices and offer training to first-line 
responders. Due to the fact that the framework in which RAN CoE has to operate though, it 
misses the flexibility to draft its programmes and training workshops in a manner that can 
meet the latest trends in the threat developments, and the subsequent needs of first-line 
practitioners to respond to these changes in society. Although 90% of the participants that 
responded to an anonymous survey conducted by RAN itself indicated that they expected a 
positive impact of their participation in RAN on their daily work in countering radicalisation. 
Furthermore it indicated that RAN is lacking a structured instrument to monitor how 
participants disseminate the good practices they picked up during the workshops into their 
own organisations, or to report back on what has been done with the good practices shared 
in terms of improving existing procedures and approaches within their organisations. 
The European Union’s Policies on Counter-Terrorism. Relevance, Coherence and Effectiveness 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 65 
5. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON RELEVANCE, POLICY 
COHERENCE AND EFFECTIVENESS 
KEY FINDINGS 
 The EU policy architecture in the way it is organised at the moment does not include 
a regular centralised update on the threats the EU and its Member States are 
dealing with, and the way threat assessments have implications for the various 
policies in place. Both Europol and INTCEN are dealing with threat assessments, but 
not in an integrated manner, and lacking the regularity needed to meet the 
constantly changing threats, and lacking the general public outreach to inform 
multiple stakeholders at the same time. 
 The counter-terrorism agenda primarily reflects the security concerns of Western 
and Northern European Member States around jihadism. Threat perceptions and 
counter-terrorist ‘legacies’ in Central and Eastern European Member States might be 
different. Moreover, the potential for political violence does not solely rest with 
jihadists as the attack by Anders Behring Breivik in Norway in 2011 showed.  
 The highly dynamic environment and asymmetric counter-terrorism strategy 
development require a policy architecture that allows policymakers to – 
collaboratively – respond fast to today’s challenges, while taking sufficient time to 
prepare for the evolution that takes place in society to be able to meet tomorrow’s 
challenges equally well. From the perspective of the latter, ensuring long-term 
counter-terrorism capacity and capabilities on all levels, and conducting strategically 
vital research on which measures are most effective, are some key elements the EU 
can contribute to. 
 The EU’s counter-terrorism policy architecture would benefit from making both its 
objectives and its underlying assumptions more explicit. In fact, the EU has been 
'widening the net' of counter-terrorism, by criminalising preparatory acts in the 
context of the new EU Directive on Countering Terrorism. This is considered 
ineffective by the experts that have been consulted for this evaluative study. 
 Counter-terrorism measures can have higher legitimacy - and therefore overall 
effectiveness - if critical human rights organisations are involved in the policy-
making phase, rather than making measures vulnerable to their criticism after 
implementation. Because of the risk of harming human rights, better oversight is 
justified. This could be achieved for instance through a modified mandate of the 
Fundamental Rights Agency, the European Parliament (‘s LIBE committee) or 
through an independent reviewer comparable to the one in the UK. 
 One of the recurring issues amongst practitioners and experts alike is the apparent 
lack of trust between services within and between Member States, accompanied by 
complex legal boundaries that hinder effective sharing of information. Particularly, 
the Commission's upon the Member States to “facilitate an information exchange 
hub based on the interaction between the law enforcement community and the 
intelligence community, within the framework of the CTG and the ECTC, in 
accordance with relevant EU and national rules and arrangements” (COM(2016) 602 
final) is one the findings of this study would support.  
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The analysis in the previous chapters brought to the front the tendency of the EU to mainly 
act in response to a specific crisis, as opposed to policy design that follows from careful 
analysis of trend developments, needs assessment to address a certain issue, evidence-
gathering on the specifics of that issue, and the expected results of certain policies, 
etcetera. Figure 12 on the next page lays out the timeline and the various strategies, 
policies and measures that have been adopted on the general aspect of counter-terrorism, 
but also on the various specific themes, as well as the EU bodies and platforms that have 
been set up. The timeline depicts a tendency to a reversed policy cycle, showing that right 
after the occurrence of terrorist attacks there is an influx in the adoption of measures and 
the establishment of EU bodies and platforms (see also figure 2 in chapter 3). No time is 
taken to conduct a needs assessment or impact assessment of potential new measures. 
This is only later followed by the formulation of general policy ambitions, the adoption of 
strategies, and action plans. At best, the development of strategies and the adoption of 
measures take place simultaneously. Many of the interviewees acknowledge this 
phenomenon, but also point to the fact that often counter-terrorism measures and policies 
were already waiting on the shelf for the window of opportunity that would generate the 
political willingness to (finally) adopt certain measures due to a (renewed) sense of urgency 
right after serious incidents, where political support was lacking before. 
This study’s analysis does show that the field of counter-terrorism is a composite field that 
has grown in an incremental and -in times- ad hoc manner, which furthermore represents a 
very crowded market place of various actors and stakeholders without clear strategic 
guidance to manage policies with long-term implications. The constantly changing security 
environment meanwhile does call for both a long term vision, and a flexibility to respond 
quickly to new developments which poses difficult and – in times – opposing challenges 
particularly to an organisation as complex as the EU. 
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Figure 12: Timeline of terrorist attacks and counter-terrorism strategies and measures, 2000-2016 
 
Source: PwC and ICCT.          Legend: 
 Attacks Data Exchange Financial
Border Justice General
Prevention Cooperation Weapons
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In this chapter, various observations are made that followed from this study’s research and 
were discussed during the interviews and the expert policy lab, and that relate to some of 
these particular challenges to stay relevant, coherent, legitimate, and henceforth effective 
as an actor in the field. First, the lack of an institutionalised practice to make regular trend 
analysis of specific threats in order to keep up with the changing security landscape will be 
touched upon (section 5.1). Furthermore, observations are made in relation to the focus of 
the EU with regard to the threat of terrorism, which seems to be biased to the priority 
threat perception of mostly Western European countries (section 5.2). Clearly, the dynamic 
of policy making in this constantly changing security environment brings along specific 
challenges, which are next touched upon in the section on fast versus slow track policy 
(section 5.3). In the following section, the importance of clear policy objective formulation 
and the need for evidence-based underlying assumptions when designing and adopting new 
policies and measures is elaborated upon, as one of the main outcomes of the expert policy 
lab which was part of the input used for the analysis of this study (section 5.4). This is 
followed by a section on the need to clear oversight on policies, which also came out as one 
of the main recommendations from the expert policy lab (section 5.5). Finally, and since 
this is considered a very important issue also in the eyes of the general public, there is a 
specific focus on the need for better information exchange (section 5.6). 
5.1. Institutionalising long-term future foresight or connecting 
threat assessment to policy design 
As mentioned in the chapter on the theoretical framework, this study intends to make 
policy recommendations to enhance the coherence and the relevance of the EU policy 
architecture with the aim to improve its effectiveness. In addition, and with an eye on 
improving the policy circle dynamic of policy design as well as of the current policy 
architecture, this study also takes into account the conclusions of chapter 4 that the EU 
counter-terrorism policy is mainly incident driven, and the fact that policy design is not 
automatically driven by regular and institutionalised threat assessment or future foresight 
studies.  
However, assessing the threats and possible future developments is not something that 
should be ignored. In fact, according to article 222, paragraph 4 of the TFEU: “The 
European Council shall regularly assess the threats facing the Union in order to enable the 
Union and its Member States to take effective action.” The terrorist threats that the EU is 
currently dealing with both have an internal and external origin, and both an internal and 
external impact. These threats, as well as the radicalisation processes to violent extremism 
of individuals, are very complex and constantly changing and changing even more rapidly 
nowadays than was the case some years ago. Furthermore, the (perceptions on the) 
threats differ among the different regions of the EU (see section 5.2). This makes it highly 
important to constantly check whether the assessment of the threats is up to date and the 
policies in place adequate to face those threats.  
Furthermore, and in order to stay ahead of the curve, long-term foresight studies are 
needed, to analyse the long-term trends, and to assess the likelihood that a certain trend 
continues into the future, whether it increases or decreases, or whether strategic shocks 
can be expected to drastically change the course of a certain trend. Based on both 
quantitative data and qualitative expert assessments, an inventory of the main influencing 
factors on the insecurities of the future can also be made, which provides input for future 
scenario planning, and can inform the policy planners on the specific issues that need to be 
addressed in order to contain the future threats. This kind of analysis can be done for the 
overall threat, but can also be informed by analysis on more specific themes.  
The European Union’s Policies on Counter-Terrorism. Relevance, Coherence and Effectiveness 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 69 
An example can be found in the area of weapons and explosives. Currently, many of the 
weapons and explosives used in terrorist attacks in the EU origin from the Balkan, and are 
clear remnants of the abundant availability during the Yugoslav war. Current policy-
makers, aware of this problem, are currently concentrating on getting a better control over 
the trafficking of these weapons and explosives, but are not (yet) necessarily analysing 
what the next hub of this form of trafficking might be. One scenario that might be worth 
considering, in this respect, is the increasing tensions on the Eastern border of the EU, and 
the continued activities of militant forces in Ukraine, and what those developments might 
mean in relation to weapons and explosives trafficking. Another example follows from the 
fact that while the EU is still developing policies to stop foreign fighters from travelling to 
conflict zones, the next urgent problem the EU will be facing is the steep increase in 
returnees that might pose a serious security risk to the Member States of the EU. In his 
latest update on the implementation of the counter-terrorism agenda the EU CTC 
henceforth stated: “The EU should as soon as possible define a common approach with 
regard to foreign terrorist fighter returnees.”150 And that concluded all there could be said 
on the topic so far.  
Looking at good practices in Member States, this study found that the Netherlands National 
Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (Nationaal Coordinator Terrorismebestrijding 
en Veiligheid, NCTV) issues a quarterly threat assessment report on terrorism, 
radicalisation and polarisation in society. This report consists of a (shorter) public part and 
a classified (longer) version, updating relevant stakeholders on the current threat level, and 
the current threats and policy concerns. In addition, the Netherlands Ministry of Security 
and Justice, the Netherlands Ministry of Defence and the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs commission future foresight studies of various risks and threats to society with 
several renowned think tanks on international relations and security studies.  
The EU policy architecture in the way it is organised at the moment, however, does not 
foresee in a regular centralised update on the threats the EU and its Member States are 
dealing with, and the way threat assessments have implications for the various policies in 
place. 
Currently, once year Europol issues a public report (EU Terrorism Situation and Trend 
Report (TE-SAT)) on the terrorist attacks that failed, foiled and actually took place in the 
EU, the number of casualties, the number of arrests etcetera. In addition, Europol identifies 
the key terrorist trends. These reports are considered “useful but (…) they are essentially 
compilations from state-provided data and there is no attempt to assess the threat posed 
by terrorism in them.”151 On exceptional occasions, Europol also issues specific public 
reports, like the recent one on the changes in the modus operandi of IS.152 In addition, 
European Union Intelligence and Situation Centre (EU INTCEN), which functions as the 
exclusive civilian intelligence capability of the EU, provides non-public information to the EU 
High Representative/Vice-President, the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the 
Member States for the purpose of informing the EU decision-making bodies in the fields of 
Common Security and Foreign/Defence Policy (CSFP/CSDP) and counter-terrorism. The 
focus of this source of information is mainly on the external threat. As far as INTCEN 
informs policy makers, the focus of the information is very targeted and not to provide an 
overall threat assessment and appreciation of the policies already in place and their 
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adequacy to the problem. Since this kind of information is furthermore not publicly 
available, it can also not be used by other bodies or policy makers that are mandated to 
cover other policy areas.  
In the April 2015 European Agenda on Security, it was pointed out that the Standing 
Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security (COSI) plays a central role in 
the way Member States can coordinate the common priorities and operation actions 
through the ‘EU Policy Cycle for serious and organised crime’.153 The Policy Cycle should 
provide a “methodology for an intelligence-led approach to internal security, based on joint 
threat assessments coordinated within Europol.”154 However, so far, both Europol and 
INTCEN are dealing with threat assessments, but not in an integrated manner, and lacking 
the regularity needed to meet the constantly changing threats, and lacking the general 
public outreach to inform multiple stakeholders at the same time. In order to provide for 
this need and to cover this lacuna, the EU CTC, to the best of his capacities, tries to provide 
summaries of the changes in threat assessments and makes an effort to communicate 
these to relevant parties. These briefings, however, lack the analytical information to back 
up the assessments. They are moreover not made available for all relevant stakeholders, 
and they can certainly not provide the input for future foresight analysis that is relevant for 
future policy design in order to stay ahead of the curve.  
One of this study’s observations is therefore that a proper threat assessment system and 
an institutionalised system to conduct future foresight studies are lacking, that would help 
avoid policy design that is mainly crisis-driven, and would help improve the overall policy 
cycle dynamic. It would therefore be recommended that with the coming into being of the 
Security Union, this point of a more integrated threat assessment will be further developed. 
5.2. EU counter-terrorism and differentiated Member State 
priorities  
The counter-terrorism agenda primarily reflects the security concerns of Western and 
Northern European Member States around jihadism. The key moments after which counter-
terrorist policies have been designed at the EU level have involved attacks linked to what is 
known as jihadism – the 2001 attacks in the United States, the 2004 attacks in Madrid and 
the 2005 attack in London. The recent policy output took place in response to the 2015 
attacks in Paris and Brussels in 2016. These attacks have taken place in Western and 
Southern European Member States, but the threat perceptions and counter-terrorist 
‘legacies’ in Central and Eastern European Member States might be different.155 Moreover, 
the potential for political violence does not solely rest with jihadists as the attack by Anders 
Behring Breivik in Norway in 2011 showed. 
The concern about foreign fighters, a prominent part of the EU’s counter-terrorism agenda, 
offers a case in point. Numbers compiled by ICCT show a stark contrast between, on the 
one hand, Member States like France, the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
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and Opposition vol. 42, no. 3 (2007), p. 300. 
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Denmark, Austria, Sweden and Finland, and, on the other hand, the remaining Member 
States. The former group has, both in absolute and relative numbers, a substantially larger 
share of citizens fighting in Syria/Iraq.156  
Bulgaria and Slovakia report, in absolute numbers, respectively less than ten and six of its 
citizens travelling to Syria/Iraq. All the other focus countries have well above a hundred 
each. Only in relative numbers would Spain (three) get somewhere near Slovakia (one) and 
Bulgaria (zero).157 But for Bulgaria and Slovakia, the numbers of citizens travelling to 
Syria/Iraq contrast strongly with the numbers of their citizens traveling to the conflict in 
Ukraine. For instance, around a hundred Slovakian citizens are reportedly fighting in 
Ukraine.158  
A similar dynamic is evident with regard to the theme of preventing radicalisation. For 
instance, with regard to Slovakia, concerns about radicalisation do not so much involve 
young Muslims, but individuals of far-right groups and involved in paramilitary groups. It 
was indicated that this was not limited to just Slovakia, but concern other Central and 
Eastern European Member States as well. This tends to be reflected in the set-up of RAN, 
including the experts invited, where the topic of jihadist radicalisation and Western 
European expertise tends to dominate. Approaches developed in Western European 
Member States such as community policing might not work well in Member States where, 
for historical reasons, there is no (strong) tradition of community policing.159 
5.3. Fast versus slow track policy  
Considering both the analysis in chapter 3 and the sections 4.1 and 4.2, the EU’s counter-
terrorism policy architecture can be seen as a strategy that is formulated and adapted in a 
highly dynamic context and in response to competing strategies of terrorist groups and 
individuals that also continuously adapt. This latter aspect increases the challenge of 
developing an appropriate strategy tremendously. Counter-terrorism strategy development 
has also been called “asymmetric”. On the day after a failed attempt on the life of Margaret 
Thatcher, the IRA claimed responsibility the next day, and said that it would try again. Its 
statement read: 
“Mrs. Thatcher will now realise that Britain cannot occupy our country and 
torture our prisoners and shoot our people in their own streets and get away 
with it. Today we were unlucky, but remember we only have to be lucky once. 
You will have to be lucky always. Give Ireland peace and there will be no 
more war.”160  
This statement also illustrates that while policy makers and executive powers can strive to 
deliver a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy, terrorists and their networks will focus 
on the weakest spots of the strategy to inflict damage and will continually innovate their 
tactics to make the most impact. Monitoring and predicting what those weak spots will be is 
therefore crucial in “staying ahead in the game” and effectively delivering counter-
terrorism. One area in which the effectiveness of EU-wide counter-terrorism policies is 
particularly sensitive is prevention of radicalisation and recruitment: if one EU Member 
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State is effective in preventing radicalisation and reducing its inhabitants’ vulnerability to 
terrorist recruitment, there is very little to prevent terrorist networks from changing their 
focus to another Member State, in which “social defences” are weaker or less-developed. 
Although of a completely different order, a similar challenge occurs when a large, 
established corporation finds its business paradigm – and as a result, its market share – 
challenged by small start-up firms that are much more flexible and entrepreneurial and 
attempt to come up with so-called disruptive innovations. Disruptive innovations are so-
called because they change not only the offering on the market, they change the market 
itself, or create a new one. Recent well-known examples of disruptive innovation are AirBnB 
and Uber, but many other examples have occurred in various industries in the past 
decades. 
Research in the field of strategic management has found that, while it is certainly not easy 
for large corporations to defend their markets and adapt to competing innovative start-ups, 
firms that are long-term successful in highly dynamic and competitive environments have 
one trait in common: they are able to combine innovation strategies that optimise for both 
the short and the long term and run them in parallel. The strategic management literature 
refers to this combination of concurrent innovative strategies as ambidexterity.161 
The lessons from strategic management literature also offer a relevant conceptual lens 
through which one can look at the field of counter-terrorism. In order to effectively deliver 
on a policy-making task in a fast-evolving and challenging environment, policymakers need 
to apply the logic of short and long-term strategies by designing a policy framework that 
allows them to – collaboratively – respond fast to today’s challenges, while taking sufficient 
time to prepare for the evolution that takes place in society to be able to meet tomorrow’s 
challenges equally well. Thus, ambidexterity in a policy-making context implies the ability 
to combine fast and slow policy-making. In the EU, the interaction between the centralised 
policy-making by the EU institutions and the decentralised policy-making by the EU Member 
States provides the opportunity for distribution of labour similar to that of a multinational 
cooperation: the headquarters ensure long-term effectiveness by conducting research on 
market developments and developing overarching and facilitating policies that apply 
globally, while the local branches optimise their effectiveness by responding swiftly to 
imminent local circumstances. 
Applied to the context of counter-terrorism policy, ambidexterity requires the combination 
of being able to respond swiftly and effectively to new developments in society, while also 
pre-emptively investing in the insights that will allow continued effective responses in the 
future. This implies the challenge of investing in both broad prevention (long-term 
effectiveness) and targeted repression (short-term effectiveness) simultaneously, to call 
out an obvious one. While obvious, this may not be easy if political preferences are to 
respond with visible (repression) measures to attacks, at the expense of reduced attention 
and budgets for prevention or intelligence investments, which as a result create room for 
the next attack. 
In light of the highly dynamic environment of counter-terrorism policy and evidence from 
the ambidexterity literature that strategic adaptability is necessary to retain 
responsiveness, it is remarkable to establish that the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy has 
not changed since 2005 (cf. section 4.1.2 of this report). Multinational corporations revisit 
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their strategies annually, and for good reasons: megatrends,162 such as climate change and 
resource scarcity, technological breakthroughs and shifts in global economic power, and 
changes in the geo-political context bring about changes in the global environment in which 
these companies operate. Those changes affect the drivers and capabilities of (potential) 
terrorists and thus require a response. 
The EU policymakers especially, given that they could and should have a strategic role in 
facilitating and empowering Member State competent authorities to ensure both short-term 
and long-term responsiveness to terrorist efforts and attacks, are in the best position to 
monitor the Union’s ambidexterity in response to an extremely challenging environment. 
However, as discussed in chapter 4, it is debatable whether they have the mandate, tools 
and information to do so at this point in time. Chapter 6 contains this study’s 
recommendations in the areas of improving the workings of the policy cycle, and 
specifically monitoring and evaluation. 
From the perspective of ambidexterity, ensuring long-term counter-terrorism capacity and 
capabilities on all levels, and conducting strategically vital research on which measures are 
most effective, are some key elements the EU can contribute to. 
5.4. Objectives and assumptions  
To be able to measure the effectiveness of certain counter-terrorism strategies, laws and 
measures (see section 5.5), it is imperative that the goals/objectives and underlying 
assumptions are clear. Indeed, during the policy lab’s brain-writing exercise (see annex 
III), which engendered no less than 120 ideas and observations on how to improve  
effectiveness and stay ahead of the curve in countering the financing of terrorism, the 
observation receiving most support from the experts was the question: “What is the 
objective of the measures?” One way of formulating a clear objective, whose effectiveness 
can subsequently be measured, is to make use of the already-mentioned SMART criteria. 
Admittedly, this is a difficult task in the context of countering terrorism. After all, what does 
counter-terrorism mean exactly? And can terrorism ever be fully countered? What are we 
trying to achieve? What is the EU’s compass when countering terrorism? Are the objectives 
perhaps too broad and not specific enough to be effective? In this context, it should be 
noted that perhaps instead of narrowing down the net, making the objectives smarter, the 
EU is in fact widening the net. An example is the criminalisation of preparatory acts in the 
context of the new EU Directive on Combating Terrorism,163 which moves away from the 
criminal act towards the ‘pre-crime space’ and which ensures that more and more people 
fall within the net of counter-terrorism. Also the experts of the policy lab did not consider 
this development to be beneficial for the effectiveness of counter-terrorism policies. 
                                                 
 
162 PwC has identified five megatrends, which significantly affect the socio-economic context in which businesses, 
governments and other organisations operate. Contextualised reports on the subject and other information are 
available at: http://www.pwc.co.uk/issues/megatrends.html. 
163 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on combatting 
terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combatting terrorism (COM/2015/0625 
final). On 16 February 2017, after the finalisation of the current study, the European Parliament approved the text 
of the new directive, see European Parliament, ‘Preventing terrorism: clampdown on foreign fighters and lone 
wolves’, Press release, 16 February 2017, available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-
room/20170210IPR61803/preventing-terrorism-clampdown-on-foreign-fighters-and-lone-wolves. The text of the 
approved text is available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+P8-
TA-2017-0046+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN.  
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Besides the objectives, the assumptions need to be clear. Clarity on the underlying 
assumptions was in fact the observation receiving most support from the experts during 
the policy lab’s brain-writing exercise (after clarity on the objectives). Do the assumptions 
of EU policy makers reflect reality? Are they evidence-based or are policies sometimes 
engendered by emotions and political pressure? As one member of the research team wrote 
earlier and elsewhere:  
“Sometimes, the necessity of these measures seems to be fully justified by 
the occurrence of terrorist incidents as such. For example, the first 
sentence of the explanatory statement to the LIBE’s Report [on the new EU 
Directive on Countering Terrorism] states that “[r]ecent terrorist attacks on 
European soil and beyond, and most significantly the terrorist attacks in 
Paris on 13 November 2015, with more than 130 dead victims, have 
underscored the need to substantially boost our efforts to prevent and fight 
terrorism”.164 But is that really so? Does one need to substantially boost 
efforts because these horrible attacks happened? Or does one need to 
substantially boost efforts because the current measures have proven to be 
clearly inefficient? One gets the impression that various measures have 
been engendered as an almost automatic and emotional reaction to 
attacks, fuelled by the demand, from both the public and especially the 
right-wing political spectrum, for harder measures, without first conducting 
a proper assessment and evaluation of whether the old measures were 
really that inefficient, and if so, why.”165 
To give another example, from the financial sector: is it possible at all to fight terrorism 
through banks when all that attackers need is a small line of credit? If there is a shift in 
terrorist financing (to various informal banking methods), should the countering of terrorist 
financing then not follow suit? 
5.5. Effectiveness and oversight  
As stated in the previous subsection, knowing what one’s goals and underlying assumptions 
are is essential in measuring effectiveness. Effectiveness should also be distinguished from 
effects. That the EU has impact or effects does not mean it is also effective. Although 
definitely a number of (evaluative) studies have been carried out on very relevant issues, 
such as the crime-terror nexus166, the policy cycle,167 the financing of terrorism168 and 
youth radicalisation,169 fully-fledged assessments on effectiveness remain rare.  
                                                 
 
164 European Parliament, “Report on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism 
(COM(2015)0625 – C8-0386/2015 – 2015/0281(COD))”, Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, 
Rapporteur: Monika Hohlmeier, A8-0228/2016, 12 July 2016. 
165 Paulussen, C., Repressing the Foreign Fighters Phenomenon and Terrorism in Western Europe: Towards an 
Effective Response Based on Human Rights”, ICCT Research Paper, November 2016,) p. 23. 
166 See European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy Department C, Citizens’ Rights and 
Constitutional Affairs, Europe’s Crime-Terror Nexus: Links between terrorist and organised crime groups in the 
European Union Study for the LIBE Committee (2012). 
167 See European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy Department C, Citizens’ Rights and 
Constitutional Affairs, The EU Internal Security Strategy, the EU Policy Cycle and The Role of (AFSJ) Agencies. 
Promise, Peril and Pre-requisites Study for the LIBE Committee (2011). 
168 See European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy Department C, Citizens’ Rights and 
Constitutional Affairs, Evaluation of EU measures to combat terrorism financing In-depth analysis for the LIBE 
Committee (2014).  
169 See European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy Department C, Citizens’ Rights and 
Constitutional Affairs, Preventing and Countering Youth Radicalisation in the EU Study for the LIBE 
Committee(2014). 
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Figure 13 shows that the number of reports monitoring implementation and evaluations of 
policies are indeed very limited compared to the sheer number of strategies and measures 
that have been adopted. This is a pity, as such evaluations might also generate important 
information when assessing whether additional measures are needed to address a certain 
(aspect of a) threat. 
Figure 13: Monitoring implementation and evaluations of policies compared to 
strategies and measures, 2001-2016 
 
 
Source: PwC and ICCT. 
 
How can effectiveness be measured? As explained in section 2.1 on the theoretical 
framework of this study, a simple and limited way of measuring the effectiveness of certain 
measures is by merely looking at formal effectiveness, i.e. whether Member States have 
implemented the measures in their national legislation. Measuring the material 
effectiveness of a measure is much more complicated. To give an example with regard to 
measures adopted in the criminal justice sector, one can measure the number of arrests a 
police makes, or the number of convictions a judge issues in counter-terrorism cases, and 
these data will surely say something about the effects of the measure, but not necessarily 
something about its material effectiveness. As stated before, the latter depends on the 
exact objective of the measure and how the measure contributes to the overarching goal of 
reducing the threat of terrorism. Since formal effectiveness also depends on the extent to 
which the mandate is followed, it is important that – as an intrinsic part of the mandate – 
the measures adopted are in line with the fundamental and human rights as laid down in 
the EU Treaty and the Charter of Fundamental Rights.170 This would moreover contribute to 
the legitimacy of these measures. Also the LIBE Committee has a task to oversee whether 
EU measures are in compliance with these rights. Examples are procedural safeguards, the 
right to non-discrimination and the freedom of expression. The early involvement of critical 
human rights organisations in the design of new measures will more easily lead to a human 
rights stamp of approval.  
                                                 
 
170 Since the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, according to article 6 of the Treaty of the European Union, the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights are part and parcel of the mandate of the EU. 
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In addition, the issue of oversight, the idea receiving most of the support from the experts 
during the policy lab’s brain-writing exercise (after clarity on the objective and the 
underlying assumptions), is relevant here. Indeed, adding up all the counter-terrorism 
legislation over time, one can see a huge potential for harming human rights, from freedom 
of movement to privacy rights, justifying better oversight. Although at the national level, 
there are various organisations looking into (human rights) compliance of certain 
measures, it was noted by the experts that EU oversight could also be strengthened, for 
instance through a modified mandate of the Fundamental Rights Agency, the European 
Parliament (‘s LIBE committee) or through an independent reviewer comparable to the one 
in the UK.171 This should be more than an institution monitoring the developments, but one 
that actually has the power to influence change. Oversight, moreover, should not be limited 
to the public sector: it is also required in the private sector, for instance when it comes to 
commercial data.  
Finally, the risk of mission creep, namely the expansion of a project or mission beyond its 
original goals, was stressed by the experts. This could influence the material effectiveness 
of a certain measure, not only because there is no clear objective/end goal, but also 
because there is less legitimacy, as powers/mandates have often been provided to serve a 
specific objective and not any other goal. 
5.6. Information exchange (systems and people) 
As the Commission wrote in September 2016,  
“… in the face of the terrorist threat faced today, the efficiency of security 
checks is highly dependent on the exchange of information not only between 
law enforcement authorities, but also intelligence communities. Effective and 
timely information-sharing among relevant authorities is a prerequisite for 
successful counter-terrorism action. But there remains fragmentation at both 
national and EU levels which can lead to dangerous security gaps.”172  
The Commission suggests that the EU level can add value by “helping to instil a culture of 
common responsibility, and the will and capacity to turn that into operational action.”173 
One of the recurring issues amongst practitioners and experts alike is the apparent lack of 
trust between services within and between Member States, accompanied by complex legal 
boundaries that hinder effective sharing of information. And to add to that, experts also 
point to an oversight deficiency: which body will oversee the proper sharing and use of 
sensitive and in many cases classified information, in order to safeguard fundamental rights 
as well as the safety of sources of information? To underline these concerns, many point to 
the lack of willingness to share data and information via the existing EU-systems. Some 
Member States’ services complain that some countries upload a lot of relevant data, 
whereas others behave as free riders.174 One Member State agency mentioned that they 
upload loads of data into e.g. Europol systems, but when searching these systems they end 
                                                 
 
171 At this point, it is also important to note that already in earlier reports, the limited role of the European 
Parliament in terms of oversight and monitoring has been stressed, see e.g., European Parliament, Directorate-
General for Internal Policies, Policy Department C, Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, Developing an EU 
Internal Security Strategy, fighting terrorism and organised crime, (2011) pp. 119-120. 
172 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council 
and the Council, Enhancing security in a world of mobility: improved information exchange in the fight against 
terrorism and stronger external borders (COM(2016) 602 final). 
173 Ibid. 
174 The research team was not able to assess the volumes of data and information uploaded in the respective 
systems by the different Member States to substantiate these remarks. 
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up finding their own data. At the same time, some practitioners emphasise the fact that 
there is not a lack of data and information, and that sharing too much can produce a data 
overload. Moreover, data quality is also an issue: only data of good quality is helpful. After 
all, all the data and information have to be analysed and although big data and software 
can be helpful, a lot of manual processing and analysis has to be carried out. It can be 
helpful, but this is not always the case. Having the sufficient people with the right analytical 
skills can make a lot of difference.  
On the EU level, some interesting developments have occurred in recent years. In parallel 
to the evolution of Europol’s European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC), the Counter 
Terrorism Group (CTG) has been strengthened in 2016 by introducing a common platform 
for the exchange of information between Member States’ security services,175 accompanied 
by secure infrastructure for timely and safe communication. According to the Commission, 
it is now urgent to reinforce the two tracks of the ECTC and the CTG, keeping them 
separate but linking the two communities, which would add up to an effective counter-
terrorism cooperation framework in Europe, without the need for new structures. The 
Commission therefore calls upon the Member States to “facilitate an information exchange 
hub based on the interaction between the law enforcement community and the intelligence 
community, within the framework of the CTG and the ECTC, in accordance with relevant EU 
and national rules and arrangements.”176 The geographical vicinity (less than 15 
kilometres) of both the ECTC and the CTG-platform177 might give rise to the attractiveness 
of such a practical solution: the physical nearness of the two platforms, populated with 
experts from the cooperating Member States, might facilitate an easy interaction between 
the two communities without the necessity to technically link the two platforms. However, 
it is a vast leap between interaction between the two communities and an ‘information 
exchange hub’. Information exchange on a structured base in a hub between law 
enforcement and intelligence can only be envisaged after challenges have been overcome, 
such as the legal obstacles in sharing information between police and intelligence services, 
the use of intelligence in court cases with respect to the fair trial principles, and the legal 
guarantees that should therefore be built in the system which are different in every 
national jurisdiction.  
Another challenge to overcome in linking the ECTC and the CTG-platform is that the 
difference between intelligence and police information is not evenly clear in all countries, 
and in several instances the different police and security services within one Member State 
have difficulties in cooperating with each other within the national boundaries. Practitioners 
and experts point to the fact that a seamless internal cooperation between the law 
enforcement agencies and security and intelligence services is key for achieving good 
international cooperation in a security union. Another point that has been raised is the fact 
that police and intelligence work are different in many respects and should remain 
different. Police work has a short cycle and is primarily focused on investigating a case, 
arresting suspects and bringing them to justice. A public and transparent criminal 
investigation which is founded on elements like the verifiability of sources and evidence is 
essential in the European legal order. Intelligence work on the other hand is not held to the 
same guarantees as a criminal investigation, is bound to the principles of secrecy and 
                                                 
 
175 See Algemene Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst, “Nieuw platform voor verdere intensivering samenwerking 
Europese inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten”, (25 January 2016). 
176 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council 
and the Council, Enhancing security in a world of mobility: improved information exchange in the fight against 
terrorism and stronger external borders (COM(2016) 602 final). 
177 The ECTC with Europol in The Hague, the CTG platform with the Dutch General Intelligence and Security 
Service (AIVD) in Zoetermeer, also in the Netherlands. 
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protection of sources and is focused more on the long-term developments, on identifying 
and countering evolving threats. So, a too close cooperation in a physical hub could lead – 
next to all kinds of legal complexities, given the different legal contexts under which 
information has been collected – to practical issues around how to prioritise the use of 
intelligence and information: solely for investigation, arrests and prosecution, or also for 
the analysis of the evolving threats. 
What interviewees perceive as very positive in the current development of both the ECTC 
and the CTG-platform is the focus on bringing experts from different services in different 
Member States together to assess the intelligence and information that is available to both 
the platforms within the context of the service that has collected it. Jointly they can assess 
the need to share specific intelligence or information and under what circumstances. This 
helps to prevent an information overload: the need to know and the need to share is 
assessed upfront, rather than by default (and currently, it is not always clear what 
information is relevant to whom). Moreover, it helps to put data and information in 
perspective, rather than treat any data and information only in the context of the receiving 
party. And finally – as many practitioners mentioned – it helps to shift the focus from yet 
another system or database to a more needs-based approach. Another factor that might 
add value is that in the cooperation in these platforms, the differences in maturity between 
services becomes more apparent, and that it provides a peer-to-peer context to help 
improve the level of maturity of the less developed services. And with an equal level of 
maturity, knowledge and capabilities and with improved information exchange within the 
framework of the CTG and the ECTC, in accordance with relevant EU and national rules and 
arrangements, the EU creates a better back office with more equal levels of intelligence and 
data in all Member States and the capabilities to match those with data e.g. collected inter 
alia for counter-terrorism purposes in border management systems and financial tracking 
programmes.  
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6. CONCLUDING REMARKS, GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
AND POLICY OPTIONS 
 
The necessity for effective, legitimate and timely EU cooperation to face the constantly 
evolving threat of terrorism, was never felt more urgently. There is no doubt that the EU 
and its Member States are acting on many fields addressing various aspects of the threat, 
but the central question in this study was whether this is done in an effective, coherent and 
legitimate manner. 
When assessing the developments with regard to the terrorism threats as well as the policy 
design and implementation over time, the question of whether we have truly moved ahead 
since the first steps were taken with the Trevi process that set up an informal and non-
official network for cooperation, becomes prominent. Although the scope of the policy fields 
related to counter-terrorism, like AFSJ and CFSP, have been deepened and the mandate 
expanded for the EU (institutions), the subsidiarity principle still applies, as well as the 
exception clause related to issues concerning internal security, allowing Member States to 
call upon their national sovereignty and deviate from the EU policy line.  
Whether the EU can set out a clear vision and provide guidance and leadership, and in its 
policy design is grounded on a thorough threat, trend and evidence-based analysis to 
assess policy needs and expected impact of policies, can be highly debated. Considering the 
plethora of sub-strategies, action plans, and overlapping policy fields with multiple 
measures, the question arises whether the EU counter-terrorism strategy indeed brings the 
strategic “conceptual guidance”178 and the framework to tie all the sub policy fields 
together, meanwhile ensuring coherence and consistency and to serve both the short and 
long-term security concerns in an effective manner in order to stay relevant. Instead, the 
effect of the sub-strategies (as well as the action plans) is to break up counter-terrorism in 
a number of ‘composite’ parts and embedding them across a range of different policy fields, 
ranging from amongst others the social domain, the financial sector, law enforcement, 
critical infrastructure, and border security. Many interviewees furthermore lamented that 
the perpetual reflex to propose new measures was not what they felt they needed most to 
effectively operate in their field of expertise, and that rather this energy be used for better 
implementing of what is already there. The analysis of the various different policy fields 
have pointed to some overlap and gaps in policies, and although recommendations can be 
made to address those issues, it might be more important to go back to the drawing table 
and redesign the entire policy field, to start with a clean slate and reassess what works and 
what does not. Maybe it is advisable to include this in the European Agenda on Security, 
and make this one of the objectives of the Security Union. 
Meanwhile, the overarching strategies have performed a similar function by linking counter-
terrorism with the EU’s CFSP and by stressing not only the linkages across international 
borders and thereby blurring the line between internal and external security as well as with 
other insecurities such as (organised) crime. This brings up questions of where the 
boundaries are of the counter-terrorism domain. Whether to address this through 
superimposing documents such as the 2015 ‘Internal Security Strategy’ with its emphasis 
                                                 
 
178 Argomaniz, J., The EU and Counter-Terrorism: Politics, polity and policies after 9/11. London: Abingdon and 
London (2011), p. 100. 
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on an “integrative and complementary approach” can be questioned as it only tends to shift 
the problem to a higher level and creating the same concerns anew.179 
However, the constantly evolving security environment, which requires a simultaneous 
short-term and long-term responsiveness, requires the EU to show qualities of 
ambidexterity. For that to work out, it would at least be necessary to know who is in the 
lead of the overall strategy and coordination of activities, but the current situation rather 
shows a very crowded market place with too many actors involved in the design and 
implementation of the various policies, and at times with even overlapping mandates. It is 
to be hoped that the newly appointed Commissioner on the Security Union can take up this 
role. But even then, due to the dynamic of the six months rotation of the EU Presidency, 
the European Council’s or the Council’s capabilities to design and follow-up on a long-term 
vision shaped and driven by the ambitions of one particular Presidency, will remain limited, 
unless this system is changed for the benefit of thematic Member State Presidencies that 
can last a longer term. 
Furthermore, when looking at the effectiveness in terms of cooperation in the various policy 
fields, it became clear from the interviews that there is a formal channel to cooperate, as 
well as an informal channel and that the latter is extremely important and hence should be 
strengthened, rather than creating yet another framework for cooperation or data sharing.  
In order to improve the current policy architecture, both the formal and material 
effectiveness of the policies and the overall coherence and relevance of the policies, this 
study suggests, based on its own research, the outcomes of the interviews and the results 
of the policy lab, a series of recommendations and policy options that should moreover 
contribute to the EU’s overall ambition formulated in the Better Regulation agenda. The 
first category of recommendations and policy options concerns the improvement of the 
policy cycle, ensuring that policies are designed in accordance with evidence-based 
underlying assumptions as to their effects, in a timely and ahead-of-the-curve response to 
threats that are not yet addressed otherwise, properly balanced with fundamental rights, 
and regularly evaluated as to their effectiveness vis-à-vis the underlying and explicitly 
formulated policy objectives. The second category of recommendations and policy options 
are more tailor-made to the selected seven sub-themes. 
6.1. Improving the policy cycle and effectiveness of EU counter-
terrorism policies: recommendations and policy options   
 
1. In general, the EU is advised to explore its existing capabilities to the full. Instead of 
mainly adopting policies/measures in the wake of incidents that may be outdated the 
moment they are implemented, the EU should improve the use of the tools it already 
has in place and connect the different stakeholders and dots, such as the earlier-
mentioned crime-terror nexus. The EU should prefer evidence-based policy and law-
making, involvement of citizens and stakeholders and transparency throughout the 
process. This implies quality over quantity, meaning for example that it should 
improve data exchange (think of a better/easier/simplified use of the existing (but 
currently underused) databases), rather than support the collection of more data.  
                                                 
 
179 Council of the European Union, “Draft Council Conclusions on the Renewed European Union Internal Security 
Strategy 2015-2020”, 9798/15, 10 June 2015, p. 8. 
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2. In order to ensure the relevance of its policy, the EU is recommended to commission 
annual future foresight studies (five to ten years ahead) that assess the possible 
development of certain risks and threats, as well as its underlying driving factors.  
3. Since the potential for political violence and terrorist attacks does not rest exclusively 
with jihadists, the EU is advised to keep an open attitude to other forms of political 
violence and the differentiated manner in which this manifests across the Union.   
4. In order to ensure that policy design or revision of policies is based on the right 
assumptions with regard to threat assessments and policy needs, and are up to date 
with the latest developments, the EU is recommended to organise a system that 
issues quarterly public threat assessments that combine the intel and information 
gathered by Europol and INTCEN. 
5. The EU is advised to organise evidence-based needs assessments identifying the best 
and most effective manner in which newly developing threats can be met. Calls for 
new policy measures should be properly and thoroughly scrutinized to ensure that 
there is indeed a gap or lacuna in the existing policies that needs to be addressed. 
6. The EU is well advised to properly reflect on its objectives and underlying 
assumptions before adopting new policies, legislation, or other kinds of measures. In 
this process the EU is recommended to make explicit what the specific counter-
terrorism objectives are for the various policies, and to formulate them in a SMART 
manner, so that its effectiveness – and not just its effects – can be measured.  
7. It is recommended that a multidisciplinary and geographically spread pool of experts 
and practitioners is consulted as part of the expert consultations that contribute to 
the qualitative part of the threat assessments and future foresight analysis, as well as 
the assessment of the relevance of certain policies. 
8. European institutions, and especially the European Parliament (‘s LIBE Committee), 
are recommended to actively involve – at the earliest stage possible – the earlier 
mentioned pool of experts and practitioners in the design of new counter-terrorism 
policies, legislation and measures. Rather than receiving criticism afterwards, 
European institutions could receive a stamp of approval from these expert groups 
prior to the instrument’s adoption, hence increasing its legitimacy and overall 
effectiveness.   
9. Furthermore, in an effort to increase legitimacy in the context of growing human 
rights concerns caused by EU legislation (think, e.g., of the widening pool of 
preparatory/inchoate offences moving further and further away from the principal 
terrorist act, combined with broad definitions), the EU needs to invest in its own 
oversight system. It is considered worthwhile to explore the possibility of modifying 
the mandate of the Fundamental Rights Agency, increase the role of the European 
Parliament (‘s LIBE committee) in this or through the appointment of an independent 
reviewer comparable to the one in the UK. 
10. It is paramount that the EU sets up an institutionalised system to regularly monitor 
and evaluate the policies and measures in place. For economic policies, a system for 
monitoring already exists in the form of the European Semester.180 A similar approach 
could be applied to counter-terrorism policies. 
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6.2. Improving legitimacy, coherence and effectiveness on specific 
policy themes: recommendations and policy options 
6.2.1. Recommendations concerning operational cooperation and intelligence/law 
enforcement and judicial information exchange 
11. The EU is recommended to invest in informal channels of cooperation (personal 
contacts/networking) between practitioners in the criminal justice sector in a multi-
disciplinary way. One could think of the setting up of a network comparable to the 
European Judicial Network specifically focused on countering terrorism, in which 
context prosecutors, judges, defence lawyers, prison wards and parole officers can 
organise, in an informal but structured manner, conferences, workshops and expert 
meetings on topical counter-terrorism issues and can share experiences and good 
(and bad) practices, for instance in the context of the gathering and use of 
(digital/cyber) evidence, or the assessment of rehabilitation needs. This will enhance 
intra-EU trust, and will lead to more cooperation and information exchange. 
12. Europol should facilitate regular sessions allowing officials and practitioners from the 
Member States to develop additional insight concerning the limitations (e.g. due to 
data protection standards) the Member States face when engaging in cross-border 
information exchange and operational cooperation. 
6.2.2. Recommendations on data collection and database access and interoperability 
13. Set up the High Level Expert Group on Information Systems and Interoperability 
(HLEG) on a permanent basis with regular meetings with participants from diverse 
settings (e.g. politicians, high level senior officials, security practitioners as well as 
technical staff) to explore what can reasonably be expected of EU information 
systems in terms of prevention and/or investigation of terrorist crimes (effectiveness) 
given the practical, technical, and legal limitations involving information exchange and 
the political context in which these systems inevitably operate. 
6.2.3. Recommendations on policies on countering the financing of terrorism 
14. In the area of countering the financing of terrorism (CFT), the EU is recommended to 
engage in regular and constructive dialogue with the private sector, particularly 
(branch organisations of) financial institutions. Banks and other private institutions 
perform a key role with regard to tracking and detecting the financing of terrorism, 
yet private actors are often the missing link in debates on CFT. Information-sharing 
and open debate could help reduce mutual wariness and foster more effective 
cooperation, hence contributing to overcoming coordination issues in CFT policy. 
15. The EU is furthermore recommended to concentrate its efforts on developing sector-
specific guidelines and facilitating the exchange of best practices between Member 
States. Supplementary guidance is especially important keeping in mind that 
transaction monitoring is frequently implemented by private actors not specialised in 
CFT. Such guidelines would help clarify a regulatory framework that often evolves 
quickly and at short notice, as is exemplified by AMLD reforms, and thus reduce the 
complexity of implementation for the private entities involved.  
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16. The EU is recommended to formulate clear objectives in the area of CFT, making use 
of SMART criteria, and consistently provide clarity on the underlying assumptions of 
its policy choices. These assumptions need to be tested constantly in order to ensure 
that EU policy is evidence-based and in line with the latest developments. This 
observation, which is especially pertinent considering that the policy area in question 
is in constant flux, contributes to the agenda of improving effectiveness and staying 
ahead of the curve in CFT policy by improving evidence-based policies. 
17. Considering that the financing of terrorism is relatively inexpensive, the EU is 
recommended to not rely overly on specific amounts of money when formulating its 
CFT policy. In this regard, risk profiling may present a more viable alternative to 
prevent terrorist financing. This recommendation could serve to reduce inefficiencies 
in EU counter-terrorism policy. 
6.2.4. Recommendations on policies regarding firearms and explosive weapons 
18. In order to address the security concerns arising from terrorist attacks involving the 
use of firearms, the EU needs to integrate the counter-terrorism paradigm into the 
internal market and recognise the limitations of market-oriented regulation on 
deterring the illicit trade and trafficking of firearms and on retrieving such firearms 
already in circulation. To achieve this integration, the EU is recommended to explore 
the opportuneness and suitability of policy-oriented measures, such as firearm 
disarmament programmes to incentivise the retrieval and/or registration of 
unregistered firearms and on improving intra-communal cooperation on this matter 
by law enforcement agencies.  
19. Furthermore, in view of integrating the counter-terrorism paradigm, the EU is 
recommended explore the possibilities to further harmonise and improve the 
categorisation of firearms under the Directive, and to harmonise or standardise the 
various regulatory details relating to firearms control (such as penal and 
administrative penalties and administrative requirements and procedures relating to 
permit and licence applications). This may strengthen the effectiveness of the internal 
market and generate a level playing field that is conducive for future data gathering 
on the scope of the EU firearms market and on measuring the effectiveness of its 
regulation. Ultimately, however, the EU is highly recommended to re-evaluate the 
necessity to pursue and maintain an internal market for firearms in its current form. 
For this purpose a study on how many EU citizens actually make use of their rights 
derived from the Firearms Directive would be most welcoming. 
20. In order to ensure the relevance of the policy to the actual threats, it is recommended 
that the EU integrates the CFSP with its internal market for firearms. Former conflicts 
zones prove to be a fertile source for the illicit trade in and trafficking of firearms. 
Small arms and light weapons transferred by Member States to non-state actors 
outside the EU may feed the illicit market in the EU. Mitigating this risk is therefore a 
community concern. 
6.2.5. Recommendation on criminal justice measures 
21. Since most Member States have adopted comprehensive sets of criminal justice 
measures, new measures in the field of criminal justice do not appear necessary. 
Besides, the increasingly broad scope of criminal justice measures, which can 
encompass behaviours that are far removed from actual terrorist attacks, has raised a 
number of concerns regarding the proportionality, necessity, and efficacy of certain 
measures. It is recommended that the EU set up monitoring, evaluation and oversight 
mechanisms of existing measures before adopting new ones.  
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6.2.6. Recommendations on policies concerning prevention against radicalisation 
22. This study echoes the recommendation made in the ICCT report on the Foreign 
Fighter Phenomenon in the EU, to initiate a reporting duty on the Member States to 
update the EU on the initiatives developed or policies implemented to prevent 
radicalisation.  
23. In order to ensure that the RAN CoE can provide state of the art good practices 
training programmes and henceforth remains relevant to the issues at hand, the EU is 
recommended to offer more flexibility to its mandate, provide more funding and a 
long-term commitment to its objectives to execute these activities and to increase its 
outreach and circle of influence. 
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ANNEX I: FACTSHEETS BY THEME 
THEME A: FORA, MEASURES AND TOOLS FOR OPERATIONAL 
COOPERATION AND INTELLIGENCE/LAW ENFORCEMENT AND 
JUDICIAL INFORMATIONEXCHANGE 
Efforts to improve operational cooperation and the exchange of information have 
repeatedly been placed high on the EU agenda, especially following terrorist attacks. This 
Factsheet, which should be read in conjunction with Factsheet B on databases, covers the 
most relevant fora, measures and tools for operational cooperation and information 
exchange that are part of the EU’s counter-terrorism initiatives. Most of these fora, 
measures and tools have not been developed specifically for counter-terrorism, but rather 
for law enforcement in the more general sense. 
Since many bodies and entities are involved in this field, some selection criteria apply. 
Bodies (e.g. EU INTCEN) and Council working parties (e.g. the Standing Committee on 
Operational Cooperation on Internal Security (COSI) and the Coordinating Committee in 
the area of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (CATS)) that deal with 
operational cooperation from a strategic perspective are excluded here due to the focus on 
measures and tools. Fora (e.g. the CTG and Interpol) that are not part of the formal 
institutional EU framework, but that have a place in relation to operational cooperation and 
information exchange, are included as well. The fora, measures and tools are discussed in 
alphabetical order. 
The EU has also developed strategies in order to stimulate operational cooperation and 
information exchange. Briefly revisiting these sheds some light on the broad contours of 
the issue. The Council adopted an ‘Information Management Strategy’ (IMS) that called for 
more coherence between and efficiency of different EU information systems concerning 
JHA; no specific systems were mentioned.181 Central was the implementation of existing 
initiatives rather than developing new ones. A renewed IMS appeared in 2014.182 Greater 
coherence was also the key word informing the Commission’s overview from 2010 of EU 
measures for collection, storage or cross-border exchange of personal information for the 
purpose of law enforcement and migration.183 It proposed several principles for future 
policy development, such as safeguarding fundamental rights, necessity, subsidiarity, 
bottom-up policy design, and review and sunset clauses. 
Another Commission Communication from 2012 entitled the ‘European Information 
Exchange Model’ (EIXM) concluded that information exchange “generally works well”, but 
requires better implementation.184  
                                                 
 
181 Council of the European Union, Draft Council Conclusions on an Information Management Strategy for EU 
internal security, 16637/09, (25 November 2009). 
182 European Council, Draft Council Conclusions on an updated Information Management Strategy (IMS) for EU 
internal security (15701/1/14), (24 November 2014). 
183 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, 
Overview of information management in the area of freedom, security and justice (COM(2010) 385 final), (20 July 
2010). 
184 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, 
Strengthening law enforcement cooperation in the EU: the European Information Exchange Model (EIXM) 
(COM(2012) 735 final), 7 December 2012, p. 2. The implementation of measures under EIXM was evaluated by 
Deloitte and European Commission Directorate-General Migration and Home Affairs, Study on the implementation 
of the European Information Exchange Model (EIXM) for strengthening law enforcement cooperation (2015), (26 
January 2015). For the positive judgment of information exchange, see International Centre for Migration Policy 
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A Commission Communication from April 2016 identified “shortcomings” in terms of the 
functionalities of the information systems and defined this as a “complex landscape of 
differently governed information systems”.185 In June 2016, following the attacks in Paris in 
2015 and Brussels in 2016, the Council produced a ‘Roadmap to enhance information 
exchange and information management including interoperability solutions in the Justice 
and Home Affairs area’.186 It listed actions for improving information exchange in the short- 
and medium term and set up long-term orientations, among them privacy and data 
protection, interoperability of systems, sharing information on the basis of need-to-share 
instead of need-to-know, and a coherent approach for exchanging information with third 
countries. Interoperability of information systems and creating coherence have been high 
on the agenda. 
 
Atlas Network 
Legal basis: n/a (as concerns the Atlas Network); Council Decision 2008/617/JHA 
(assistance of special intervention units between Member States) 
The Atlas Network is an association of special police units of the Member States with the 
aim of improving practical cooperation, training and performing joint exercises.187 The 
network was created after the attacks on 11 September 2001 in the context of the Police 
Chiefs Task Force (PCTF), an informal forum of high-level police representatives aimed at 
facilitating operation activities that was active between 2000 and 2009.188 Council Decision 
2008/617/JHA provides general rules allowing special intervention units to come to the 
assistance of other Member States, in a supporting capacity, if requested in case of a crisis 
situation. 
 
Eurojust 
Legal basis: Council Decision 2002/187/JHA (establishing Eurojust); Council Decision 
2003/659/JHA 2002 (amendment concerning budgetary arrangements); Council Decision 
2009/426/JHA (amendment to enhance operational effectiveness) 
Eurojust aims to stimulate and improve the coordination of judicial investigations and 
prosecutions for cases with links between two or more Member States. As such Eurojust 
sets up and participates in Joint Investigation Teams (discussed below), these are 
multinational and multiagency teams investigating criminal offences. Eurojust’s annual 
report from 2015 noted that practitioners consider JITs an “efficient and effective tool to 
coordinate cross-border investigations and prosecutions”, but the differences in timeframes 
of domestic proceedings is considered a challenge.189  
Eurojust also connects with the Member States through seconded national experts (national 
correspondents) who constitute its National Coordination System. Requests for assistance 
can be initiated through the national correspondents or via Eurojust’s On-Call Coordination 
mechanism that is available on a 24/7 basis. Art. 13 of Decision 2009/426/JHA obliges 
                                                                                                                                                            
 
Development, Study on the status of information exchange amongst law enforcement authorities in the context of 
existing EU instruments, (December 2010). 
185 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, 
Stronger and Smarter Information Systems for Borders and Security (COM(2016) 205 final), (6 April 2016), p. 3. 
186 Council of the European Union, Roadmap to enhance information exchange and information management 
including interoperability solutions in the Justice and Home Affairs area, 9368/1/16 Rev 1, (6 June 2016). 
187 Council of the European Union, Atlas common challenge 2013: "All together to protect you!", 8570/13 (17 April 
2013). 
188 Council of the European Union, Discussion document on a normative framework for “ATLAS”, 8434/05 (25 April 
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Member States to share information with Eurojust to streamline the coordination of cross-
border cases, although this is not done in a timely and systematic manner.190 The 
information is stored in Eurojust’s Case Management System. The agency also maintains a 
– non-public – Terrorism Convictions Monitor (TCM) which contains an overview and 
analysis of terrorism-related developments, including concluded court proceedings as well 
as upcoming and ongoing trials. 
 
The European Border and Coast Guard Agency (EBCG) 
Legal basis: Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
14 September 2016 on the European Border and Coast Guard and amending Regulation 
(EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation 
(EC) No 863/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Council Regulation (EC) 
No 2007/2004 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC 
The EBCG was launched in October 2016 and replaces the European Agency for the 
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of 
the European Union (Frontex) that was in operation since May 2005. The EBCG is tasked 
with implementing ‘European integrated border management’ at the national and EU level 
to ensure freedom of movement within the EU as well as contribute to maintaining an area 
of freedom, security and justice.191 For this purpose, the EBCG is tasked with developing a 
‘technical and operational strategy’.192 The activities of the EBCG should be conducted with 
respect for fundamental rights. 
The EBCG consists of the EBCG Agency and the national border and coast guard agencies. 
The tasks of the EBCG have been expanded to include the ability to carry out a 
‘vulnerability assessment’ of Member State capacity and readiness (in terms of equipment, 
infrastructure, staff, budget and financial resources) to deal with potential crises at their 
external borders. In addition, the EBCG Agency can appoint a coordinating officer for each 
joint operation or rapid border intervention. The Member State on whose territory the 
operation or intervention takes place shall take the views of this officer ‘into consideration 
and follow them to the extent possible’.193  
A new competence is the option to carry out operational activities at the external borders 
involving a Member State and a neighbouring third country. Such operations can even take 
place on the territory of the neighbouring third state on the basis of an agreement. The 
EBCG will also assist the Member States with the return of irregularly staying third country 
                                                                                                                                                            
 
189 Eurojust, Annual Report 2015, (2016), pp. 18-19. 
190 Council of the European Union, Systematic feeding and consistent use of European and international Databases 
- information sharing in the counter-terrorism context, 7726/16 (14 April 2016), p. 4. 
191 European Parliament and Council of the European Union, Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2016 on the European Border and Coast Guard and amending 
Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EC) No 
863/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 and Council 
Decision 2005/267/EC (L 251/1). 
192 European Parliament and Council of the European Union, Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2016 on the European Border and Coast Guard and amending 
Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EC) No 
863/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 and Council 
Decision 2005/267/EC (L 251/2). 
193 European Parliament and Council of the European Union, Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2016 on the European Border and Coast Guard and amending 
Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EC) No 
863/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 and Council 
Decision 2005/267/EC (L 251/26). 
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nationals, including through the availability to Member States of ‘European return 
intervention teams’.194   
A ‘rapid reaction pool’, a standing corps of at least 1500 border guards, should be available 
to assist the Member States in carrying out external border controls. The rapid reaction 
pool can be deployed at the request of a Member State or on the basis of a Council decision 
when ‘urgent action’ is required to maintain external border controls.195 The pool shall 
consist of border guards from the Member States, including non-EU states Norway, 
Switzerland, Iceland, and with financial support from Liechtenstein.196 The budget is 
scheduled to increase from €238 million in 2016 to €322 million in 2020. Staff will rise from 
417 in 2016 to 1000 in 2020.197 The ECBG Agency will have its headquarters in Warsaw, 
Poland. 
 
European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) 
Legal basis: Regulation (EU) 2016/794; Council Decision 2009/936/JHA 
Europol assists the Member States in dealing with a specific set of criminal offences, 
including terrorism. It collects, stores, processes, analyses and exchanges information. 
Europol also facilitates operational cooperation via JITs (discussed below) and provides law 
enforcement expertise to the Member States. The agency also produces threat 
assessments, strategic and operational analyses and general situation reports such as the 
annual and public TE-SAT. 
For the purposes of operational cooperation and information exchange, Europol maintains 
the following mechanisms: 
Europol Information System (EIS) 
EIS is Europol’s central reference system to verify the availability beyond national 
jurisdictions of data relating to suspected and convicted persons, criminal structures, 
offences and means to commit them. The system allows for cross-matching data by 
performing searches. EIS relies on Member States to enter the data. Although information 
sharing via Europol has increased, there is room for improvement according to a 2015 
study. Some police officers hesitate to upload information to avoid compromising ongoing 
operations. Others are unaware that for certain information there is an obligation to share 
                                                 
 
194 European Parliament and Council of the European Union, Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2016 on the European Border and Coast Guard and amending 
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Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EC) No 
863/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 and Council 
Decision 2005/267/EC (L 251/63). 
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with Europol.198 In April 2016, the EU CTC reported “significant gaps” with regard to data 
on foreign terrorist fighters entered in EIS.199 
Secure Information Exchange Network Application (SIENA) 
SIENA allows for the exchange of operational and strategic information and intelligence 
relating to crime between Europol, the Member States and third parties that have a 
cooperation agreement with Europol. SIENA has not been fully rolled out in all Member 
States and action is undertaken to ensure this.200 In addition, a 2015 study found that 
SIENA is not used in a significant manner, one of the reasons being that no information is 
entered at night and there is no legal obligation to use it for communications.201 However, 
Europol did note a substantial rise in counter-terrorism related messages exchanged 
through SIENA: from 2,245 in 2015 to 3,934 in 2016.202 SIENA has been upgraded to the 
security classification level of Confidential to make possible the transmission of information 
of a higher sensitivity.203 In January 2016, with the creation of the ECTC (see below) as 
part of Europol, a separate space in SIENA is dedicated to exchange counter-terrorist-
related information. 
24/7 operational centre 
This is the central Europol hub for processing incoming data. The data can subsequently be 
fed into the EIS or Analytical Working Files (AWFs). The operational centre processes 
information exchanged with third parties and coordinates support for policing major events. 
The AWFs set out the conditions under which Europol can undertake analytical activities. 
Only within the bounds of an AWF is analysis and support to the Member States permitted. 
Europol currently houses two AWFs, one on serious and organised crime and another on 
counter-terrorism.   
Europol Analysis System (EAS) 
EAS is the operational information system through which information can be centralised 
and managed as well as analysed by tools offered by the system. 
European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC) 
The ECTC is operational since January 2016. It is an enhanced central information hub to 
increase information exchange and operation cooperation as well as a centre for expertise. 
It focuses on foreign fighters, information exchange with regard to terrorist financing, 
online terrorist propaganda, illegal arms trafficking and international cooperation. Following 
the attacks in Brussels in March 2016, the ECTC acted as a support platform for counter-
terrorism authorities in the Member States.204 FIU.net, the platform for exchanging 
                                                 
 
198 Deloitte and European Commission Directorate-General Migration and Home Affairs, Study on the 
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information on money laundering and terrorist financing, is part of the ECTC (see below 
Factsheet D on CFT).205 
Focal Points 
Europol organises the analysis of information according to two AWFs (see above under 24/7 
operational centre): serious and organised crime and counter-terrorism. Each AWF is 
subdivided into several so-called Focal Points which have a distinct thematic or regional 
focus. One is called Hydra which deals with Islamist terrorism in general, another Focal 
Point is TFTP or Terrorist Financing Tracking Programme (see also Factsheet B and 
Factsheet D). A third is the Focal Point Travellers which concerns individuals suspected of 
travelling across international borders to take part in terrorist activities and that present a 
(future) threat to the security of the Member States. In April 2016, the EU CTC reported 
“significant gaps” with regard to data on foreign terrorist fighters entered in Focal Points 
Travellers (FPTs).206  
 
Framework Decision on simplifying the exchange of information and intelligence between 
law enforcement authorities of the Member States of the European Union 
Legal basis: Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA 
Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA, also known as the Swedish Decision because of the 
initiative by Sweden, lays down rules for Member States’ law enforcement authorities to 
simplify the exchange of information more effectively and expeditiously in order to detect, 
prevent and investigate criminal offences or conduct criminal intelligence operations. Since 
there is no common legal framework for the exchange of information and intelligence for 
law enforcement purposes, a legal obligation for simplifying information exchange comes 
closest to any such a framework. Member States can refuse a request for information 
exchange if doing so would harm their own national security, compromise ongoing 
investigations, operations or the safety of individuals, or when the request is evidently 
disproportionate for the goal of the request. Attached to the Framework Decision is a form 
guiding the information requests. A 2015 study found that three Member States still had to 
implement Framework Decision 2006/960. Operational compliance was not achieved fully 
either, one of the reasons for this being that the form for information requests was 
considered not being helpful.207 
 
High Level Expert Group on Information Systems and Interoperability (HLEG) 
Legal basis: Commission Decision of 17.6.2016 setting up the High Level Expert Group on 
Information Systems and Interoperability C(2016) 3780 final 
In order to address the “complex landscape of differently governed information systems” 
the Commission set up the HLEG.208 This group brings together EU agencies, national 
experts and relevant institutional stakeholders in order to examine the legal, technical and 
operational aspects of creating interoperable information systems. HLEG’s aim is to 
“contribute to an overall strategic vision on how to make the management and use of data 
                                                 
 
205 Council of the European Union, State of play on implementation of the statement of the Members of the 
European Council of 12 February 2015, the JHA Council Conclusions of 20 November 2015, and the Conclusions of 
the European Council of 18 December 2015, 6785/16 (4March 2016), p. 32. 
206 Council of the European Union, Systematic feeding and consistent use of European and international Databases 
- information sharing in the counter-terrorism context, 7726/16 (14 April 2016), p. 2. 
207 Deloitte and European Commission Directorate-General Migration and Home Affairs, Study on the 
implementation of the European Information Exchange Model (EIXM) for strengthening law enforcement 
cooperation (2015), pp. 27-28. 
208 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, 
Stronger and Smarter Information Systems for Borders and Security (COM(2016) 205 final), (6 April 2016), p. 3. 
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for border management and security more effective and efficient, and to identify solutions 
to implement improvements”.209 HLEG is tasked with giving advice and assistance to the 
Commission to realise the interoperability of information systems as well as cooperate and 
coordinate between the Commission and Member States regarding legislation on 
interoperability. The expert group should bridge the technical and policy dimensions on 
information systems and interoperability.210 Up until May 2017, five meetings are planned. 
HLEG’s main findings will be reported to the European Parliament and the Council by the 
Commission.211 
 
Joint Investigation Teams (JITs) 
Legal basis: Council Framework Decision 2002/465/JHA 
The notion of the JIT is contained in the Council of Europe’s Convention on Mutual 
Assistance in Criminal Matters to which the EU became a party in 2000.212 Framework 
Decision 2002/465/JHA provides the legal basis. A JIT can be set up when criminal 
investigations lead to links with other Member States or when a criminal investigation 
requires coordination and concerted action by the Member States. For a JIT to carry out 
criminal investigations it should involve two or more Member States and concern a specific 
purpose and have a limited duration. Seconded JIT members – those from the Member 
States other than the Member State that has set up the JIT – may be entrusted with 
particular investigative tasks under the law of the Member State the JIT is operating in. 
Europol, Eurojust and OLAF (the EU’s anti-fraud office) can participate in a JIT. Eurojust 
can also request the setting up of a JIT and Europol can support its functioning via SIENA 
and its analytical capabilities. JITs were formed following the shooting down of Malaysian 
Airlines flight MH17 over Ukraine and after the November 2015 Paris and March 2016 
Brussels attacks.213 
Counter Terrorism Group (CTG) 
Legal basis: n/a 
The CTG, set up in 2001, is an informal intergovernmental structure for meetings between 
the heads of the intelligence and security services of the Member States, including Norway 
and Switzerland. It lies outside EU structures although it closely collaborates with Europol 
and the EU CTC. Since July 2016 the CTG operates an online database for improved 
information exchange on (suspected) terrorists. According to an interviewee, the 
cooperation is good, but a challenge remains how to cooperate with third states. 
                                                 
 
209 European Commission, High-Level Expert Group on Information Systems and Interoperability: Scoping Paper, 
(June 2016), p. 2. 
210 European Commission, High-Level Expert Group on Information Systems and Interoperability: Scoping Paper, 
(June 2016), p. 7. 
211 Ibid., p. 8. 
212 Council Act of 29 May 2000 establishing in accordance with Art. 34 of the Treaty on European Union the 
Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the European Union (2000/C 
197/01), p. 1. 
213 For the Paris and Brussels attacks, see Council of the European Union, Systematic feeding and consistent use of 
European and international Databases - information sharing in the counter-terrorism context, 7726/16 (14 April 
2016), p. 6. 
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THEME B: DATA COLLECTION AND DATABASE ACCESS AND 
INTEROPERABILITY 
This factsheet gives an overview of the most relevant databases in relation to the EU’s 
counter-terrorism efforts. Most of the data collection tools discussed here were not 
specifically designed for the purposes of counter-terrorism. They were either set up to 
assist law enforcement in general, border control and/or migration. Some were later 
retooled for the aim of law enforcement, including counter-terrorism. The Terrorist 
Financing Tracking Program (TFTP) and the Passenger Name Records (PNR) system were 
specifically set up for counter-terrorism. The databases are discussed in alphabetical order. 
 
Eurodac 
Legal basis: Regulation (EC) No 2725/2000 (establishing Eurodac); Regulation (EU) No 
603/2013 (amending Eurodac for law enforcement purposes) 
Eurodac was established in 2000 to contribute to the identification of applicants for asylum 
and persons arrested for unlawful crossing of the external border of the EU. The Regulation 
from 2013 amended Eurodac to be used by law enforcement authorities for the prevention, 
detection, and investigation of terrorist offences or other serious criminal offences. Since 
Eurodac’s primary role is not that of law enforcement, the Regulation stipulates certain 
conditions under which Eurodac can be accessed for law enforcement purposes. Other 
means (national fingerprint databases and the Prüm and VIS arrangements discussed 
below as well as in Factsheet C) need to be exhausted first before the use of Eurodac can 
be considered. In addition, several other cumulative conditions need to be met:  
 There must be an overriding public security concern;  
 Access is for a specific case instead of a systematic comparison;  
 There are reasonable grounds access contributes substantially to preventing, 
detecting or investigating criminal offences.  
Twelve Member States have indicated that they will grant law enforcement authorities 
access to Eurodac, two Member States had not taken a decision yet, three Member States 
cannot tell due to future political decisions in relation to the Prüm Treaty (see below), and 
four Member States indicated they would not apply the law enforcement provisions of 
Regulation 603/2013.214 
A Commission proposal that is now being developed intends, among other things, to strive 
for interoperability of Eurodac with SIS II and VIS.215 
 
                                                 
 
214 Eurodac SCG, Report on the national preparation for the implementation of the Eurodac Recast, (April 2016), p. 
4. 
215 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
establishment of ‘Eurodac’ for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of [Regulation (EU) No 
604/2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining 
an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a 
stateless person], for identifying an illegally staying third-country national or stateless person and on requests for 
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Since 2013 responsibility for the operational management of Eurodac is in the hands of EU-
LISA, the EU agency dedicated to managing large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, 
security and justice. 
 
European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur) 
Legal basis: Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013 
Eurosur is the information-exchange framework for generating EU-wide situation awareness 
as well as a ‘common pre-frontier intelligence picture’ for detecting, preventing and 
combating illegal immigration and cross-border crime and saving migrant lives at the 
external borders of the Member States. It allows for the exchange of non-classified and 
classified information in a secure manner and in near-real-time with Member States’ 
national coordination centres in order to improve the reaction capability at the external 
borders. Eurosur is maintained by Frontex (see also Factsheet A). 
 
European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS) 
Legal basis: Council Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA (organisation and content of the 
exchange of information from criminal records); Council Decision 2009/316/JHA 
(establishment ECRIS) 
ECRIS concerns the exchange of information between Member States’ criminal records 
databases. It became operational in 2012 and is a decentralised arrangement, meaning 
that data remains stored in national databases and transmitted between these systems. 
The goal of ECRIS is to create a better understanding of the facts and types of penalties or 
measures between Member States. ECRIS should contribute to a fuller context in the sense 
that a suspect’s previous convictions will not remain unknown, thereby making possible 
different considerations in handling a suspect. Among the categories of offences about 
which information is exchanged are five terrorist offences:  
 Directing a terrorist group;  
 Knowingly participating in the activities of a terrorist group;  
 Financing of terrorism;  
 Public provocation to commit a terrorist offence;  
 Recruitment or training for terrorism. 
Twenty-five Member States are interconnected through ECRIS while Malta, Portugal and 
Slovenia are currently not participating.216 At the moment, the Commission is working on a 
proposal to replace Decision 2009/316/JHA with a Directive, amongst other things to 
reduce the administrative burden to increase the efficiency of information exchange with 
regard to so-called third country nationals and stateless persons. A Commission report on 
the implementation of Decision 2009/316/JHA will accompany the Directive amending 
ECRIS.217 
                                                 
 
216 European Commission, Impact Assessment Accompanying the proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council amending Council Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA, as regards the exchange of 
information on third country nationals and as regards the European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS), 
and replacing Council Decision 2009/316/JHA, (SWD(2016) 4 final), (19 January 2016), p. 2. 
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Implementation of the Prüm Treaty 
Legal basis: Council Decision 2008/615/JHA; Council Decision 2008/616/JHA 
(administrative and technical implementation of the previous decision) 
Council Decision 2008/615/JHA implements the so-called Prüm Treaty (signed in May 2005) 
aimed to step up cross-border cooperation in relation to countering terrorism, cross-border 
crime and illegal migration.218 The Council Decision implementing this treaty creates the 
conditions for the exchange of several types of data: the automated transfer of DNA 
profiles, fingerprint data, certain data relating to national vehicle registration, and data in 
connection to events with a major cross-border dimension (e.g. sporting events, European 
Council meetings).  
Data is stored in anonymous profiles and only after a hit between profiles has been 
established can personal data be requested, taking into consideration the limits imposed by 
national laws in terms of data protection. Also for the purposes of the prevention of 
terrorist offences, personal data can be exchanged. In addition, joint patrols and other joint 
operations can be organised for the maintenance of public order and security and the 
prevention of criminal offences. 
The Prüm Treaty is not fully implemented yet and not applied consistently. Not all articles 
have been implemented by all Member States. Five Member States are still not operational 
with regard to either DNA, fingerprint data or vehicle registration data. Moreover, not all 
Member States are connected to each other in terms of interconnectivity for the automated 
data exchanges concerning the aforementioned three types of data.219 A 2015 study 
reported that implementation was slow due to political unwillingness to implement the 
treaty as well as the actual purpose of the Treaty being unclear.220 
 
Passenger Name Records (PNR) 
Legal basis: Agreement from 2012 with the United States (OJ 2012 L 215/5); Agreement 
from 2006 with Canada (OJ 2006 L 82/15); Agreement from 2012 with Australia (OJ 2012 
L 186/4); Directive (EU) 2016/681 (establishment EU PNR) 
An initiative for a Council Directive requiring airlines to retain and share Passenger Name 
Records (PNR) data was listed as part of the EU’s response to the attacks in Madrid in 
March 2004.221 In 2008, the European Parliament refused to vote on a proposal put forward 
by the Commission the year before. The PNR proposal introduced by the Commission in 
2011 was blocked by the European Parliament on the grounds of necessity and 
proportionality in 2013. Between 2011 and 2014, the Commission provided funds for 
setting up national PNR systems through the ‘Prevention of and Fight against Crime (ISEC)’ 
programme.222 After the Paris attacks in January 2015 the European Parliament was willing 
                                                 
 
218 Council of the European Union, Prüm Convention, 10900/05, (7 July 2005). 
219 Council of the European Union, ‘Implementation of the provisions on information exchange of the Prüm 
Decisions”’, 5017/8/16 Rev 8, 16 December 2016. 
220 Deloitte, European Commission Directorate-general Migration and Home Affairs, “Study on the implementation 
of the European Information Exchange Model (EIXM) for strengthening law enforcement cooperation”, (26 January 
2015), pp. 40-41.  
221 Council of the European Union, Declaration on combating terrorism, 7906/04, (29 March 2004), p. 9. 
222 Council of the European Union, “Directive (EU) 2016/681 on the use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data for 
the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime – Implementation 
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to negotiate an EU PNR regime and a Directive was adopted in April 2016. The PNR 
Directive (see also below) is considered “one of the most important new instruments in the 
identification, detection and countering of criminals, terrorists and their travel 
movements”.223 However, one interviewee questioned the added value of PNR in terms of 
counter-terrorism and thought it might be more suitable for dealing with organised crime 
instead. 
PNR data is collected by airlines. The data concerns reservation information on passenger 
itineraries exchanged by airlines when passengers use multiple airlines to reach their 
destination. Certain EU measures and international agreements have made possible access 
to PNR data by law enforcement authorities to prevent, detect, investigate and prosecute 
terrorist offences and serious crime.  
The EU has two types of PNR arrangements in place. The first concerns international 
agreements with third countries. An agreement for the transfer of EU PNR data to the 
United States was concluded in 2004, but annulled by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
on the basis of an inadequate scope in 2006.224 A new agreement was signed in 2007 and 
after a review in 2010 a new agreement was reached in 2012. The agreement on the 
transfer of PNR data from 2006 with Canada expired in September 2009, and a new draft 
agreement was signed in June 2014. Before voting on the consent of this draft agreement, 
the European Parliament referred it in November 2014 to the ECJ to determine its 
compatibility with the EU Treaties. The Court has not yet decided on the issue. A 
provisional agreement on PNR transfers to Australia was concluded in 2008 and a 
renegotiated agreement appeared in 2012.  
The agreements specify the periods of data retention and the conditions under which the 
data can be accessed and shared with third countries. PNR data can only be used and 
processed on a case-by-case basis. Any relevant information retrieved from the PNR data 
by the US, Canada and Australia shall be made available to the Member States, Europol or 
Eurojust. In addition, these institutions can request access to the PNR data shared with the 
US, Canada and Australia. PNR data from the EU may be transferred by the US, Canada 
and Australia with third countries when meeting specific conditions. At regular intervals, a 
Joint Review is conducted by the EU and the US to jointly evaluate data protection 
safeguards. The latest Joint Review from January 2017 noted general satisfaction with the 
implementation of the agreement in line with conditions of the agreement, although certain 
aspects such as the number of US personnel with access to PNR data and the masking out 
of data can be improved.225  
The second PNR arrangement concerns an autonomous EU system. The already-mentioned 
Directive 2016/681 creates an obligation for Member States to require airliners operating 
from their territory to be able to access PNR data and transfer it to other Member States to 
prevent, detect, investigate and prosecute terrorist offences and serious crime. Each 
Member State is asked to set up a national Passenger Information Unit (PIU) that is 
exclusively tasked with collecting and processing PNR data. The obligation to collect data 
                                                 
 
223 Council of the European Union, “Directive (EU) 2016/681 on the use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data for 
the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime – State of affairs 
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concerns only flights to EU territory from third countries and vice versa. Data is retained for 
a period of five years maximum after which they are deleted permanently. The Directive 
does not cover PNR data retrieved from flights between the Member States. It is allowed 
for Member States to collect data on intra-EU flights, but only on selected ones. What 
‘selected’ means is not specified in the Directive. Europol may request, upon a case-by-
case basis, PNR data from the Member States. Transfer of PNR data with third countries is 
also possible only on a case-by-case basis. See also Factsheet C. 
By November 2016, four Member States had functioning or almost functioning PNR 
systems, including a legal basis. Twelve Member States are at different stages in setting up 
the technical infrastructure and adopting legislation. Eleven Member States are at the 
beginning of the technical and legal process. The deadline for transposition of the Directive, 
considered to be on a ‘tight’ schedule, is May 2018.226  
 
Schengen Information System II (SIS II) 
Legal basis: Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006 (establishment SIS II, border control 
cooperation); Council Decision 2007/533/JHA (establishment SIS II, law enforcement 
cooperation); Regulation (EC) No 1986/2006 (cooperation on vehicle registration) 
SIS II is in operation since 2013. It is the successor to SIS which was included as part of 
the Schengen Convention (1990) as a compensatory scheme for the removal of internal 
border controls between the Member States. SIS II allows for the creation of alerts with the 
aim of refusing entry or stay of third-country nationals. In addition, alerts can be issued for 
persons wanted for arrest for surrender or extradition procedures, for missing persons, for 
persons and objects requiring discrete checks, for objects for seizure or use as evidence in 
criminal proceedings, or for persons sought to assist with a judicial procedure. Foreign 
terrorist fighter alerts can be created in SIS II, but the EU CTC reported in April 2016 that 
the data is not systematically entered.227  
SIS II has new functionalities. Biometrics can be used for confirming a person’s identity, 
and different types of alerts can be linked, but practice reveals that there is no search 
possibility for fingerprints and that compatibility of issues hinder creating different alerts for 
the same person.228 Moreover, in certain circumstances a flag can be added to an alert, 
meaning that a Member State will not act on an alert. Europol and Eurojust can access and 
search SIS II data. Council Decision 2007/533/JHA includes the option to exchange 
passport data with Interpol’s SLTD database (see below) although no such connection has 
been established yet.229 A 2016 Commission evaluation of SIS II concluded that not all 
Member States “query SIS II systematically when they query their national police or 
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immigration databases”; the effective performance of SIS II depends on the systematicity 
of queries.230 
The Commission is trying to boost SIS II as a counter-terrorism tool.231 New amendments 
are under way to create an alert for terrorism-relating activities, to issue alerts for third-
country nationals who are regarded as extremist speakers, and to allow the security 
services of the Member States access to SIS II.232 The EU CTC referred to a classified 
document in which it was concluded that Member States use “different standards” when 
using SIS II for counter-terrorism purposes.233 The still classified status of the document 
does not allow to explicate what “different standards” means.234 
Since 2013 the responsibility for the operational management of SIS II is in the hands of 
EU-LISA.  
 
Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP) 
Legal basis: Agreement from 2010 with the United States (OJ 2010 L 195/5) 
The TFTP is also covered in Factsheet D concerning measures to counter terrorist financing. 
The TFTP is a US initiative that was set up shortly after the attacks on 11 September 2001. 
Its purpose was to mine global financial data traffic processed by the Belgian financial 
message services company SWIFT in order to identify terrorist finances. The program was 
disclosed to the general public in 2006 and led to concerns in several EU Member States 
about the privacy of their citizens. The EU negotiated an agreement with the US over the 
transfer of financial messaging data to the US in 2010. The initial agreement was rejected 
by the European Parliament and adopted after renegotiations resulted in stronger data 
protection provisions. Since 2010, there have been repeated calls by the Council and 
European Parliament to explore the establishment of an EU Terrorist Finance Tracking 
System (TFTS). In 2013, the Commission published a Communication on the topic, 
accompanied by an impact assessment, in which it argued that “a proposal for an EU TFTS 
is not clearly demonstrated”.235 
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TFTP concerns the transfer of financial payment messages from the EU to the US for the 
purpose of prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of terrorism or terrorist 
financing while observing data protection norms. Relevant information obtained through the 
TFTP is then transmitted (back) to competent authorities in the Member States, Europol, 
Eurojust and/or third countries. Europol plays an important role by assessing whether the 
data requested is necessary and/or sufficiently narrow in scope to meet the relevant data 
protection standards. The Member States, Europol and/or Eurojust may also request, when 
detecting relevant signals, a search of TFTP data. This has happened 160 times between 
January 2015 and January 2016.236 The EU CTC observed that the TFTP “has proven to be a 
valuable tool in counter-terrorism investigations: it enhances the ability to map out terrorist 
networks, often filling in missing links in an investigative chain”.237  
Financial data transferred but not extracted for investigative purposes will be deleted (“as 
soon as technologically feasible”) after annual evaluation.238 The US will carry out an 
annual evaluation to see that data retention periods are not longer than necessary. 
Independent overseers, including a person appointed by the European Commission, have 
the authority to review all searches of the extracted data. The EU and the US agreed to 
jointly evaluate data protection safeguards after six months of the agreement entering into 
force and then continue to do so, on a regular basis. Though the 2010 agreement sought to 
address data protection concerns, some uncertainties persist. The agreement has a 
duration of five years after which there is an automatic extension of one year unless one of 
the parties terminates the agreement. 
Between 2010 and 2013, the Member States lodged 158 requests with US authorities for 
financial data, resulting in 924 so-called investigative leads.239 The Joint Review Report 
from the Commission and the US Treasury Department concluded the TFTP has “significant 
value (…) in preventing and combatting terrorism and its financing”.240 The report provides 
numerous examples of the TFTP for investigative purposes and detection, but its added 
value in terms of prevention and prosecution is less well demonstrated; 45% of all TFTP 
data viewed were three years or older.241 The latest Joint Review Report from January 2017 
noted that the Commission was satisfied with the implementation of the controls and the 
safeguards of the agreement. Moreover, a strong increase of data sharing between the US 
and the EU and its Member States was noted: 8,998 leads during the review period 
compared to 3,929 leads during the previous review period.242 
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Europol is tasked with assessing US requests for financial data stored in the EU in terms of 
specificity and substantiation. The Europol Joint Supervisory Body evaluates this role from 
time to time. The 2015 review noted that compared to earlier reviews that the “relevancy, 
accuracy, accountability and readability” of Europol procedures for handling US data 
requests “has been maintained”.243 The 2015 review did note a “clear tension between the 
idea of limiting the amount of data to be transmitted by tailoring and narrowing the 
requests and the nature of TFTP [as a scheme for mass and regular data exchange]”.244   
  
Visa Information System (VIS) 
Legal basis: Council Decision 2004/512/EC (establishing VIS); Council Decision 
2008/633/JHA (access VIS for prevention, detection and investigation of terrorist offences 
and other serious criminal offences); Regulation (EC) No 767/2008 (exchange of data on 
short-stay visas) 
VIS was established in 2004 by Council Decision 2004/512/EC. It involves the exchange of 
visa data between the Member States to conduct a common visa policy. VIS allows the 
processing of data and decisions concerning third country nationals applying for short stay 
visits or to travel through the Schengen Member States. Biometric data can be matched 
through VIS. Council Decision 2008/633/JHA allowed VIS to be used for the purposes of 
maintaining internal security and the combating of terrorism under certain specified 
circumstances. Regulation 767/2008 made available data on short-stay visas to the 
Member States for the prevention, detection and investigation of terrorist offences and 
serious criminal offences. 
The data contained in VIS can only be searched by the designated authorities when there 
are reasonable grounds that such a search will provide them with data that has substantial 
added value in preventing, detecting or investigating terrorist offences and serious crime. 
Europol has access to VIS. An October 2016 evaluation by the Commission showed the 
Member States consider VIS an effective and efficient system in processing visa 
applications. 245 With regard to the contribution of VIS to internal security, according to 
nineteen of “responding Member States (…) VIS had a positive impact on the prevention of 
threats to the Member States’ internal security, while only two Member States consider this 
impact as limited.” What exactly this positive impact entails is not specified. Moreover, the 
evaluation observes that “access to the VIS for law enforcement purposes on the basis of 
the VIS Decision remains quite fragmented across the Member States”.246   
Since 2012 the responsibility for the operational management of VIS is in the hands of EU-
LISA.  
 
                                                 
 
243 Council of the European Union, Report on the Europol’s implementation of the TFTP agreement, (12338/15), 
(28 September 2015), p. 3. 
244 Ibid., p. 4. 
245 European Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the 
implementation of Regulation (EC) No 767/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the 
Visa Information System (VIS), the use of fingerprints at external borders and the use of biometrics in the visa 
application procedure/REFIT, (COM(2016) 655 final), (14 October 2016), p. 8. 
246 Ibid. 
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International Criminal Police Organisation (Interpol) 
 
Interpol is an intergovernmental organisation concerned with improving worldwide police 
cooperation by providing technical and operational support. The organisation has 190 
member countries and its origins date back to 1923. Interpol maintains databases, 
accessible to members via National Central Bureaus (NCBs), on a variety of topics: child 
abusers and victims, fingerprints, DNA profiles, stolen and lost travel documents, stolen 
administrative documents, counterfeit documents, motor vehicles, vessels, works of art, 
ballistics data, illicit arms, radiological and nuclear materials, and maritime piracy. All 
databases, with the exception of the ballistics database, are accessible in real-time through 
Interpol’s I-24/7 network. This network allows sharing, searching and cross-checking of 
data. On several of the aforementioned topics Interpol offers analytical tools as well. 
In addition to databases, Interpol also operates a system of Notices. A Notice is an 
international request for cooperation or an alert to share critical information. The Notices 
serve to identifying and locating persons or objects. Topics subject to Notices are: to seek 
the location and arrest of wanted persons for extradition or similar lawful action (Red), to 
help locate missing persons or to help identify those unable to identify themselves (Yellow), 
to collect additional information about a person’s identity, location or activities concerning a 
crime (Blue), to seek information about unidentified bodies (Black), to provide warnings 
and intelligence about persons having committed criminal offences and likely to do so again 
in other countries (Green), to warn of an event, person, object or process representing a 
serious and imminent threat to public safety (Orange), to seek or provide information on 
criminal modus operandi, objects, devices and concealment methods (Purple), and a Notice 
for persons or groups subject to United Nations Security Council sanctions. 
The Council, via Common Position 2005/69/JHA, has sought to encourage Member States 
to increase their sharing of data on stolen or lost travel documents with Interpol’s Stolen 
and Lost Travel Documents (SLTD) database. In April 2016, the EU CTC reported that 
supply of data is uneven and not all Member States upload their data automatically.247 The 
Council is undertaking actions to enhance the interoperability between SIS II and the SLTD 
database.248 A 2010 study found that when Member States share information and a third 
country is involved, they tend to favour Interpol over Europol.249 
Since 2009 Interpol opened the Office of the Special Representative of INTERPOL to the 
European Union (SRIEU) to enhance the visibility of Interpol to EU institutions and 
agencies, promote collaboration and act as a privileged partner in law enforcement 
activities. 
                                                 
 
247 Council of the European Union, Systematic feeding and consistent use of European and international Databases 
– information sharing in the counter-terrorism context, (7726/16), (14 April 2016), p. 4. 
248 Council of the European Union, Roadmap to enhance information exchange and information management 
including interoperability solutions in the Justice and Home Affairs area, (9368/1/16 Rev 1), 6 June 2016. 
249 International Centre for Migration Policy Development, Study on the status of information exchange amongst 
law enforcement authorities in the context of existing EU instruments, (December 2010), p. 71.  
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THEME C: MEASURES TO ENHANCE EXTERNAL BORDER SECURITY 
This factsheet provides an overview of measures to enhance external border security250, 
including the (proposals on) systematic checks on EU citizens entering EU territory against 
relevant databases, the European Border and Coast Guard and on a new Entry-Exit System 
and measures regarding security risk management on goods bound for the EU. Some of 
these measures have a clear link with the measures described in the previous factsheet on 
data collection and database access and interoperability, notably the new PNR Directive and 
other measures to enable the collection of and matching with data for border control 
purposes. 
Legal framework 
 
EU instruments 
 
Persons 
In 2002 the Commission presented the Communication entitled ‘Towards integrated 
management of the external borders of the Member States of the European Union’,251 that 
called on Member States to take into consideration at external borders the magnitude of 
crime, terrorism, crimes against children, arms trafficking, corruption and fraud. The 
Communication proposed the development of a common policy on management of the 
external borders of the Member States of the European Union, which should include at least 
a common corpus of legislation, a common co-ordination and operational co-operation 
mechanism, common integrated risk analysis, staff trained in the European dimension and 
inter-operational equipment and burden-sharing between Member States in the run-up to a 
European Corps of Border Guards. Countering terrorism has always been one of the 
objectives of EU measures to enhance external border security, though never the sole 
objective.   
The Council Directive on the obligation of carriers to communicate passenger data from 
2004252 requires air carriers to collect and transmit passenger data (API data: number and 
type of travel document used, nationality, name and date of birth of the passenger, border 
crossing point of entry into the EU, departure and arrival time of the transportation, total 
number of passengers carried) to the authorities of the Member State of destination 
responsible for control. Non-compliance may lead to fines being imposed and even, in the 
case of serious infringement, confiscation of the means of transport or withdrawal of the 
operating licence. This Directive was adopted following a request by the European Council 
of 25 and 26 March 2004, which convened following the terrorist attacks in Madrid. 
The Schengen Borders Code of 2006253 improved the legislative part of the EU integrated 
border management policy by setting out the rules on the border control of persons 
crossing EU external borders and on the temporary reintroduction of border control at 
                                                 
 
250 This analysis refers only to external borders: the Schengen Area for people and the borders of the European 
Customs Union for goods. The internal borders are out of scope of this analysis, however the debate on internal 
border security sometimes is sparked by events like the attacks on the Berlin Christmas Market. 
251 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, 
towards integrated management of the external borders of the member states of the European Union (COM(2002) 
233 final). 
252 Council of the European Union, Council Directive 2004/82/EC of 29 April 2004 on the obligation of carriers to 
communicate passenger data (L 261/24). 
 European Parliament and Council of the European Union, Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the 
movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) (L 105/1). 
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internal borders. EU Member States assist each other with the effective application of 
border controls. Operational cooperation was coordinated by Frontex, since 2016 the EBCG, 
see also Theme A. Where in the Schengen area serious deficiencies are identified in the 
carrying out of external border controls by an EU Member State, the Commission may issue 
recommendations. For the Member State concerned, this may include submitting to the 
EBCG strategic plans based on a risk assessment to deal with the situation or initiating the 
deployment of European border guard teams or, as a last resort, triggering the closure of a 
specific border crossing point. 
In its Communication on reinforcing the management of the EU’s maritime borders of 
2006,254 the Commission set out operational measures designed to combat illegal 
immigration, protect refugees and set up controls at, and surveillance of, the EU’s external 
maritime borders. It proposed maximising the capacity of Frontex (EBCG), establishing a 
Coastal Patrol Network, developing a European surveillance system, setting up expert 
teams to carry out an initial assessment of each person intercepted and maximising the use 
of Community financial resources. 
The 2007 Regulation on Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABIT)255 set up a system 
providing enhanced technical and operational assistance for a limited period, in the form of 
rapid-reaction intervention teams including guards from other Member States. The teams 
will intervene at the request of any Member State faced with urgent and exceptional 
situations resulting from a mass influx of illegal immigrants. 
In the 2008 framework of the European strategy for integrated border management,256 the 
Commission floated the idea of new tools: measures benefiting bona fide travellers from 
Non-EU Member States, an EU entry/exit registration system, automated gates for 
checking travellers based on biometric identifiers, and an electronic system of travel 
authorisation for Non-EU Member State nationals not requiring visas before travelling to a 
Member State. 
At its meeting of 25-26 March 2010, the European Council endorsed the EU Internal 
Security Strategy (ISS).257 The strategy sets out the challenges, principles and guidelines 
for dealing with security threats relating to organised crime, terrorism and natural and 
man-made disasters. It has five strategic objectives, with specific actions for each 
objective, for overcoming the most urgent challenges in order to make the EU more secure. 
One objective was to strengthen security through border management. In relation to the 
movement of persons, the EU could treat migration management and the fight against 
crime as twin objectives of the integrated border management strategy. The instruments 
improving security in relation to the movement of goods are also complementary, and are 
constantly being developed to tackle the increasingly sophisticated criminal organisations.  
                                                 
 
254 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council, reinforcing the management of the 
European Union's southern maritime borders (COM(2006) 733 final). 
255 European Parliament and Council of the European Union, Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 establishing a mechanism for the creation of Rapid Border 
Intervention Teams and amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 as regards that mechanism and 
regulating the tasks and powers of guest officers (L 199/30). 
256 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Preparing the next steps in border 
management in the European Union (COM(2008) 69 final) 
257 Council of the European Union, Draft Internal Security Strategy for the European Union: “Towards a European 
Security Model, 5842/2/10 Rev 2 (23 February 2010). 
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In line with this, the actions proposed consist of: 
 exploiting the full potential of Eurosur (see below); 
 enhancing the contribution of Frontex at external borders; 
 developing common risk management for movement of goods across external 
borders (see below); 
 improving interagency cooperation at national level. 
Management of external borders must both enhance security and facilitate travel. With 
these objectives in mind, in 2011 the Commission presented proposals for an improved 
Schengen evaluation and monitoring system, and an analysis of the potential establishment 
of Entry/Exit and Registered Traveller systems as called for by the European Council.258 
Furthermore, the Commission proposed EU legislation on the collection of PNR (cf. Theme 
B) on flights entering or leaving the territory of the EU.259  
The Arab spring revolutions in 2011 resulted in a large influx of immigrants from the 
Southern Mediterranean who entered the EU illegally. These events have demonstrated the 
limited resources of the EU in immigration matters. Therefore, the Commission presented 
initiatives260 aimed at establishing a comprehensive European migration policy which is 
better able to meet the challenges presented by migration. This policy must respect the 
European tradition of asylum and protection, while preventing illegal border crossings. The 
Commission in particular announced creating a European system of border guards and the 
strengthening of the operational capacities of Frontex. 
To improve integrated border management and to prevent cross-border crime and illegal 
immigration, the EU in 2013 created the European border surveillance system (Eurosur).261 
Eurosur is a multi-purpose system to prevent illegal immigration and cross-border crime at 
the external borders. It will also contribute to ensuring the protection and saving the lives 
of migrants trying to reach European shores. It provides a mechanism allowing border 
surveillance agencies to rapidly exchange information and work together. By means of 
national coordination centres, all EU Member States’ national authorities responsible for 
border surveillance (e.g. border guards, police, coastguard, navy, and etcetera) must 
coordinate their activities with those of other Member States and Frontex (EBCG). As of 
December 2013, Eurosur was operational in the 19 EU Member States that have signed the 
Schengen Agreement and that have southern and eastern external borders. The remaining 
11 Schengen countries joined Eurosur on 1 December 2014. 
In the interest of the entire Schengen Area EU Member States must invest in the protection 
of the EU’s external borders. For some countries, notably those situated at the external 
frontiers of the Union, these investments can be very large. The External Borders Fund 
(EBF)262 provided financial support to assist EU Member States in responding to such 
                                                 
 
258 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, First 
Annual Report on the implementation of the EU Internal Security Strategy (COM(2011) 790 final). 
259 Ibid. 
260 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Communication on migration (COM(2011) 248 
final) – Not published in the Official Journal. 
261 European Parliament and Council of the European Union, Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 establishing the European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur) 
(L 295/11). 
262 European Parliament and Council of the European Union, Regulation (EU) No 515/2014 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 establishing, as part of the Internal Security Fund, the instrument 
for financial support for external borders and visa and repealing Decision No 574/2007/EC (L 150/143). 
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situations. Overall, EUR 1 820 million was allocated for these objectives over the period 
2007–13, to promote the implementation of the ISS and to ensure that it becomes an 
operational reality. The Fund has led to significant improvements, such as to the shortening 
of the duration of passenger checks, modernisation of surveillance systems and 
development of IT systems for external border controls. 
Following the introduction of risk management in the EU legal framework in 2005 and its 
roll-out between 2009 and 2011, the European Commission evaluated the situation and on 
21 August 2014 adopted a Communication on the EU Strategy and Action Plan for customs 
risk management: Tackling risks, strengthening supply chain security and facilitating trade 
(COM/2014/527). The Strategy and Action Plan annexed to the Communication proposes a 
set of step-by-step actions to reach more coherent, effective and cost-efficient EU customs 
risk management at the external borders. 
Following the terrorist attacks in Paris in January 2015, JHA ministers issued a joint 
statement. This served as an input for the 12 February statement by EU leaders, which 
called for several internal measures, including: 
 adopting an EU PNR framework; 
 making full use of the existing Schengen framework, including for systematic checks 
of EU citizens at external borders. 
At their meeting in March 2015, ministers discussed the implementation of the measures 
agreed in the recent statements. They focused in particular on: 
 the reinforced application of the Schengen framework: ministers agreed to 
implement systematic checks based on risk assessment no later than June 2015; 
 EU PNR Directive: ministers agreed to actively engage with the European Parliament 
in order to make decisive progress in the coming months. 
In June 2015, the Commission finalised a first set of common risk indicators, concerning 
foreign terrorist fighters, to detect terrorist travel. These risk indicators were developed in 
close cooperation with national experts, the EEAS, EU Agencies and Interpol. Common risk 
indicators and guidance from the EBCG now support the work of national border authorities 
when conducting checks on individuals.263 
Also in 2015, some terrorists tried to exploit the large irregular flows of persons occurring 
at the EU external borders. The so-called ‘hotspot approach’ was introduced to identify any 
individuals posing a threat to EU security and separate them from those who need 
protection. The hotspot workflow and the relocation process included integrated and 
systematic security checks, with support provided by the EBCG and Europol in the 
registration and fingerprinting of arrivals.264 
On 15 December 2015, the European Commission adopted an important set of measures to 
manage the EU’s external borders and protect the Schengen area without internal borders. 
The objective of these measures is inter alia to improve the internal security in the EU. In 
September 2016, the Commission proposed a European Border and Coast Guard to ensure 
                                                 
 
263 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council 
and the Council, Delivering on the European Agenda on Security to fight against terrorism and pave the way 
towards an effective and genuine Security Union (COM(2016) 230 final). 
264 Ibid. 
Policy Department for Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 132 
strong and shared management of the external borders.265 The EBCG replaces Frontex that 
was in operation since May 2005 (see Theme A). The Commission also proposed to amend 
the Schengen Border Code in order to introduce, at the external borders of the EU, 
systematic checks against relevant databases for all people entering or exiting the 
Schengen area.266 This proposal was amended by the European Parliament (see hereafter) 
A uniform European travel document for return will facilitate effective return of illegally 
residing third-country nationals.267 
Following the terrorist attacks in Brussels on 22 March 2016, EU ministers responsible for 
justice and home affairs and representatives of EU institutions met on 24 March 2016. They 
adopted a joint statement, calling for: 
 urgent adoption of the PNR Directive by the European Parliament in April 2016;268 
 increasing the feeding and use of European and international databases in the fields 
of security, travel and migration. 
On 6 April 2016, the Commission adopted a revised legislative proposal for Smart 
Borders.269 The revised legislative proposal for Smart Borders includes a Regulation for the 
establishment of an Entry/Exit System and a proposed amendment to the Schengen 
Borders Code to integrate the technical changes needed for the Entry/Exit System. It also 
announced the assessment of a new EU tool, the EU Travel Information and Authorisation 
System (ETIAS), where visa-exempt travellers would register relevant information 
regarding their intended journey. The automatic processing of this information could help 
border guards in their assessment of third-country visitors arriving for a short stay. 
The proposed EU Entry/Exit System will improve the management of the external borders 
and reduce irregular migration into the EU (by tackling visa overstaying), while also 
contributing to the fight against terrorism and serious crime and ensuring a high level of 
internal security. The system will collect data including identity, travel documents and 
biometrics as well as registering entry and exit records at the point of crossing. It will apply 
to all non-EU citizens who are admitted for a short stay in the Schengen area (maximum 90 
days in any 180-day period). Negotiations with the co-legislators on the two proposals are 
currently ongoing, and the Commission called for final adoption of the proposals by the end 
of 2016 with a view to the System becoming operational in early 2020 after three years of 
development.270 
                                                 
 
265 European Parliament and Council of the European Union, Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2016 on the European Border and Coast Guard and amending 
Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EC) No 
863/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 and Council 
Decision 2005/267/EC (L 251/1). 
266 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Regulation No 562/2006 (EC) as regards the reinforcement of checks against relevant databases at external 
borders (COM/2015/0670 final). 
267 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a European 
travel document for the return of illegally staying third-country nationals, (COM/2015/668 final). 
268 See also Factsheet B. 
269 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, 
Stronger and Smarter Information Systems for Borders and Security (COM(2016) 205 final). 
270 European Commission, “State of the Union 2016: Commission Targets Stronger External Borders”, Commission 
Press Release (14 September 2016). 
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In the Communication “Enhancing security in a world of mobility” 271, the Commission sets 
out the key workstreams to further implement the European Agendas on Migration and 
Security and the Security Union. The Commission points in this Communication to the fact 
that gaps in border control bring gaps in security: 
“The emergence of foreign terrorist fighters as a major security risk has 
underlined the cross-border threat and the particular importance of 
comprehensive and effective border checks, including on EU citizens. This adds 
to broader concerns that counter-terrorism has been hampered by the ability of 
terrorists to operate across borders, putting the spotlight on gaps in the 
sharing of key intelligence. 
The EU can use the opportunities for a common approach to build a powerful 
system harnessing its scale to bring citizens more security. If the EU uses its 
law enforcement and border control tools to the full, exploits the potential of 
inter-operability between information sources to identify any security concerns 
from a common pool of information, and uses the stage of entry into the EU as 
a key point for security checks to take place, the result will negate the ability of 
terrorist networks to exploit gaps.”272 
The Commission’s Communication puts the focus on entry procedures and external border 
management, by strenghtening the EBCG, stronger controls through the Entry-Exit System, 
enhancing identity management and strengthening the fight against document fraud273 and 
checking of visa-free travellers in advance in and European Travel Information and 
Authorisation System. 
The idea of establishing a European System for Travel Authorisation for visa-exempted 
third-country nationals, with similar objectives to the well-known US ‘ESTA’ system, was 
discarded by the Commission in 2011 as the potential contribution to enhancing the 
security of the Member States would neither justify the collection of personal data at such a 
scale nor the financial cost and the impact on international relations. In 2016, the 
Commission launched a feasibility study on a European Travel Information and 
Authorisation System (ETIAS) that must provide an additional layer of control over visa-
exempt travellers. ETIAS would – like the US ESTA and the previous idea of an EU ESTA - 
determine the eligibility of all visa-exempt third-country nationals to travel to the Schengen 
Area, and whether such travel poses a security or migration risk. Information on travellers 
would be gathered prior to their trip. The Commission presented a feasibility study on 
ETIAS and based on the results of the study as well as consultations, the Commission 
presented a legislative proposal in November 2016 for the establishment of ETIAS.274 
On 15 December 2015, the Commission put forward a proposal for a Regulation amending 
the Schengen Borders Code (Regulation (EC) No 562/2006)275. Under the current rules, 
                                                 
 
271 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council, 
Enhancing security in a world of mobility: improved information exchange in the fight against terrorism and 
stronger external borders COM(2016) 602 final. 
272 Ibidem. 
273 See also: Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Action plan to 
strengthen the european response to travel document fraud, COM(2016) 790 final. 
274 European Commission, “State of the Union 2016: Commission Targets Stronger External Borders”, Commission 
Press Release (14 September 2016). 
275 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Regulation No 562/2006 (EC) as regards the reinforcement of checks against relevant databases at external 
borders (COM/2015/0670 final). 
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identity checks carried out on EU nationals at the EU external borders are not systematic. 
The revision requested by Council would aim at enabling systematic and permanent checks 
at all points of entry at the external borders of the EU, including the verification of 
biometric information against the relevant databases, making full use of available technical 
solutions in order not to hamper the fluidity of the movement. After negotiations between 
the European Parliament and the Council, an amended Regulation was drafted276, under 
which Member States are obliged to check systematically third country nationals against all 
databases on entry as well as on exit. Border guards should also systematically check 
persons enjoying the right of free movement under Union law against the Schengen 
Information System and other relevant Union databases. Member States should also, in 
their own interest and in the interests of other Member States, enter data into the 
European databases. Equally, they should ensure that the data are accurate and up-to-date 
and obtained and entered lawfully.  
 
Goods (Customs) 
The EU has the responsibility of supervising the Union’s international trade and upholding 
minimum standards of customs risk management and controls. The common strategic 
objectives are the protection of the security of the supply chain and the safety of citizens 
and the financial interests of the EU and its Member States, as well as the facilitation and 
acceleration of legitimate trade to promote competitiveness. To this end, and in the context 
of the EU Customs Security Programme, in 2005, the European Parliament and the Council 
adopted the ‘security amendment’ to the Community Customs Code.277 This amendment 
introduced a common Customs Risk Management Framework (CRMF), specifying detailed 
common risk criteria and standards and risk information and analysis sharing. These 
standards and rules contribute to border management for security and safety purposes if 
applied equally along the length of the border. A gap in the application of these border 
standards and rules presents a risk for the whole EU. Effective implementation of CRMF 
depends on operators submitting advance information to Customs electronically and for 
Customs screening this information in an ‘equivalent’ manner on the basis of common 
standards and criteria. In 2010, the Commission proposed an EU action plan to strengthen 
air cargo security, with new rules and a definition of criteria for identifying high risk cargo, 
and has now progressed to the final stage of the development of an EU aviation security 
risk assessment. These initiatives are aimed to prevent terrorist access to materials and 
improve transport security, which is deemed critical in the fight against terrorism. 
The October 2010 (Yemen) incident278 demonstrated weaknesses in the security standards 
and procedures applying to air cargo in the EU and worldwide. The debate ensued 
                                                 
 
276 And approved after the finalization of this report, on 16 February 2017. 
277 European Parliament and Council of the European Union, Regulation (EC) No 648/2005 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 13 April 2005 amending Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the 
Community Customs Code (L 117/13). 
278 On October 29, 2010, two packages, each containing a bomb consisting of 300 to 400 grams of plastic 
explosives and a detonating mechanism, were found on separate cargo planes. The bombs were discovered as a 
result of intelligence received from Saudi Arabia's security organisation. They were bound from Yemen to the 
United States, and were discovered at en route stop-overs, one at East Midlands Airport in the UK and one in 
Dubai in the United Arab Emirates. According to the USA and the UK, the bombs were probably designed to 
detonate mid-air, with the intention of destroying both planes over Chicago or another city in the US. Key in this 
case was the sharing of intelligence with the customs offices in Germany and the UK by US, Dubai and Saudi 
Arabia. This was all the more relevant since scanners, x-ray machines, chemical swabs and sniffer dogs were not 
able to detect the explosives – 100% scanning with current systems did not help (would not have helped) in this 
case. Another important element was that the quality of pre-loading data, including elements like 
consigner/consignee data, proved essential for analysis and detection. In this case, thanks to good bilateral 
cooperation and some luck, the bombs did not detonate. 
The European Union’s Policies on Counter-Terrorism. Relevance, Coherence and Effectiveness 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 135 
underlined the need to review security procedures and requirements more broadly for all 
transport modes. The Yemen incident illustrated very clearly several key points to be 
considered in formulating EU customs supply chain security policy. These include the time-
sensitive nature of risk mitigation measures, the simultaneous involvement of several 
Member States in a single transaction and their interdependence, the multi-agency and 
international dimension to the issue and the core interest of industry and stakeholders in 
the international trading and supply chain system. These interlinked elements underline the 
need for a proactive, interconnected approach to risk management involving multiple 
actors. The Commission to that end presented in 2013 a Communication279 with the 
objective to review the implementation of customs risk management policy, to put forward 
a strategic approach for the years ahead and to make recommendations for action with a 
focus on efficient deployment of resources. 
Following the introduction of risk management in the EU legal framework in 2005 and its 
roll-out between 2009 and 2011, the European Commission evaluated the situation and on 
21 August 2014 adopted a Communication on the EU Strategy and Action Plan for customs 
risk management: Tackling risks, strengthening supply chain security and facilitating 
trade280. The Strategy and Action Plan annexed to the Communication proposes a set of 
step-by-step actions to reach more coherent, effective and cost-efficient EU customs risk 
management at the external borders. An explicit reference to terrorism is absent in this 
Strategy. 
 
International agreements  
PNR 
The EU has signed bilateral PNR Agreements with the US, Canada and Australia.281 PNR 
data is information provided by passengers during the reservation and booking of tickets 
and when checking in on flights, as well as collected by air carriers for their own 
commercial purposes. PNR data can be used by law enforcement authorities to fight serious 
crime and terrorism. 
Customs/container security 
The Agreement between the European Community and the US on customs cooperation and 
mutual assistance in customs matters of 1997 was extended on 22 April 2004 and its scope 
broadened to cover cooperation on securing the international trade supply chain.282 Later in 
2004, the EU-US Joint Customs Cooperation Committee adopted ten recommendations on 
the implementation of the extended agreement, with a view to strengthening the security 
of maritime container transport while facilitating legitimate trade through reciprocal 
security standards and industry partnership programmes.  
 
                                                 
 
279 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the 
European Economic and Social Committee on Customs Risk Management and Security of the Supply Chain 
(COM(2012) 793 final). 
280 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the 
European Economic and Social Committee on the EU Strategy and Action Plan for customs risk management: 
Tackling risks, strengthening supply chain security and facilitating trade (COM(2014) 527 final). 
281 See also Factsheet B. 
282 Council of the European Union, Council Decision of 30 March 2004 concerning the conclusion of the Agreement 
between the European Community and the United States of America on intensifying and broadening the 
Agreement on customs cooperation and mutual assistance in customs matters to include cooperation on container 
security and related matters, 2004/634/EC (L 304/32). 
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Assessment of added value of measures to enhance external border security 
 
Measures to enhance external border security serve many purposes, including 
counterterrorism 
Although some of the measures to enhance external border security were announced in the 
wake of terrorist events (like PNR and ETIAS), these measures serve in almost all instances 
more objectives than only counter-terrorism. The impact assessment for the PNR 
Directive283 for instance presents this measure as being relevant against the threat of 
terrorism and serious crime: “Terrorism and other serious crime are the biggest threats to 
security. By making PNR data available for the prevention, detection, investigation and 
prosecution of such crimes, law enforcement authorities will be provided with a necessary 
tool for the efficient performance of their tasks.” For the EES, the objective to contribute to 
the fight against terrorism and serious crime and ensure a high level of internal security is 
named as one of three objectives, next to improve the management of external borders 
and to reduce irregular migration, by addressing the phenomenon of overstaying.284 The 
objectives of ETIAS are to perform a security risk assessment, next to perform a migration 
risk assessment, to reduce the number of refusals at the border by pre-assessing part of 
the Schengen Borders Code entry conditions, thus creating benefits for both travellers and 
carriers and support border guards in their decision-making. Moreover, the objective for 
ETIAS is to obtain advance information for all border types, as opposed to the current 
situation where API/PNR cover only air borders. The security risks that should be addressed 
by ETIAS are terrorism and serious and cross-border organised crime, the latter including 
document and identity fraud, trafficking in human beings, drug trafficking and illicit 
firearms trafficking.285 The measures to enhance external border security listed in this 
section are not solely developed for counter-terrorism purposes, and the fight against 
terrorism is not even the main objective of these measures. 
Since ‘9/11’ and other terrorist attacks in Europe and elsewhere, security has become a top 
priority for European customs. The security of the EU, of the Member States and of citizens 
depends on each and every single point of entry of goods into the EU. If customs failed to 
act to tackle risks consistently along the EU’s external borders, the customs union and the 
EU single market would become unsustainable. According to the Commission, effective risk 
management of the movement of goods through the international supply chain is critical for 
security and safety and essential to facilitating legitimate trade and protecting the financial 
and economic interest of the EU and its Member States. The Commission therefore initiated 
several policies to strengthen customs risk management.286 Many of these policies refer to 
terrorist attacks or incidents. These policies were however never solely aimed at fighting 
                                                 
 
283 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the use of 
Passenger Name Record data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and 
serious crime (COM/2011/0032 final). 
284 Commission staff working document: Executive summary of the impact assessment accompanying the 
document proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing an Entry/Exit 
System (EES) to register entry and exit data and refusal of entry data of third country nationals crossing the 
external borders of the Member States of the European Union and determining the conditions for access to the 
EES for law enforcement purposes and amending regulation (ec) no 767/2008 and regulation (eu) no 1077/2011 
and proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (eu) 2016/xxx 
as regards the use of the Entry/Exit System (EES) (COM(2016) 194 final) and (COM (2016) 196 final).(Impact 
assessment EES). 
285 PwC, Feasibility Study for a European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS): Final Report, (16 
November 2016). 
286 See e.g. European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council, European Parliament and 
the European Economic and Social Committee on the role of customs in the integrated management of external 
borders (COM(2003) 452 final), and European Commission, Action Plan for strengthening the fight against terrorist 
financing, Annex 1 to the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council 
(COM(2014) 527 final). 
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terrorism; the term risk is here used in the widest sense here: it covers not only risks to 
public security in the movement of goods (criminal, terrorist or other trafficking or illegal 
trade in firearms, biological products or explosives, for example), but also the threats to 
society’s security from trade in goods which pose a risk to public health, the environment 
and consumers.287 It is difficult to assess from Commission documents to what extent 
measures strengthening customs risk management were developed for fighting terrorism, 
or whether the other objectives were equally or even more relevant. 
The added value of measures to enhance external border security for counter-terrorism 
To what extent the measures to enhance external border security described in this section 
contribute to the fight against terrorism is hard to assess, in many instance mainly also 
because the measures are not yet implemented or have been implemented only recently. 
The Commission has assessed for many of the then proposed measures their impact, and 
provided assessments of the added value or significance of each measure – and for each 
measure assessments of different possible options – for the counter-terrorism objective.  
In the impact assessment for the PNR Directive, it is stated that “because of the dramatic 
effects of a plane crash, and because of the destruction caused by such a crash, terrorists 
appear to have a preference for using aircraft to perform an act of terror. In addition, 
criminals who traffic people and goods also tend to use air travel because it is faster than 
other modes of transport.” This leads to the preferred option to limit the use of PNR data to 
travel by air. However, under this option not all controlled border crossings to the EU would 
be covered, and there would therefore continue to be a high possibility of terrorists and 
criminals entering its territory via other border crossings/land or sea borders. Furthermore, 
there remains a risk that those wishing to enter EU territory use alternative means of 
transport, for example ship, ferry, train, bus, thus making the instrument less effective.288  
According to the impact assessment, overall, this option could sufficiently achieve the goal 
of increasing security in the EU. An extension of the scope of the PNR measure to cover sea 
and rail travel could be considered in the future, once authorities have learned from the 
experiences with PNR collection from air travel. 
The added value of the Entry/Exit System for the fight against terrorism is less obvious and 
the general policy objectives of the Entry-Exit System are therefore, “in order of priority: 
 To counteract irregular immigration; 
 To contribute to the fight against terrorism and serious crime and ensure a high 
level of internal security.” 
However, the impact assessment for the EES clearly concludes that the preferred policy 
option assessed has no impact (no added value) for the fight against terrorism and serious 
crime.289 
                                                 
 
287 "‘Risk’ means the likelihood and the impact of an event occurring, with regard to the entry, exit, transit, 
movement or end-use of goods moved between the customs territory of the Union and countries or territories 
outside that territory and to the presence within the customs territory of the Union of non-Union goods, which 
would pose a threat to the security and safety of the Union and its residents, to human, animal or plant health, to 
the environment or to consumers”. See also: European Parliament and Council of the European Union, Regulation 
(EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 October 2013 laying down the Union 
Customs Code (L 269/1). 
288 Impact assessment on PNR Regulation, p. 33. 
289 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, Executive Summary of the impact assessment 
Accompanying the document Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing 
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ETIAS would be an additional requirement for a population of travellers arriving using very 
different means at the Schengen border: by train, bus or in a private vehicle. In the EU, 
although land travel currently represents around 5% of the visa-exempted third country 
nationals (VE-TCNs) arriving at the Schengen borders, this number is likely to increase 
dramatically given the current visa liberalisation discussions. The situation at land differs 
greatly from that at air and sea. Contrary to air travel, no advance passenger information 
(like API) is sent for travellers arriving by land. One of the main objectives of ETIAS is 
filling an information gap on VE-TCNs, which is greatest at land borders. However, the 
practice of verifying TCNs’ travel documents before they board a train or bus is still not 
widespread amongst carriers and such verifications prior to the boarding are complex to 
implement. The heterogeneity of the carriers’ situations at land (small companies, different 
types of vessels, multiple stops before arriving at the Schengen Area, not all land carriers 
stop at the border, etc.) makes it very unlikely for now, and unrealistic for the EU, to 
require all carriers to verify their passengers’ travel documents, visas and authorisations 
before embarking. 
In addition, more people travel privately by land than by air and sea. This heterogeneity 
makes it difficult to inform all VE-TCNs of the new requirement. This also means that more 
VE-TCNs would try to make an application close to the border, or even once they arrive at 
the border. Indeed, travellers could try to apply on the spot using their own mobile devices, 
for instance, and would stand a good chance of receiving quickly a positive answer. This 
situation would probably lead to queues and people waiting at the border to receive the 
authorisation. In order to better manage the crowds and avoid potentially tense situations, 
computers with Internet access (which could be limited to the ETIAS website) or Internet 
hotspots could be made available at the border in order to let travellers apply on the spot 
from their mobile devices. However, if ETIAS was to fill the information gap of visa-
exempted third country nationals arriving at the border, and one of the shortcomings of the 
PNR Directive is that PNR data is sent at check-in, which leaves authorities limited time to 
conduct assessments, it is not clear how this is overcome at land borders with ETIAS. 
In the feasibility study for a ETIAS, the significance of the fight against terrorism is 
characterised as a risk that has recently been highlighted as a priority for the EU and with a 
limited link to VE-TCNs, whereas serious and cross-border organised crime has recently 
been clearly highlighted as a top priority for the EU and with an established link to VE-
TCNs. In this sense, terrorism is a risk less significant for ETIAS to assess and help address 
than serious and cross-border organised crime. 290 
The impact assessments and feasibility studies on PNR, EES and ETIAS build to a certain 
extent on the assumption that Member States will use the data that is collected and/or 
generated in these border management systems to match with their own data, and on the 
assumption that Member States enter relevant data in EU systems (such as SIS II) so that 
an automated match can be made with data that is collected and/or generated in these 
border management systems.291 Under the first assumption is perhaps another assumption 
                                                                                                                                                            
 
an Entry/Exit System (EES) to register entry and exit data and refusal of entry data of third country nationals 
crossing the external borders of the Member States of the European Union and determining the conditions for 
access to the EES for law enforcement purposes and amending Regulation (EC) No 767/2008 and Regulation (EU) 
No 1077/2011 and Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation 
(EU) 2016/xxx as regards the use of the Entry/Exit System (EES) (SWD(2016) 116 final), p. 34. 
290 PwC, “Feasibility Study for a European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS): Final Report”, (16 
November 2016), pp. 127-128. 
291 Or, as the Commission more explicitly stated: “The performance of a system is of course also conditioned by 
the quality of data it contains, hence the need for Member States to fully implement and use existing rules and 
systems – such as the Schengen Information System, the Visa Information System, the Interpol Stolen and Lost 
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that Member States, by sharing, possess more or less the same data and information, so 
that a match with systems in one Member State would lead to a similar outcome as a 
match in any other Member State. In most of the impact assessments, however, these 
assumptions remain implicit, and the consequences if these assumptions prove not to be 
correct are not made explicit either.   
In the aftermath of the Yemen incident,292 the Commission concluded in 2012293 on the 
basis of a study that the current customs risk management framework was not sufficient to 
address security and safety risks uniformly at the external border. Exchanges of 
information between customs and other authorities varied significantly at national level and 
are sometimes lacking at EU level. On this subject, a PwC study concluded “…there is room 
for improvement in the exchange of intelligence and information at all levels (between 
organisations at the national level, between the national and the EU level and between 
organisations at the EU level).”294 The conclusions of the Commission dated 2003 seemed 
still valid:  
 
“At Community level, there is no uniformity or harmonisation of security 
controls, which are sometimes slow to respond to new threats. This results in 
varying levels of performance in these areas at different points in the customs 
territory. In some places ... controls are less effective owing to a lack of 
investment and modern systems. In security terms, this means that the 
chances of seizing explosive devices, biological weapons or dangerous goods 
in time depend upon where at the Community’s external border these goods 
enter.”295  
 
This situation was assessed unsatisfactory and in need of remedial action to fill in the 
existing gaps and for a new approach to EU risk management.  
In the EU Strategy and Action Plan for customs risk management of 2014,296 promoting 
interagency cooperation and information sharing between customs and other authorities at 
the Member States and EU level to ensure effective risk management, i.a. via development 
of further cross-sectoral co-operation arrangements, improvement of sharing and 
accessibility of (risk) information, and customs involvement in risk and threat assessments, 
was listed as one of the objectives. This objective has to be developed between 2015 and 
2020 according to the indicative timetable. The effectiveness of all initiatives in the area of 
customs risk management thus still depend on interagency cooperation and information 
sharing between customs and other authorities at the Member States and EU level, and 
that has still to be developed. The Progress Report of July 2016 on the implementation of 
                                                                                                                                                            
 
Travel Documents database, EURODAC and Europol databases.” – see: Communication from the Commission to 
the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council, Enhancing security in a world of mobility: 
improved information exchange in the fight against terrorism and stronger external borders COM(2016) 602 final. 
292 Ibid. 
293 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the 
European Economic and Social Committee on Customs Risk Management and Security of the Supply Chain 
(COM(2012) 793 final). 
294 PwC, “Study on possible ways to enhance EU-level capabilities for customs risk analysis and targeting” (31 May 
2012). 
295 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council, European Parliament and the 
European Economic and Social Committee on the role of customs in the integrated management of external 
borders (COM(2003) 452 final). 
296 Annex to European Commission, Action Plan for strengthening the fight against terrorist financing, Annex 1 to 
the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council (COM(2014) 527 final) 
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the EU Strategy and Action Plan for customs risk management297 gives an overall 
qualitative assessment of the implementation of the Strategy and draws some preliminary 
conclusions. The Report states that reform of customs risk management is a resource-
intensive exercise, that achieving results takes time and although a large number of actions 
have been launched, progress has been uneven: “Progress is most noticeable on actions 
which fall within the remit of customs, while it has been slower for those actions requiring 
increased cooperation between customs and other authorities, in particular cooperation 
with law enforcement and security authorities.”298 
 
Implementation in Member States 
 
Implementation in seven focus Member States 
 
Table 1: Overview of implementation of Council Directive 2004/82/ EC on the 
obligation of carriers to communicate passenger data in seven focus Member 
States 
Belgium Bulgaria France Germany 
The 
Netherlands 
Slovakia Spain 
Act of May 
15, 2006 on 
various 
measures 
relating to 
transport 
(Official 
publication: 
Staatsblad; 
Publication 
date: 2006-
06-08; Page: 
29388-
29393) 
Foreigners in 
the Republic 
of Bulgaria 
(Official 
publication: 
Official 
Gazette; 
Number: 63; 
Publication 
date: 2007-
08-03) 
Law No. 
2006-64 of 
23 January 
2006 on the 
fight against 
terrorism 
and other 
provisions 
relating to 
security and 
border 
controls (1) 
Official 
publication 
of the 
French 
Republic 
(JORF); 
Number: 
2006-64; 
Publication 
date: 2006-
01-24    
3. Act amending 
the Federal Police 
Act (Official 
publication: 
Bundesgesetzblatt 
Teil 1 ( BGB 1 ); 
Number: 70; 
Publication date: 
2007-12-31; 
Page: 03214-
03215 ) 
Act of July 9, 
2007 to amend 
the Aliens Act 
2000 Directive 
no. 2004/82 / 
EC of 29 April 
2004 on the 
obligation of 
carriers to 
communicate 
passenger data 
(PbEU L 261) 
(Official 
publication: 
Staatsblad 
(Bulletin des 
Lois et des 
Décrets royaux); 
Number: 252; 
Publication date: 
2007-07-12; 
Page: 00001-
00002) 
Law no. 
48/2002 
Coll. on Stay 
of Aliens and 
on 
amendment 
of certain 
laws (Official 
publication: 
Zbierka 
zákonov SR; 
Publication 
date: 2002-
02-02) 
Organic Law 
2/2009, of 
11 
December, 
on the 
amendment 
of Organic 
Law 4/2000, 
of 11 
January, on 
the rights 
and 
freedoms of 
foreigners in 
Spain and 
their social 
integration 
(Official 
publication: 
Boletín 
Oficial del 
Estado ( 
B.O.E ); 
Number: 
299/2009; 
Publication 
date: 2009-
12-12; Page: 
04986-
05031) 
 
 
                                                 
 
297 European Commission, Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Progress 
Report on the implementation of the EU Strategy and Action Plan for customs risk management (COM(2016) 476 
final). In view of the short time elapsed since the launch of the actions, this Report does not seek to assess their 
impact. 
298 Ibid. 
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Many of the measures in the area of border management are implemented via Regulations. 
One important exception is the API Directive, another one will be the PNR Directive. 
Interestingly, some Member States (UK, the Netherlands) implemented the API Directive in 
their immigration law, whereas others (Germany, France) implemented the API Directive in 
laws related to law enforcement. When implemented in immigration law, Member States 
might face difficulties in using the potential of API data for law enforcement purposes. 
In 2012, an evaluation on the implementation and functioning of the obligation of carriers 
to communicate passenger data set up by Directive 2004/82299 has been conducted. 
Member States have transposed some or all the provisions of the Directive.300 However, the 
vast majority of Member States’ legislation is not in full conformity with the Directive. While 
one Member State301 is in full conformity, eight Member States302 are not due to gaps in 
transposition, two Member States303 have incorrectly transposed some of its provisions and 
the remaining 18 Member States304 have incorrectly and not fully transposed all of the 
provisions of the Directive. The main issues of non-conformity relate to data protection 
legislation, late transposition, gaps in the definitions, absence of cross referencing (no 
referencing is made to the Schengen Convention) and absence of minimum and or 
maximum levels of sanctions. On a positive note, the evaluation concluded that 18 Member 
States used API data for law enforcement purposes (as allowed for by the last paragraph of 
Article 6.1).305  
 
Effectiveness of measures to enhance external border security 
In 2010, the Commission concluded306 that significant steps forward have been taken to 
enhance border security over the past five years. New technologies are being used in the 
development of a modern, integrated border management system. Biometric passports 
were introduced in 2006. The second generation of the Schengen Information System is 
operational and second generation of the Visa Information System is under development, 
and their legal framework has been established. However, a thorough evaluation of EU 
counter-terrorism policies to assess to what degree EU counter-terrorism policies - 
including measures to enhance external border security - have achieved the stated 
objectives has not been produced by the Commission (despite repeated calls by the 
European Parliament).307 
                                                 
 
299 ICF GHK, Evaluation on the implementation and functioning of the obligation of carriers to communicate 
passenger data set up by Directive 2004/82. See ICF GHK, Evaluation on the implementation and functioning of 
the obligation of carriers to communicate passenger data set up by Directive 2004/82. Final Report for 
Directorate-General for Home Affairs, (17 September 2012), p. 3. 
300 The above-mentioned assessment is not applicable to Denmark, since Denmark is not bound to transpose the 
Directive under EU law. In addition, Liechtenstein has not been considered in the analysis of the transposition of 
the Directive since it does not have an airport or any external land or maritime borders. 
301 Slovenia. 
302 Bulgaria, Cyprus, France, Spain, Ireland, Norway, Romania and Sweden. 
303 Greece and Latvia. 
304 Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Lithuania, 
Luxemburg, Latvia, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia and the UK. 
305 Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Spain, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, 
Lithuania, Luxemburg, Latvia, Malta, Portugal, Romania and the UK. 
306 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, The 
EU Counter-Terrorism Policy: main achievements and future challenges (COM/2010/0386 final), (20 July 2010). 
307 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, The 
EU Counter-Terrorism Policy: main achievements and future challenges (COM/2010/0386 final), (14 December 
2011), and Hayes, B. and Jones, C., “Report on how the EU assesses the impact, legitimacy and effectiveness of 
its counterterrorism laws”, Statewatch (2013), pp. 26-27. 
Policy Department for Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 142 
Since most measures to enhance external border security developed since 2001 are only 
just implemented or still to be implemented, it is difficult if not impossible to say anything 
about their effectiveness. However, some data is available with regard to the effectiveness 
of the API Directive. 
The Commission evaluation on the implementation and functioning of the obligation of 
carriers to communicate passenger data set up by Directive 2004/82 concluded that in 
terms of relevance of the Directive to the needs for intervention, 55% of the stakeholders 
viewed combating illegal immigration and 41% improving border control as the most 
important objectives. Member States competent authorities with a longstanding tradition of 
fighting against terrorism also identified law enforcement as a perceived need at the time 
of transposing the Directive. According to the evaluation, in the context of law 
enforcement, API systems have helped identifying persons posing security risks and other 
persons including victims of human trafficking and smugglers. However: competent 
authorities surveyed were substantially less positive about the (perceived or potential) 
effectiveness of API systems in enhancing border security and public order.308  
The Netherlands evaluated the use of API data in 2014309 and concluded that the 
effectiveness and added value of the use of API data for the fight against serious crime and 
terrorism – outside the framework of border management and fighting illegal migration – 
was legally not possible, since the Alien Act (Vreemdelingenwet) in which the API Directive 
was implemented did not provide a sufficient legal basis for these objectives. There is 
however a legal basis in the Netherlands, for the General Intelligence and Security Service 
(Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, AIVD), to use the API data for national 
security purposes, and the assessment of the effectiveness and added value by the AIVD 
was positive (not clear is whether use for counter-terrorism was included in this 
assessment). 
                                                 
 
308 Council of the European Union, Council Directive 2004/82/EC of 29 April 2004 on the obligation of carriers to 
communicate passenger data (L 261/24), p. 6 and section 7.2.1. 
309 Evaluatierapport inzake het gebruik van Advanced Passenger Information (API) in Nederland, (2014). 
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THEME D: COMBATING TERRORIST FINANCING 
The EU has adopted a variety of measures aimed at combatting the financing of terrorism. 
EU responses generally fall into two broad categories, namely 1) anti-money laundering 
(AML) and measures aimed at preventing financing terrorism, and 2) the implementation of 
asset freezes, including those required by the United Nations (UN) “smart sanctions” 
regime.310 These measures are complemented by additional legislation, for instance relating 
to information requirements. This Factsheet provides an overview of EU instruments related 
to terrorist financing, and international cooperation of the EU with third countries and 
international organisations. It also discusses the (effectiveness of) implementation at the 
Member State level (concentrating particularly on the seven focus countries). 
 
Legal Framework 
EU instruments  
Several key general counter-terrorism instruments with relevance to the combatting of 
terrorist financing can be identified. First of all, there is Council Framework Decision 
2002/475/JHA on combatting terrorism as amended in 2008.311 In art. 2(2)(b) it sets out 
that intentionally funding activities of terrorist groups is to be made punishable. 
The instrument has been discussed in several implementation reports,312 and in an external 
study accompanying the last report that assessed the implementation of the legal 
framework adopted by EU Member States to combat terrorism in practice. 
At the end of 2015, a proposal for a Directive on combating terrorism was put forward that 
is to replace the Framework Decision.313 It aims at implementing new international 
standards and obligations taken by the EU and tackling the evolving terrorist threat in a 
more effective way. While Member States are already committed to comply with Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendations314 and have to a large extent adopted the 
necessary implementing measures, the extension of the offence of terrorist financing as 
currently included in art. 2 Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA at EU level “ensures that 
Member States are not subject to different legal obligations and that the differences in the 
scope of criminal offences do not affect cross border information exchange and operational 
cooperation.” The proposal is presented without an impact assessment.315 Denmark does 
not take part in the adoption of this proposal and will not be bound by it. Framework 
Decision 2002/475/JHA,316 as amended by Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA,317 shall 
continue to be binding upon and applicable to Denmark. 
                                                 
 
310 Bures, O., “Ten Years of EU’s Fight against Terrorist Financing: A Critical Assessment”, Intelligence and 
National Security 30 2-3 (2015), p. 210. 
311 Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism (2002/475/JHA), p. 1, as 
amended by Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA, Council Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA of 28 November 
2008, p. 21. The preamble to the 2002 decision refers to the UN Convention for the suppression of financing 
terrorism of 9 December 1999, and to the Council Recommendation of the same date on cooperation in combating 
the financing of terrorist groups. The Framework Decision is discussed more extensively in Factsheet F. 
312 European Commission, Commission reports of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism (COM(2004)409, 
COM(2007) 681) and COM(2014) 554). 
313 Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism (COM(2015)0625). 
314 The FATF recommendations set an international standard for AML and terrorist financing. They require states to 
take such actions as implementation of international conventions, and setting up Financial Intelligence Units. 
Available at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf.  
315 See also section 4.2 on the lack of preparing Impact Assessments for counter terrorism legislative proposals. 
316 OJ L 164, 22.6.2002, pp. 3-7. 
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The EU primarily responds to terrorist financing through the Anti-Money Laundering 
Directive (AMLD),318 and the enforcement of UN sanction regimes. The AMLD, which 
implements FATF recommendations, aims to prevent the use of the financial system for 
money laundering or terrorist financing. UN sanctions are enforced through asset freezing 
regulations. The EU also maintains an autonomous blacklist of persons and entities whose 
assets should be frozen pursuant to Common Position 2001/931/CFSP,319 which is modified 
every six months by the Council under Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001.320 This list differs 
from lists which simply implement UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions, such as in 
Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 imposing certain specific restrictive measures 
directed against certain persons and entities associated with the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida 
organisations.321 In July 2016, the Commission adopted a list of high risk third countries 
with strategic deficiencies in their AML and Countering Terrorist Financing regimes, which is 
to be reviewed three times a year.322 Banks are to subject financial flows emanating from 
the 11 listed countries to enhanced due diligence measures. 
Other relevant legislation includes Regulation (EC) No 1781/2006 on information on the 
payer accompanying the transfer of funds,323 Regulation (EC) No 1889/2005, which puts 
certain controls on people carrying cash in excess of 10,000 EUR when entering or leaving 
the EU,324 as well as the Payment Services Directive 2015/2366.325 
Given the importance of a Union-level response to issues surrounding money laundering, 
financing of terrorism, and organised crime, new rules have been established in Regulation 
(EU) 2015/847 relating to information on payers and beneficiaries that must accompany 
money transfers when at least one of the payment service providers involved in the 
transfer is settled in the EU.326 Furthermore, a fourth AMLD (Directive (EU) 2015/849) was 
adopted.327 This legal instrument contains further preventive measures to tackle the 
manipulation of funds received through severe criminality, and the acquisition of money or 
property for terrorist purposes. The new rules incorporate, inter alia, recommendations of 
the FATF. Cash payments of 10,000 EUR or more will be included under the Directive (as 
opposed to 15,000 EUR under the third AMLD). 
                                                                                                                                                            
 
317 OJ L 330, 9.12.2008, pp. 21-23. 
318 Currently, the 3rd AMLD is being applied (2005/60/EC, OJ L 309, 25.11.2005, p. 15), but it will be replaced by 
the 4th AMLD 2015/849 (OJ L 141, 5.6.2015, p. 73) by 2017. The Commission has urged the Member States to 
actually implement the 4th AMLD by the end of 2016, ahead of the formal deadline of 26 June 2017. Additionally, 
work on the proposed 5th AMLD (COM(2016(450)) is currently in progress.  
319 OJ L 344, 28.12.2001, pp. 93-96. 
320 Ibid., p. 70. 
321 Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against certain 
persons and entities associated with the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida organisations, OJ L 139, 29.5.2002, p. 9 as 
amended by Council Regulation (EU) 2016/363, OJ L 68, 15.3.2016, p. 1. 
322 See Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1675 of 14 July 2016 supplementing Directive (EU) 2015/849 
of the European Parliament and of the Council by identifying high-risk third countries with strategic deficiencies(OJ 
L 254/1) p. 1.  
323 OJ L 345, 8.12.2006, pp. 1-9. Now being replaced by Regulation (EU) 2015/847 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on information accompanying transfers of funds and repealing Regulation (EC) 
No 1781/2006 (OJ L 141), 5.6.2015, p. 1. 
324 Art. 3 Regulation 1889/2005, (OJ L 309/09), 25.11.2005, Regulation (EC) No 1889/2005 Of The European 
Parliament And Of The Council of 26 October 2005 on controls of cash entering or leaving the Community, p. 9. 
See also Bures, O., “Ten Years of EU’s Fight against Terrorist Financing: A Critical Assessment”, Intelligence and 
National Security, 30(2-3) (2015), p. 210.  
325 OJ L 337, 23.12.2015, pp. 35-127. 
326 Regulation (EU) 2015/847 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on information 
accompanying transfers of funds and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1781/2006 ( 1 ), (OJ L 141/1), 5.6.2015, p. 1. 
327 Ibid., p. 73. 
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In February 2016, the Commission also presented its Action Plan against terrorist 
financing,328 which is set to shape the future development of EU policy in this field. The 
plan envisages a number of actions that can be taken to improve the EU efforts aimed at 
combatting terrorist financing. Among other things, the Commission urges Member States 
to enact a speedy transposition of the new (fourth) AMLD, bringing the proposed date of 
transposition forward to 1 January 2017, and enhance cooperation through Financial 
Intelligence Units (FIUs). FIUs are national bodies that receive and analyse suspicious 
transaction reports and other information relevant to inter alia financing of terrorism. 
European FIUs exchange information through FIU.net, a decentralised computer network 
funded by the European Commission.329 
The proposal for further amendments to the AML Directive330 - making it the fifth AMLD - 
seeks to improve the effectiveness of EU strategy on high-risk third countries, suspicious 
virtual currency transactions, and FIU information access, as well as address transparency 
concerns, and reduce the misuse of anonymous prepaid. The proposed fifth AMLD was 
discussed in the Council in July 2016 and forms an important pillar of the EU’s response to 
recent terrorist attacks and the Panama Papers.331 
A further proposal for a Directive on countering money laundering by criminal law was 
published in December 2016. The proposal refers to “recent terrorist attacks in the 
European Union and beyond” as part of its rationale in the explanatory memorandum.332 
The proposed Directive aims to implement international obligations emanating from the 
Warsaw Convention333 and the FATF Recommendations. 
In relation to asset freezes, the Commission also published a proposal for a Regulation on 
the mutual recognition of freezing and confiscation orders in December 2016. The 
explanatory memorandum states that “the terrorist attacks in 2015 and 2016 in the 
European Union and beyond underlined the urgent need to prevent and fight terrorism.”334 
The proposed Regulation builds on existing EU legislation such as Directive 2014/42/EU,335 
which sets minimum standards for freezing and confiscation orders, and is designed to 
improve cross-border enforcement of such orders. 
                                                 
 
328 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on an 
Action Plan for strengthening the fight against terrorist financing (COM(2016) 050 final). 
329 See https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/fiunet-financial-intelligence-units. 
330 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the document: Report from the 
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the evaluation of the second generation Schengen 
Information System (SIS II) in accordance with art. 24 (5), 43 (3) and 50 (5) of Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006 
and art. 59 (3) and 66 (5) of Decision 2007/533/JHA, (SWD(2016) 450 final). 
331 See European Commission, Fact Sheet, Questions and Answers: Anti-money Laundering Directive, Strasbourg, 
5 July 2016.  
332 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on countering 
money laundering by criminal law (COM/2016/826 final).   
333 Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and 
on the Financing of Terrorism of (2005), CETS No 198. 
334 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the mutual 
recognition of freezing and confiscation orders (COM/2016/819 final).  
335 European Parliament and Council of the European Union, Directive 2014/42/EU of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 3 April 2014 on the freezing and confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds of crime in the 
European Union (L 127/39), p. 39. 
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International agreements with international organisations and third countries  
Internationally, the EU works through and cooperates with various international 
organisations, including the UN, the FATF, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the 
Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC),336 as well as third countries, 
particularly the United States. Indeed, as noted above, the ‘smart sanctions’337 regime to 
combat terrorist financing was developed in the UN framework, and UNSC Resolution 
1373338 provided the impetus for the adoption of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP339 on 
combatting terrorism at an EU level, as well as subsequent legislation. European FIUs also 
cooperate at the international level in the Egmont Group, an informal network through 
which FIUs exchange information, training, and best practices.340 Of key interest in EU-third 
country cooperation is the EU-US Agreement on the Terrorist Finance Tracking 
Programme341 that is discussed in detail in Factsheet B.  
In the proposal for a Directive on combating terrorism342 that is to replace the Framework 
Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism,343 UNSC Resolution 2178(2014)344 is 
quoted in which criminalising the funding of foreign terrorist fighters is required. Additional 
references are made to UNSC Resolution 2249(2015),345 which urges Member States to 
prevent and suppress the financing of terrorism. The proposal also refers to UNSC 
Resolution 2199(2015),346 which calls on States to ensure that any person who participates 
in the financing of terrorist acts is brought to justice, and emphasises that support to 
terrorism may be provided through trade in oil and refined oil products etc. In the 
Additional Protocol to the 2015 Council of Europe (CoE) Convention on the prevention of 
terrorism,347 certain criminal law provisions of the UNSC Resolution 2178(2014) are 
implemented, notably providing or collecting funds for such travels (art. 5). The EU signed 
the Additional Protocol as well as the Convention on 22 October 2015.348 
Recommendation No. 5 of the 2012 FATF Recommendations provides that “countries should 
criminalise terrorist financing on the basis of the Terrorist Financing Convention, and should 
                                                 
 
 See for instance Co-Chairs' Statement – Council of the European Union, 25th EU-GCC Joint Council and Ministerial 
Meeting, Press Release 467/16, Foreign Affairs & international relations, (18 July 2016). 
337 The term ‘smart sanctions’ refers to the targetted instead of generic sanctions that are implemented, targetting 
in particular specific actors or entities that are allegedly involved in illegal activities that jeopardise international 
peace and security. This method of sanctioning is considered to be more effective than the method that could 
potentially also target the general population of a particular country/regime that is sanctioned. 
338 Security Council Resolution S/RES/1373 28 September 2011. 
339 Council common position 2001/931/CFSP of 27 December 2001 on the application of specific measures to 
combat terrorism (2001/931/CFSP), p. 93. 
340 See http://www.egmontgroup.org. 
341 Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the processing and transfer of 
Financial Messaging Data from the European Union to the United States for the purposes of the Terrorist Finance 
Tracking Program, OJ 2010 (L 195/5), p. 5. 
342 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on combating 
terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism (COM/2015/0625 
final).  
343 Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism (2002/475/JHA), p. 1, 
Council Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA of 28 November 2008 amending Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA 
on combating terrorism (2008/919/JHA), p. 21. 
344 Security Council Resolution S/RES/2178, 24 September 2014. 
345 Security Council Resolution S/RES/2249, 20 November 2015. 
346 Security Council Resolution S/RES/2199, 12 February 2015. 
347 Council of Europe Convention on the prevention of terrorism and its Additional Protocol (Riga Protocol), Council 
of Europe Treaty Series (CETS) – No. 217. The Convention itself is CETS No. 196. See also Council Decision (EU) 
2015/1913 of 18 September 2015 on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, of the Council of Europe 
Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (CETS No 196) (OJ L 280), p. 22, and Council Decision (EU) 2015/1914 
of 18 September 2015 on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, of the Additional Protocol to the Council of 
Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (CETS No 196), p. 24. 
348 See https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-is-new/news/news/2015/20151022_2_en. 
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criminalise not only the financing of terrorist acts but also the financing of terrorist 
organisations and individual terrorists, even in the absence of a link to a specific terrorist 
act or acts”.349 In light of the urgent need to address the threat posed by foreign terrorist 
fighters, the FATF revised the Interpretive Note to Recommendation 5 on the criminal 
offence of terrorist financing to incorporate the relevant element of UNSC Resolution 
2178(2014). This clarifies that Recommendation 5 requires countries to criminalise 
financing the travel of individuals who meet the definition of foreign terrorist fighters in 
UNSCR 2178(2014) by travelling to a State other than their States of residence or 
nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation 
in terrorist acts, or the providing or receiving of terrorist training, including in connection 
with armed conflict. 
 
Implementation by Member States 
Overview of implementation in all Member States 
Although most Member States have implemented criminal justice measures as called for by 
EU policies, this is also owing to other instruments from the UN and the CoE.350 In any 
case, most EU measures regarding criminal justice have been well implemented in Member 
States (see also Factsheet F).351 
Implementation in the seven focus Member States  
The focus countries have all criminalised financing terrorism in their criminal codes. An 
overview of these provisions can be found in the table below, which also lists other relevant 
laws. A few remarks below set out some more details. Nevertheless, the FATF did find 
some shortcomings in the manner in which some of these countries complied with the FATF 
recommendations on terrorism financing. 
 
                                                 
 
349 For the FATF Recommendations as well as the accompanying interpretative note, please consult: 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf. The 
Convention that is referred to is the UN International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism, 2178 UNTS 197. The European Union itself is not a party to this convention, but has called upon its 
Member States to become parties (Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP of 27 December 2001 on combating 
terrorism (2001/931/CFSP), p. 90.   
350 United Nations Security Council Resolution 2178 (2014); Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe 
Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (2015). 
351 Van Ginkel, B. and Entenmann, E. (Eds.), “The Foreign Fighters Phenomenon in the European Union. Profiles, 
Threats & Policies”, The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague 7, no. 2 (2016). 
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Table 2: Overview of implementation of legislation to fight terrorism financing in 
seven focus Member States  
 
Financing of terrorism, 
criminal codes 
Other relevant legislation 
Belgium 
Arts. 140 para 1 and 141 
Criminal Code 
Anti-money laundering and terrorist financing law352 
Bulgaria Art. 108a(2) Criminal Code Measures against the Financing of Terrorism Act
353 
France Art. 421-2-2 Criminal Code 
Law n°2016-731 on organised crime, terrorism and 
the financing thereof;354 Article D561-15 of the 
Monetary and Financial Code355 
Germany Section 89c Criminal Code Money laundering and terrorist financing law356 
The 
Netherlands 
Art. 421 Criminal Code 
Money laundering and terrorist financing prevention 
act357 
Slovakia 
Section 419(2)(a) Act 
300/2005 (Criminal Code) 
Act No. 297/2008 Coll. on the Prevention of Proceeds 
of Criminal Activity and Terrorist Financing;358 Act No. 
126/2011 Coll. on the implementation of international 
sanctions359 
Spain Article 576 Criminal Code 
Law 102/201003 on  preventing money laundering 
and terrorist financing;360 Royal decree 413/2015 on 
the monitoring committee for terrorist financing 
(Comisión de Vigilancia de Actividades de la 
Financiación del Terrorismo, CVATF)361 
 
In Belgium, the financing of terrorism is criminalised in arts. 140 para 1 and 141 of the 
Criminal Code. In art. 140, terrorist financing is considered as participation in an activity of 
a terrorist group (referred to in art. 139); and art. 141 criminalises acts committed by a 
person who, outside the circumstances provided in art. 140, provides material resources 
with a view to committing a terrorist offence (referred to in art. 137). Terrorist financing is 
                                                 
 
352 Wet tot voorkoming van het gebruik van het financiële stelsel voor het witwassen van geld en de financiering 
van terrorisme, B.S. (9 February, 1993), p. 2828. 
353 Закон за мерките срещу финансирането на тероризма, State Gazette No. 
16/18.02.2003. 
354 Loi no 2016-731 renforçant la lutte contre le crime organisé, le terrorisme et leur financement, et améliorant 
l’efficacité et les garanties de la procédure pénale, JO 4.6.2016. 
355 Code monétaire et financier No. 2001-420, JO 16.5.2001. 
356 Gesetz zur Ergänzung der Bekämpfung der Geldwäsche und der Terrorismusfinanzierung (Gw-Be-kErgG), BGBl 
2008, Teil I, Nr. 37, (20 August 2008). 
357 Wet ter voorkoming van witwassen en financieren van terrorisme (WWTF), Stb. 2008, 303., (Dutch law on 
AML/terrorist financing).  
358 Zákon č. 297/2008 Z. z. o ochrane pred legalizáciou príjmov z trestnej cinnosti a o ochrane pred financovaním 
terorizmu a o zmene a doplnení niektorých zákonov, Čiastka 113/2008, 01.08.2008. 
359 Zákon č. 126/2011 Z. z. o vykonávaní medzinárodných sankcií, Čiastka 40/2011, (21 April 2011). 
360 Ley 10/2010 de prevención del blanqueo de capitales y de la financiación del terrorismo, BOE núm. 103 of (29 
April 2010), p. 37458. 
361 Real Decreto 413/2015 por el que se aprueba el Reglamento de la Comisión de Vigilancia de Actividades de 
Financiación del Terrorismo, BOE núm. 129 of (30 May 2015), p. 46255. 
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also specifically addressed in the Belgian anti-money laundering and terrorist financing law 
(WG/FT).362 
The FATF noted in 2015 that Belgium has the basic core elements needed to develop a solid 
AML/Countering the Financing of Terrorism (CFT) regime, and that the legal framework 
technically complies in broad terms but still needs to be adapted to the revised FATF 
requirements of 2012.363 More specifically, while the criminalisation of terrorist financing in 
Belgium responds largely to the requirements in the UN Convention for the Suppression of 
the Financing of Terrorism and Recommendation 5, there are some technical shortcomings. 
“Financing one or two terrorists with no proven link to one or more specific terrorist acts is 
not covered by the current definition. The financial penalty of EUR 30 000 is low and its 
dissuasiveness is in doubt.”364 
In Bulgaria, financing of terrorism is criminalised in art. 108a(2) of the Criminal Code. 
Additionally, Bulgaria has a specific law dealing with terrorist financing, namely the 
Measures against the Financing of Terrorism Act, which was adopted in 2003, and also 
incorporates an autonomous regime for restrictive measures against those people, 
organisations, etc. with suspected links to terrorism.365  
In France, art. 421-2-2 of the Criminal Code addresses terrorist financing, as does law 
n°2016-731 on organised crime, terrorism and the financing thereof. Terrorist financing is 
also addressed in art. D561-51 of the Monetary and Financial Code, which sets up an 
advisory board for anti-money laundering and terrorist financing (COLP).  
In Germany, the financing of terrorism is included in Section 89c of the Criminal Code, as 
well as the Money laundering and terrorist financing law.366 The FATF had noted in 2014 
that, though Germany had made sufficient progress with regard to all core 
recommendations, insufficient progress was demonstrated for two key recommendations. 
Specifically, it was found that the definition of serious violent act endangering the state did 
not wholly comply with the Terrorist Financing Convention, and that technical deficiencies 
persist in the regime for freezing of terrorist assets, which interprets legal privileges too 
broadly and does not include provisions for ‘EU internals’.367 
In the Netherlands, measures regarding the financing of terrorism are implemented 
through art. 421 of the Criminal Code, the Money laundering and terrorist financing 
prevention act (Wet ter voorkoming van witwassen en financieren van terrorisme)368 and 
the Sanctions Act 1977 (Sanctiewet 1977).369 Notably, the prevention act has been 
described as effective in filtering out suspicious transactions that could be linked to 
financing terrorism. As for nationally imposed sanctions, affected persons can and have 
addressed Dutch courts to fight such decisions but so far that remained unsuccessful. Since 
the 2011 FATF mutual evaluation, the Netherlands amended its preventive AML/CFT 
                                                 
 
362 Wet tot voorkoming van het gebruik van het financiële stelsel voor het witwassen van geld en de financiering 
van terrorisme, B.S. (9 February 1993), p. 2828. http://economie.fgov.be/nl/modules/regulation/loi/ 
19930111_l_prevention_blanchiment_financement_terrorisme.jsp. 
363 FATF, Mutual Evaluation Report Belgium (2015). 
364 Ibid., p. 72. 
365 Закон за мерките срещу финансирането на тероризма, State Gazette No. 16, 18 February 2003. See also 
Committee of Experts on Counter-terrorism (CODEXTER) Profile on Counter-Terrorist Capacity of Bulgaria (2013) 
p. 4. 
366 Gesetz zur Ergänzung der Bekämpfung der Geldwäsche und der Terrorismusfinanzierung (Gw-Be-kErgG). BGBl 
2008, Teil I, Nr. 37, (20 August 2008). 
367 FATF, Mutual Evaluation of Germany: 3rd Follow-up Report (2014). pp. 13 and 16 respectively. 
368 Wet ter voorkoming van witwassen en financieren van terrorisme (WWTF), Stb. 2008, 303. 
369 Ibid. Stb. 1980, 93. 
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legislation and issued and further updated guidance documents with the aim to address 
shortcomings identified. By February 2014, it was found that the majority of the 
shortcomings, including those on beneficial ownership requirements, had been (largely) 
addressed, and that the Netherlands’ level of compliance with FATF Recommendation 5 was 
therefore assessed to have reached a level of compliance essentially equivalent to Largely 
Compliant (LC).370 
The Slovak Criminal Code criminalises terrorist financing in Section 419, which should be 
read in conjunction with Sections 129, and 297. Since Section 419 does not cover all 
terrorist financing, it is notable that Section 129 jo. Section 297 may be interpreted as 
criminalising financing terrorist activities beyond those in Section 419.371 372 Further laws 
relating to terrorist financing are Act No. 297/2008 Coll. on the Prevention of Proceeds of 
Criminal Activity and Terrorist Financing, and Act No. 126/2011 Coll. on the implementation 
of international sanctions. 
Terrorist financing is included in art. 576 of Spain’s penal code, and also dealt with in law 
10/2010 on preventing money laundering and terrorist financing, as amended in 2012 and 
royal decree 413/2015 on the monitoring committee for terrorist financing (CVATF).  
 
Effectiveness of these measures and cooperation (in practice) among different 
organisations and between Member States  
Many consider the effectiveness of the EU CFT policy to be unclear or even insufficient. In 
the Netherlands, the Court of Auditors found that the results of the AML/CFT legislation in 
this country have been disappointing, as it “insufficiently prevents against terrorist 
financing” and because “the chances of terrorism financing being discovered and punished 
are small”.373 In 2016, the Minister of Security and Justice explained to the Dutch 
parliament that it is difficult to measure the effectiveness of measures against terrorist 
financing because they are primarily aimed at preventing that financial institutions and 
others are abused for the purpose of terrorist financing; because of the preventive nature 
of the measures their effectiveness is hard to assess.374 
A point of contention is the effectiveness of national lists, for which two significant issues 
were identified, namely the diverging standards in various Member States375 and the need 
to consider individuals who intend to de-radicalise. In his 2015 assessment of EU CFT 
policy, Bures considered that effectiveness was unclear, listing EU-specific obstacles such 
as differing threat perception across Member States and weak cross-Pillar cooperation.376 
The Dutch Central Bank (DNB) is currently working on a thematic examination of 
transaction monitoring. Ideally, transaction monitoring enables the timely identification of 
                                                 
 
370 FATF, Mutual Evaluation of the Netherlands: 2nd Follow-up Report (2014). Largely compliant (LC) means that 
there are only minor shortcomings, see FATF, Methodology for Assessing Compliance with the FATF 
Recommendations and the Effectiveness of AML/CFT Systems, (2016), p. 13. 
371 Moneyval, Report on Fourth Assessment Visit Anti Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of 
Terrorism: Slovak Republic (2011), pp. 38-41. 
372 One interviewee indicated that concerns exist that Slovakian legislation may not sufficiently distinguish 
between different levels of support for terrorism, i.e. setting up a terrorist group, participating in it or financing it. 
373 Algemene Rekenkamer, Bestrijding Witwassen en Terrorisme Financiering (2008) (Dutch Court of Audit 
Evaluation of AML/terrorist financing policy). 
374 Beantwoording Kamervragen over BNC-fiche inzake Actieplan Europese Commissie terrorismefinanciering, (25 
April 2016). 
375 One interviewee remarked that listed persons in the Netherlands can simply cross the border and open an 
account in Belgium.  
376 Bures, O., “Ten Years of EU’s Fight against Terrorist Financing: A Critical Assessment”, Intelligence and 
National Security 30 2-3 (2015), p. 232.  
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unusual transactions and transaction patterns. Interim findings of the examination 
indicated that an improvement of the transaction monitoring process is needed. For 
instance, it was found that the risk profile and classification of clients is insufficiently used 
in investigations into unusual transactions.377 The DNB stressed that better information on 
how to structure and carry out transaction monitoring for the private actors concerned is 
needed. In the Policy Lab Workshop on EU counter-terrorism policy performed within this 
evaluative study, it was underscored that the private sector is often the missing link. This 
finding is especially pertinent in the field of CFT, where the cooperation of financial 
institutions and other private actors is key.378 One other issue raised in the interviews was 
that banks become risk-averse due to the costly and burdensome risk assessment rules 
that they must comply with. This kind of ‘de-risking’ may result in ethnic profiling and 
reluctance to operate in certain (particularly African) countries.379 Bures has also noted that 
the EU’s CFT efforts are hampered in particular by the tension between profit and security 
that arises in relation to private financial institutions. These actors have responded to legal 
AML and blacklist requirements by reporting too large a number of suspicious transactions 
for authorities to handle.380 These observations apparently also hold true for France. 
Though the role of banks in CFT has increased significantly there, public-private partnership 
on terrorist financing in France has been characterised by mutual wariness. For example, 
the staff members of Tracfin (the French FIU) were found to be wary of bankers, who they 
perceived as simply covering themselves rather than submitting a “real report”.381 It was 
also noted that, of the persons interviewed for this study, only Tracfin officials spoke of 
“partnership”, making it seem that the term had been imposed.382  
Finally, the lowering of thresholds is judged to not be very relevant for the prevention of 
terrorist financing383 (but rather for AML), notably since terrorism usually involves small 
amounts of money.384 Moreover, even with CFT measures becoming more advanced, 
terrorists are likely to adopt different methods, such as human couriers, for the exchange 
and acquisition of money.385 
                                                 
 
377 See https://www.dnb.nl/nieuws/dnb-nieuwsbrieven/nieuwsbrief-betaalinstellingen/kopie-van-nieuwsbrief-
betaalinstellingen-mei-2016/dnb345523.jsp See also: Ministerie van Financiën, Kamerbrief “Bestrijden witwassen 
en terrorismefinanciering” (Kamerstuk 31477, nr. 17) (5 oktober 2016) (letter Dutch Minister of Finance of 5 
October 2016 reacting to newspaper article claiming that DNB is worried about supervision money laundering). 
378 A 2013 article on the global counter-terrorism financing regime also incorporates dialogue with financial 
services providers as its first recommendation, see Dean, A., Thompson, E., & Keatinge, T., Draining the Ocean to 
Catch one Type of Fish: Evaluating the Effectiveness of the Global Counter-Terrorism Financing Regime, 
Perspectives on Terrorism, 7(4), (2013) pp. 71-72. 
379 In a 2013 PhD thesis, M. Wesseling also noted that risk assessments performed by banks were subjective 
rather than objective and warned that the flexibility of the risk-based approach could cause legal uncertainty, lack 
of transparency and even discrimination, see Wesseling, M., The European fight against terrorism financing: 
Professional fields and new governing practices, (2013), p. 211.  
380 Bures, O., “Ten Years of EU’s Fight against Terrorist Financing: A Critical Assessment”, Intelligence and 
National Security 30 2-3 (2015), p. 232. 
381 Favarel-Garrigues, G., Godefroy, T., & Lascoumes, P. Reluctant partners? Banks in the fight against money 
laundering and terrorism financing in France, Security Dialogue, 42(2), (2011), pp. 186-188. 
382 Ibid., p. 192.  
383 According to several persons interviewed for this project. It was further suggested that, though banks may 
engage in suspicious transaction tracking and flagging of high cash payments, more specific information from FIUs 
would make it easier to signal certain trends. 
384 Wesseling, M., Evaluation of EU measures to combat terrorist financing, In-depth analysis for the LIBE 
Committee, European Parliament, (2014), p. 22. 
385 Dean, A., Thompson, E., & Keatinge, T., Draining the Ocean to Catch one Type of Fish: Evaluating the 
Effectiveness of the Global Counter-Terrorism Financing Regime, Perspectives on Terrorism, 7(4), (2013) p. 71. 
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THEME E: FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVE WEAPONS 
The EU has introduced several instruments on regulating firearms and explosive weapons, 
both in the context of governing the trade of and possession in such items; and in relation 
to implementing obligations arising from international treaties. The raison d’être of these 
instruments varies and is not per se for the sole purpose of countering terrorism. Various 
instruments govern the arms procurements and trade between or with States,386 while 
others regulate domestic markets on the said products. For the purposes of assessing the 
counter-terrorism paradigm of the arms regulation by the EU, the selection below covers 
those EU instruments which regulate the trade in and possession of firearms and explosive 
weapons by natural or legal persons as these instruments have an inherent overlap with 
counter-terrorism interests. Universal arms restrictions based on international law and 
custom, such as those under international humanitarian law, and interstate arms regulation 
under categorical arms reduction and prohibition conventions are outside the ambit of this 
study.  
 
EU instruments 
The key EU instrument on regulating the possession and trade of firearms by natural and 
legal persons is Directive 91/477/EEC387 and its amendment under Directive 2008/51/EC388 
(hereinafter the consolidated version is referred to as the ‘Firearms Directive’). The 
Firearms Directive provides the definition of firearms, its parts, essential components and 
ammunition. Its main aim is to regulate the EU market on the trade of firearms, both for 
the purposes of creating and maintaining an internal firearms market in which legal 
possessors can freely travel with their firearm from one Member State to another as well as 
serving the security interests of its Member States in countering illicit trade in and 
trafficking of firearms and illegal use of firearms. Any firearm or its part that is 
manufactured or assembled in the EU, or that enters the EU, needs to be marked and 
registered or, otherwise, must have been deactivated.389 Furthermore, serving the security 
interests, the Firearms Directive provides authorisation restrictions for the possession of 
and trade in firearms. The underlying idea is that every usable firearm that is in circulation 
in the EU market must be traceable. 
The Firearms Directive establishes four categories of firearms: prohibited firearms under 
Category A; firearms subject to authorisation under Category B; firearms subject to 
declaration under Category C; and other firearms under Category D.390 The Firearms 
Directive provides that Member States must adopt rules to restrict the possession of and 
trade in these firearms, which include: permit requirements for the acquisition and 
possession of firearms;391 registration requirements for each firearm that is placed on the 
                                                 
 
386 The term used in the international context is small arms and light weapons (SALW), as opposed to the term 
firearms used in the EU’s internal context. 
387 European Parliament and European Council, Directive 2008/51/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council amending Council Directive 91/477/EEC on control of the acquisition and possession of weapons (21 May 
2008) (179/5).  
388 European Parliament and European Council, Directive 2008/51/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council amending Council Directive 91/477/EEC on control of the acquisition and possession of weapons (21 May 
2008) (179/5).  
389 Certain categories are exempted from the Firearms Directive, European Parliament and European Council 
Directive 2008/51/EC of 18 November 2015 amending Council Directive 91/477/EEC of 21 May 2008 on control of 
the acquisition and possession of weapons or are subject to national discretion, which follows later. 
390 Ibid., Annex I. 
391 Ibid., art. 5. 
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market;392 establishing and maintaining a registration data-filing system to record firearms 
and their suppliers, buyers and possessors;393 making the pursuit of dealership conditional 
upon mandatory background checks;394 requirements for dealers to register the records of 
firearms and the details of their buyers throughout their period of activity;395 the 
introduction of the European Firearms Pass (EFP) to allow legal firearm possessors to travel 
between Member States with their firearms without the need for prior authorisation by the 
Member State of destination, thereby serving the internal market;396 and certain minimum 
criteria on what qualifies as the deactivation of firearms.397 
The Firearms Directive exempts certain categories of firearms and Member States enjoy 
national discretion on certain details, allowing differentiation in various aspects of the 
regulation (such as penal sanctions for violations of the firearms legislation)398 and 
derogation for more stringent regulation under national law.399 The following exemptions 
and discretions are noted: While the four categories of firearms are proscribed by the 
Firearms Directive, the simplified system of two categories (firearms that are illegal; and 
firearms that are subject to authorisation) is used by several Member States and is 
recommended by the European Commission. Nevertheless Member States have discretion 
on this matter and, in view of the subsidiarity principle, may maintain the system of four 
categories if that is already in use. In art. 17 of the Firearms Directive the EC committed 
itself to exploring the effectiveness of the two-category system. This materialised in the 
2015 report.400 The report recognised the important role of the Firearms Directive in 
introducing tracing and marking requirements for firearms and in minimum standards for 
the acquisition of firearms.401 It also evaluated the cost-effectiveness of the Firearms 
Directive, concluding that its results were achieved at a reasonable cost.402 Most 
importantly, however, the report states that there is a lack of clear data on security related 
issues and that the data relating to the legal firearms market is of poor quality.403 This was 
also mentioned by one of the interviewed experts, noting that most of the available data 
comes from the United States and relates to their domestic market and regulation whereas 
the situation is different in the EU. Even the scope of the illicit firearms market in the EU is 
unclear, with figures ranging between as low as 80,000 and 80,000,000. 
The carrying of firearms, and the use of firearms for hunting or target shooting purposes, 
fall under the scope of national law. Member States enjoy discretion on the regulation of 
firearms possessed by public authorities and by collectors or bodies concerned with the 
cultural and historical aspects of weapons (for example, museums and historical battle 
enactment groups). Furthermore, in accordance with the use of EFPs, Member States may 
not prohibit persons resident within their territory from possessing a firearm legally 
acquired in another Member State unless they prohibit the acquisition of the same firearm 
within their own territory. 
                                                 
 
392 Ibid., art. 4(2). 
393 Ibid., art. 4(4). 
394 Ibid., art. 4(3). 
395 Ibid., art. 4(4). 
396 Ibid., art. 12. 
397 Ibid., Annex I, part II. 
398 While Member States enjoy discretion, the penalties must nevertheless be effective as they must sufficient to 
promote compliance with its firearm regulation; Firearms Directive, art. 16.  
399 Firearms Directive, arts. 3 and 15(4). 
400 Firearms Directive, art. 17, age 10. 
401 European Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Evaluation of 
Council Directive 91/477/EC of 18 June 1991, as amended by Directive 2008/51/EC of 21 May 2008, on control of 
the acquisition and possession of weapons (18 November 2015), p. 8. 
402 Ibid., p. 9. 
403 Ibid., p. 14. 
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Firearms in government stocks are exempted from the marking requirements unless they 
are transferred to permanent civilian use. Standards concerning the deactivation of 
firearms are not specified in the Firearms Directive. With the adoption of the amendment in 
2008 the EC committed itself to provide guidelines on this matter, but it was not until 
December 2015 that it actually introduced such guidelines under Regulation 2015/2403. 
Furthermore, while ammunition falls within the scope of the Firearms Directive, Member 
States have discretion whether to include authorisation requirements for ammunition 
components; and on this matter they enjoy discretion on whether to apply the marking 
standards under the 1969 Convention on Reciprocal Recognition of Proofmarks on Small 
Arms.404 
Additionally, in 2005 the European Commission adopted Recommendation 2005/11/EC405 to 
introduce the EFP model, as provided under the Firearms Directive.406 In 2012 the 
Commission adopted Regulation No 258/2012 as a measure to implement art. 10 of the 
2001 Firearms Protocol.407 This provision requires the establishment of general 
requirements for export, import and transit licensing or authorisation systems. And 
following the EC’s review of the Firearms Directive,408 and in the aftermath of the Paris 
attacks of November 2015, the Commission also adopted Regulation 2015/2403 to 
establish common guidelines on deactivation standards and techniques to ensure that 
deactivated firearms are rendered irreversibly inoperable.409  
In addition to Regulation 2015/2403 introducing common guidelines on standards for the 
deactivation of firearms, the EU is preparing the amendment of the Firearms Directive by 
means of introducing stricter rules on online sale and acquisition of firearms, stricter control 
on semi-automatic firearms which resemble automatic rifles, the inclusion of blank-firing 
weapons (alarm and signal weapons, salute and acoustic weapons and replicas) within the 
scope of the Firearms Directive, and additional rules on the marking of firearms to improve 
traceability of firearms. All of which are aimed at serving the security interests of its 
Member States after the Paris attacks. The vote on the amendment was postponed after 
the reasoned opinion of the Swedish Parliament on questions concerning the principle of 
subsidiarity.410 The assemblies of Austria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Finland, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, and the United Kingdom also 
contributed opinions. From the selected Member States the assemblies of France, Germany 
and Slovakia also contributed opinions and statements, all of which were of a political or a 
procedural nature without reasoned legal opinion.411 The European Parliament’s Internal 
Market and Consumer Protection Committee (IMCO) adopted its report with 
                                                 
 
404 Convention for the reciprocal recognition of proof marks on small arms (with regulations and annexes) (1969), 
795 UNTS 249. 
405 European Commission, Commission Recommendation complementary to Recommendation 96/129/EC on the 
European firearms pass (Text with EEA relevance) (2005/11/EC) (28 December 2004). 
406 European Parliament and European Council Directive 2008/51/EC of 18 November 2015 amending Council 
Directive 91/477/EEC of 21 May 2008 on control of the acquisition and possession of weapons, art. 1(4) and 
Annex II. 
407 2001 UN Protocol against the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components 
and ammunition, annexed to the Convention against transnational organised crime. 
408 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52015DC0751&from=EN.  
409 European Parliament and European Council Directive 2008/51/EC of 18 November 2015 amending Council 
Directive 91/477/EEC of 21 May 2008 on control of the acquisition and possession of weapons, paragraph 18. 
410 Reasoned opinion of the Swedish Parliament on COM(2015), transmitted to the Commission, the Council and 
the European Parliament on 28 January 2016. 
411 For France, see http://www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-WEB/scrutiny/COD20150269/frass.do;  
for Germany, see http://www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-WEB/scrutiny/COD20150269/debra.do; and 
for Slovakia, see http://www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-WEB/scrutiny/COD20150269/skrad.do.  
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recommendations concerning the definitions, inter alia, the need for clarification of the term 
“firearm”, to enhance the control of essential components by including definitions on that 
matter, the need to define further “alarm and signal weapons”, “salute and acoustic 
weapons”, “museum” and “collector”.412 The European Commission and European 
Parliament reached a political agreement about the adoption of the amendments in 
December 2016.413 
Finally, on countering the proliferation of explosive weapons, the EU adopted the 2008 
Action Plan on Enhancing the Security of Explosives,414 and the 2013 Regulation (EU) No 
98/2013 on the marketing and use of explosives precursors (Regulation on Explosive 
Precursors – REP).415 This Regulation aims to restrict private access to scheduled explosive 
precursors (such as ammonium nitrate fertilizers) above certain limit values416 and 
introduces rules on licensing,417 labelling,418 reporting duties,419 and registration of 
transactions.420 It furthermore provides that the Commission must review the instrument 
by September 2017 in view of, inter alia, terrorism concerns.421 Furthermore Directive 
2014/28/EU was adopted to harmonise the laws of Member States relating to the making 
available on the market and supervision of explosives for civil uses (MSECU).422 The 
Directive prohibits the use and possession of and trade in restricted explosives423 by 
general members of the public and allows Member States to establish a licensing system to 
justify access to such items.424 
 
Cooperation/agreements with international organisations/third countries 
While bilateral agreements by the selected Member States on small arms and light weapons 
(SALW) are limited, there are numerous international instruments concerning SALW that 
address illicit trade and proliferation concerns, some of which may include counter-
terrorism concerns. While often only the Member States are party to such instruments, 
occasionally the EU as such may also have signed an instrument.425 The EU has several 
instruments concerning third countries and aimed at countering illicit trade in SALW, both 
at a global scale and for certain regions. To these ends the Council adopted the 1997 
Programme for preventing and combatting illicit trafficking in conventional arms. Of further 
importance for third countries is the Council’s 1998 Joint Action on the EU’s contribution to 
combatting the destabilising accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons 
                                                 
 
412 IMCO, “Report on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council 
Directive 91/477/EEC on control of the acquisition and possession of weapons”, A8-0251/2016 (2016).  
413 European Commission, “Firearms: Agreement on Commission proposal to increase citizens' security”, 
Commission Press Release (20 December 2016). 
414 European Commission, Progress Report on the Implementation of the EU Action Plan on Enhancing the Security 
of Explosives (2012). 
415 European Parliament and Council of the European Union, Regulation (EU) No 98/2013 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 15 January 2013 on the marketing and use of explosives precursors (L 39/1). 
416 Arts. 4(1) and 6, REP. 
417 Art. 7, REP. 
418 Art. 5, REP. 
419 art. 9, REP. 
420 art. 8, REP. 
421 art. 18(1)(b), REP. 
422 European Parliament and Council of the European Union, Directive 2014/28/EU of The European Parliament and 
of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to the making 
available on the market and supervision of explosives for civil uses (recast) (L 96/1) (MSECU). 
423 As defined in art. 2, MSECU. 
424 art. 4, MSECU. 
425 For example, the 2001 UN Protocol against the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts 
and components and ammunition, annexed to the Convention against transnational organised crime. 
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(amended in 2002 to include also ammunition).426 The EU is engaged in several 
programmes for such purposes. The most important of which that has direct relevance to 
EU counter-terrorism concerns is the programme on countering illicit SALW trade and 
registering firearms in Albania, Moldova and the countries of the former Yugoslavia – the 
South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light 
Weapons (SEESAC).427 
 
Implementation in selected Member States 
Overview 
The aftermath of the Paris attacks and the investigation into the origins of the weapons 
used revealed that there are large differences between Member States on how they govern 
the deactivation of firearms.428 Reports that the Kalashnikovs used were of Bulgarian origin 
also exposed the challenges arising from firearms that entered the illegal circuit prior to the 
introduction of the Firearms Directive.429 What little data is available indicates that there 
are around 81 million licit and illicit firearms in the EU, of which an estimated 67 million are 
unregistered firearms and (not necessarily excluding one another) an estimated 19 million 
are illicit firearms (extrapolated from the data that was retrieved from seven Member 
States).430 An earlier survey of experts also indicates that when questioned which groups 
are involved in illicit firearms trafficking, 4.4% of the answers identified terrorists while 
74.4% of the answers did not identify any specific group.431 The implementation of the EU 
Action Plan on Enhancing the Security of Explosives has been reviewed in 2012.432 
Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Slovakia and Spain adopted national 
legislation implementing the firearms directive, often by means of amending existing 
legislation.  
                                                 
 
426 European Council, Joint Action of 17 December 1998 adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the 
Treaty on European Union on the European Union’s contribution to combating the destabilising accumulation and 
spread of small arms and light weapons (1999/34/CFSP) (L 9/1), European Council, Council Joint Action of 12 July 
2002 on the European Union’s contribution to combating the destabilising accumulation and spread of small arms 
and light weapons and repealing Joint Action 1999/34/CFSP (2002/589/CFSP) (L 191/1). 
Of relevance are also the yet broader (i.e. covering also arms) 1998 EU Code of Conduct on Arms Export, 2008 EU 
Common Position, and the 2009 Joint Action on support for EU activities in order to promote the control of arms 
exports and the principles and criteria of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP among third countries. 
427 South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC).  
428 Gawron, Tomas, “How the proposed EU gun directive amendment might backfire”, EUobserver (3 December 
2015).  
429 Guineva, M., “Kalashnikovs Used in Paris Terror Attacks ‘Were Made in Bulgaria’”, (19 November 2015). 
430 European Commission, Study to Support an Impact Assessment on Options for Combatting Illicit Firearms 
Trafficking in the European Union (2014), pp. 16-18. 
431 Ibid., p. 30. 
432 European Commission, Progress Report on the Implementation of the EU Action Plan on Enhancing the Security 
of Explosives (2012). 
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Table 3: National implementation of the Firearms Directive 
BEL BGR DEU ESP FRA NLD SVK 
domestic legislation 
Law on the 
import, 
export, transit 
and the fight 
against the 
trafficking of 
arms, 
ammunition 
and 
equipment 
intended 
specifically for 
military use or 
law 
enforcement 
and related 
technology 
 
& 
 
The 2008 
amendment is 
at the level of 
sub-
entities.433 
Law 
amending the 
Law on 
weapons, 
ammunition, 
explosives 
and 
pyrotechnic 
articles434 
Act amending 
the Weapons 
Act and other 
regulations435 
Royal Decree 
976/2011, 
Dated 8 July, 
Amending 
The 
Regulation Of 
Weapons, 
Approved By 
Royal Decree 
137/1993 Of 
29 January436 
Art. 76 of the 
2010-1657 
Act, Art. 118 
of the 2011-
267 Act, 
Decree 2011-
618, and 
Decree 2011-
1253.437 
Amendment 
of the 
Weapons and 
Ammunition 
Act438 
Act No. 
190/2003 
Coll. on 
firearms and 
ammunition 
and on 
amending and 
supplementing 
certain acts 
 
& 
 
Act No. 
92/2010 Coll. 
amending and 
supplementing 
Act No. 
190/2003 
Coll. on 
Firearms and 
Ammunition 
and on 
amending and 
supplementing 
certain acts as 
amended and 
amending Act 
of the 
National 
Council of the 
Slovak 
Republic No. 
145/1995 
Coll. On 
Administrative 
Fees as 
amended439 
                                                 
 
433 Ministère Des Affaires Étrangères, Commerce Extérieur, Coopération au Développement - 5 Aout 1991 - Loi 
relative à l’importation, à l’exportation, au transit et à la lutte contre le trafic d’armes, de munitions et de matériel 
devant servir spécialement à un usage militaire ou de maintien de l’ordre et de la technologie y afférente. 
434 Закон за изменение и допълнение на Закона за оръжията, боеприпасите, взривните вещества и 
пиротехническите изделия. 
435 Gesetz zur Änderung des Waffengesetzes und weiterer Vorschriften.  
436 Real Decreto 976/2011, de 8 de julio, por el que se modifica el Reglamento de Armas, aprobado por el Real 
Decreto 137/1993, de 29 de enero.  
437 Art. 76 de la loi n° 2010-1657 du 29 décembre 2010 de finances pour 2011; art. 118 de la LOI n° 2011-267 du 
14 mars 2011 d’orientation et de programmation pour la performance de la sécurité intérieure; décret n° 2011-
618 du 31 mai 2011 modifiant le régime des matériels de guerre, armes et munitions; and décret no 2011-1253 
du 7 octobre 2011 modifiant le régime des matériels de guerre, armes et munitions. 
438 Wet van 26 januari 2012 tot wijziging van de Wet wapens en munitie in verband met de implementatie van 
richtlijn 2008/51/EG van het Europees Parlement en de Raad van de Europese Unie van 21 mei 2008 tot wijziging 
van de richtlijn 91/477/EEG van de Raad inzake de controle op de verwerving en het voorhanden hebben van 
wapens (PbEU L179) (Implementatiewet EG-richtlijn 2008/51 inzake de controle op de verwerving en het 
voorhanden hebben van wapens). 
439 Zákon č. 440/2009 Z. z., ktorým sa mení a dopĺňa zákon č. 190/2003 Z. z. o strelných zbraniach a strelive a o 
zmene a doplnení niektorých zákonov v znení neskorších predpisov & Zákon č. 92/2010 Z. z., ktorým sa mení a 
dopĺňa zákon č. 190/2003 Z. z. o strelných zbraniach a strelive a o zmene a doplnení niektorých zákonov v znení 
neskorších predpisov a ktorým sa mení zákon Národnej rady Slovenskej republiky č. 145/1995 Z. z. o správnych 
poplatkoch v znení neskorších predpisov. 
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minimum age 
18 18 18 18 (with 
exceptions) 
18 (12-18 for 
sports shooters) 
18 21 (18 for 
hunting) 
private ownership of automatic assault rifles 
Prohibited Licensed 
possession 
permitted 
Prohibited Prohibited Prohibited Prohibited Prohibited 
private ownership of semi-automatic assault rifles  
Special 
authorisation 
Licensed 
possession 
permitted 
Special 
authorisation 
Special 
authorisation 
Licensed 
possession 
permitted 
Prohibited Special 
authorisation 
private ownership of rifles and shotguns  
Regulated by 
law 
Regulated by 
law 
Regulated by 
law 
Regulated by 
law 
Regulated by 
law 
Regulated by 
law 
Regulated by 
law 
private ownership of handguns (pistols and revolvers) 
Special 
authorisation 
Licensed  
possession 
permitted 
Special 
authorisation 
Special 
authorisation 
Prohibited 
with 
exceptions 
Licensed  
possession 
permitted  
Special 
authorisation 
max penalty for illicit firearm possession 
five years 
imprisonment 
and/or 25,000 
EUR fine 
six years 
imprisonment 
and/or a fine 
ten years 
imprisonment 
two years 
imprisonment 
three years 
imprisonment 
and a fine 
nine months 
imprisonment 
and a fine 
eight years 
imprisonment  
background check for authorisation/licencing 
background 
check includes 
criminal and 
other records 
background 
check 
includes 
criminal, 
mental 
health, and 
substance 
abuse records 
(not 
applicable for 
sales between 
privates or by 
dealers) 
background 
check 
includes 
criminal, 
mental 
health, and 
addiction 
records 
background 
check 
includes 
criminal, 
mental 
health, 
physical and 
domestic 
violence 
records 
background 
check 
includes 
criminal, 
mental 
health, and 
health records 
background 
check 
includes 
criminal 
records 
background 
check includes 
criminal and 
mental health 
records  
 denying/revoking authorisation or license in case of records of violence 
no specific 
provision 
no specific 
provision 
no specific 
provision 
licence should 
be denied or 
revoked in 
case of (an 
history of) 
domestic 
violence 
no specific 
provision 
no specific 
provision 
unknown 
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authorisation or licence requirements for sale and/or transfer of firearms 
dealing in 
firearms by 
way of 
business is 
unlawful 
without a 
dealer’s 
licence 
dealing in 
firearms by 
way of 
business is 
unlawful 
without a 
dealer’s 
licence 
dealing in 
firearms by 
way of 
business is 
unlawful 
without a 
dealer’s 
licence 
dealing in 
firearms by 
way of 
business is 
unlawful 
without a 
dealer’s 
licence 
dealing in 
firearms by 
way of 
business is 
unlawful 
without a 
dealer’s 
licence 
dealing in 
firearms by 
way of 
business is 
unlawful 
without a 
dealer’s 
licence 
dealing in 
firearms by 
way of 
business is 
unlawful 
without a 
dealer’s 
licence 
prohibition on 
private sale of 
firearms 
no prohibition 
on private 
sale of 
firearms 
unknown unknown no prohibition 
on private 
sale of 
firearms 
prohibition on 
private sale of 
firearms 
unknown 
firearms marking and tracing requirements 
for certain 
firearms  
on each 
firearm 
on each 
firearm 
on each 
firearm 
on each 
firearm 
on each 
firearm 
on each 
firearm 
State 
authorities 
carry out 
arms tracing 
and tracking 
procedures 
State 
authorities 
carry out 
arms tracing 
and tracking 
procedures 
State 
authorities 
carry out 
arms tracing 
and tracking 
procedures 
State 
authorities 
carry out 
arms tracing 
and tracking 
procedures 
State 
authorities 
carry out 
arms tracing 
and tracking 
procedures 
State 
authorities 
carry out 
arms tracing 
and tracking 
procedures 
State 
authorities 
carry out 
arms tracing 
and tracking 
procedures 
data 1 on (registered) firearms440 
estimated 
total of 
privately 
owned 
firearms 
740,000 
estimated 
total of 
privately 
owned 
firearms 
350,000 
estimated 
total of 
privately 
owned 
firearms 
5,500,000 
estimated 
total of 
privately 
owned 
firearms 
3,350,000 
estimated 
total of 
privately 
owned 
firearms 
3,000,000 
estimated 
total of 
privately 
owned 
firearms 
205,000 
estimated 
total of 
privately 
owned 
firearms 
280,000 
estimated 
number of  
licences 
409,000 
estimated 
number of  
licences 
250,000 
estimated 
number of  
licences 
1,400,000 
estimated 
number of  
licences 
2,000,000 
estimated 
number of  
licences 
1,890,000 
estimated 
number of  
licences 
72,000 
estimated 
number of  
licences 
150,000 
data 2 on (registered) firearms441 
estimated 
total of 
privately 
owned 
firearms 
1,800,000 
estimated 
total of 
privately 
owned 
firearms 
480,000 
estimated 
total of 
privately 
owned 
firearms 
25,000,000 
estimated 
total of 
privately 
owned 
firearms 
4,500,000 
estimated 
total of 
privately 
owned 
firearms 
19,000,000 
estimated 
total of 
privately 
owned 
firearms 
510,000 
estimated 
total of 
privately 
owned 
firearms 
270,000 
estimated 
number of  
licences 
458,000 
estimated 
number of  
licences 
n.a. 
estimated 
number of  
licences 
2,000,000 
estimated 
number of  
licences 
2,500,000 
estimated 
number of  
licences  
n.a. 
estimated 
number of  
licences 
n.a. 
estimated 
number of  
licences 
n.a. 
estimated 
number of 
registered 
firearms 
870,000 
estimated 
number of 
registered 
firearms 
275,960 
estimated 
number of 
registered 
firearms  
n.a. 
estimated 
number of 
registered 
firearms 
3,051,000 
estimated 
number of 
registered 
firearms 
2,802,000 
estimated 
number of 
registered 
firearms 
330,000 
estimated 
number of 
registered 
firearms 
102,700 
                                                 
 
440 Katja Triebel, Report: Impact Assessment on Firearms Directive (2016), Firearms United, Attachment 4, 
https://firearms-united.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Impact-Assessment.pdf. 
441 European Commission, Study to Support an Impact Assessment on Options for Combatting Illicit Firearms 
Trafficking in the European Union (2014). 
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estimated 
number of 
illicit firearms 
n.a. 
estimated 
number of 
illicit firearms  
93,200 
estimated 
number of 
illicit firearms 
17,000,000 
estimated 
number of 
illicit firearms 
n.a. 
estimated 
number of 
illicit firearms 
n.a. 
estimated 
number of 
illicit firearms 
n.a. 
estimated 
number of 
illicit firearms 
n.a. 
estimated 
number of 
unregistered 
firearms 
930,000 
estimated 
number of 
unregistered 
firearms 
204,310 
estimated 
number of 
unregistered 
firearms  
n.a. 
estimated 
number of 
unregistered 
firearms 
1,449,000 
estimated 
number of 
unregistered 
firearms 
16,198,000 
estimated 
number of 
unregistered 
firearms 
180,000 
estimated 
number of 
unregistered 
firearms 
167,300 
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THEME F: CRIMINAL JUSTICE MEASURES 
In the area of criminal justice, the EU counter-terrorism policy consists of measures which 
require Member States to criminalise certain offences in relation with terrorist activity. 
Besides, a number of tools (not specific to counter-terrorism) are available at the EU and 
international levels with regards to cooperation in the field of criminal justice. The 
measures have overall been rather well implemented by Member States, as most have 
criminalised terrorist offences in line with EU policy, although with various nuances, and not 
necessarily in implementation of EU measures. Furthermore, a number of Member States 
have already adopted measures envisaged by the new Directive on combatting terrorism 
(e.g. travel and training). Regarding cooperation, the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) has 
proved effective. 
 
Legal framework 
EU instruments 
The key instruments of the EU counter-terrorism policy in the field of criminal justice are 
Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA,442 which defines the notion of terrorist offence, 
and requires Member States to enact a number of new terrorism-related offences, and 
Council Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA,443 which amends the previous decision by 
adding further offences. Other relevant EU instruments (not specific to counter-terrorism) 
include Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA444 which established the EAW, the EU 
Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters,445 and Council Framework Decision 
2008/909/JHA on the mutual recognition of judgments in criminal matters.446 Framework 
Decisions have a legal effect similar to Directives, meaning that Member States are obliged 
to implement the recommended measures but have a certain discretion in the means 
employed. 
Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combatting terrorism provides a definition of 
“terrorist offences”, which are certain offences under national law, such as attacks upon a 
person’s life which may cause death, or kidnapping, “which, given their nature or context, 
may seriously damage a country or an international organisation”, and are “committed with 
the aim of: seriously intimidating a population, or unduly compelling a Government or 
international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act, or seriously 
destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social 
structures of a country or an international organisation”447 (terrorist intent). 
 
                                                 
 
442 Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism (2002/475/JHA).  
443 Council Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA of 28 November 2008 amending Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA 
on combating terrorism (2008/919/JHA).  
Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender 
procedures between Member States (2002/584/JHA). 
445 Council of the European Union, Council Act of 29 May 2000 establishing in accordance with art.. 34 of the 
Treaty on European Union the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of 
the European Union, C 197/1, (29 May 2000). 
446 Council Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the application of the principle of mutual 
recognition to judgments in criminal matters imposing custodial sentences or measures involving deprivation of 
liberty for the purpose of their enforcement in the European Union (2008/909/JHA). 
447 Council Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA of 28 November 2008 amending Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA 
on combating terrorism (2008/919/JHA), art 1. 
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Furthermore, EU measures require Member States to criminalise a number of designated 
terrorist offences, and to punish them by “effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal 
penalties”.448 Pursuant to Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA, Member States must 
criminalise the following designated offences: directing a terrorist group; participating in 
the activities of a terrorist group; inciting or aiding or abetting a terrorist offence; 
attempting to commit a terrorist offence. Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA provides for 
the following additional offences: direct or indirect public provocation to commit a terrorist 
offence; recruitment for terrorism; training for terrorism. 
The new Directive on combating terrorism replacing Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA, 
which is recently adopted449 and which seeks to provide for “EU-wide minimum rules, and 
in particular additional common definitions of criminal offences”,450 would furthermore add 
the following designated offences: receiving training for terrorism; travelling abroad for 
terrorism; organising or otherwise facilitating travelling abroad for terrorism. 
In order to facilitate cooperation at the EU level when applying criminal justice measures, 
the EAW established under Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA allows a Member State to 
request another to arrest and surrender a person suspected or convicted of terrorism for 
the purposes of conducting a criminal prosecution or executing a sentence.451 Besides, the 
2000 Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the EU Member 
States452 provides a number of cooperation tools such as the possibility to set up joint 
investigation teams (see also Factsheet A).453 Finally, pursuant to Framework Decision 
2008/909/JHA, criminal convictions with regards to terrorism must be recognised and 
enforced across Member States without verification of the double criminality of the act.454 
 
International agreements  
Since 2015, the EU is party to the Council of Europe 2005 Convention on the prevention of 
terrorism and its 2015 Additional Protocol (Riga Protocol),455 which, similarly to EU 
                                                 
 
448 Ibid., art. 5.  
449 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on combatting 
terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combatting terrorism (COM/2015/0625 
final). On 16 February 2017, after the finalisation of the current study, the European Parliament approved the text 
of the new directive, see European Parliament, ‘Preventing terrorism: clampdown on foreign fighters and lone 
wolves’, Press release, 16 February 2017, available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-
room/20170210IPR61803/preventing-terrorism-clampdown-on-foreign-fighters-and-lone-wolves. The text of the 
approved text is available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+P8-
TA-2017-0046+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN.  
450 Proposal for a Directive on combatting terrorism, Explanatory memorandum, Sect. 2. 
451 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender 
procedures between Member States (2002/584/JHA), art. 2.  
452 Council of the European Union, Council Act of 29 May 2000 establishing in accordance with Art. 34 of the Treaty 
on European Union the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the 
European Union, C 197/1, (29 May 2000). This EU instrument supplemented the 1959 Council of Europe 
Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters. 
453 Council of the European Union, Council Act of 29 May 2000 establishing in accordance with Art. 34 of the Treaty 
on European Union the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the 
European Union, C 197/1, (29 May 2000), art. 13. See also Factsheet Theme A. 
454 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, Tables ‘State of play’ and ‘Declarations’ 
accompanying the document: report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the 
implementation by the Member States of the Framework Decisions 2008/909/JHA, 2008/947/JHA and 
2009/829/JHA on the mutual recognition of judicial decisions on custodial sentences or measures involving 
deprivation of liberty, on probation decisions and alternative sanctions and on supervision measures as an 
alternative to provisional detention (SWD(2014) 34 final of 5.2.2014), art. 7. 
455 EU signs Convention on prevention of terrorism, 22 October 2015; Council of Europe Convention on the 
prevention of terrorism and its Additional Protocol (Riga Protocol). 
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instruments, require its parties to ensure that certain terrorism-related offences are 
criminalised. 
Regarding mutual legal assistance at the international level, the EU entered into bilateral 
agreements on mutual assistance and extradition with the United States, Japan, Iceland 
and Norway.456 
 
Implementation in Member States 
 
Overview 
Although most Member States have implemented criminal justice measures called for by EU 
policies, this is also owing to other instruments requiring the adoption of similar measures 
(UNSC Resolutions 1624 and 2178, Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of 
Terrorism and its Additional Protocol).457 In any case, most EU counter-terrorism measures 
regarding criminal justice have overall been rather well implemented in Member States.458  
Some Member States have implemented the measures by enacting new specific provisions 
outlining offences as formulated by the Framework Decisions (eg. Belgium, Bulgaria), while 
others have expanded existing provisions on preparatory terrorist acts, which can allow the 
prosecution of offences such as participation, recruitment, training, and travel (eg. France, 
Germany). Besides, some measures (eg. aiding and abetting, attempting to commit a 
terrorist offence) did not require specific implementation in most Member States, as 
existing general provisions on complicity and attempts to commit offences already comply 
with the measures.459 
Two main issues can be identified from the Commission’s reports on the implementation of 
the Framework Decisions on terrorist offences. First, regarding the definition of terrorist 
offences, not all Member States have fully transposed the definition as formulated in the 
Framework Decisions (eg. Germany). In the view of the Commission, “[t]his provision is of 
crucial importance”, as “[a] common definition of terrorism constitutes the basis on which 
all other provisions in the Framework Decision are built and allows for the use of law 
enforcement co-operation instruments”.460 Second, regarding public provocation to commit 
a terrorist offence, some Member States have been reluctant to adopt specific provisions in 
                                                 
 
456 Agreement on extradition between the European Union and the United States of America (2003),; Agreement 
on mutual legal assistance between the European Union and the United States of America (2003),; Agreement 
between the European Union and Japan on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters (2009); Agreement 
between the European Union and the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway on the application of certain 
provisions of the Convention of 29 May 2000 on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States 
of the European Union (2003).  
457 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1624 (2005); United Nations Security Council Resolution 2178 
(2014); Council of Europe Convention on the prevention of terrorism and its Additional Protocol (Riga Protocol). 
458 Report from the Commission based on art. 11 of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on 
combating terrorism (COM(2007)681); Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council 
on the implementation of Council Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA of 28 November 2008 amending Framework 
Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism (COM(2014) 554), NCTV FF report, pp. 60-61. 
459 Ibid., p. 6; European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), Foreign fighters – Member State responses and 
EU action (2016), p. 7. 
460 Report from the commission based on art. 11 of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating 
terrorism (COM(2004)409), Report from the Commission based on art. 11 of the Council Framework Decision of 
13 June 2002 on combating terrorism (COM(2007)681), p. 17. 
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view of concerns with regards to freedom of expression,461 and have preferred to rely on 
provisions criminalising incitement or provocation in more general terms.462 
A number of Member States have already criminalised training and travel related offences 
(suggested in the recently adopted Directive), while others are in the process of adopting 
legislation. The offence of “facilitating travelling abroad for terrorism” (suggested in the 
new Directive) appears already criminalised in most Member States as it is covered by 
more general provisions on aiding and abetting (required under Framework Decision 
2002/475/JHA). 
Finally, a trend can be observed of Member States adopting administrative measures, such 
as travel bans, exclusion orders, assigned residence orders, in addition or alternative to 
criminal justice measures (e.g. France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United 
Kingdom).463 The use of administrative measures in situations where prosecution would be 
difficult for instance with regards to evidence collection or secrecy has raised concerns for 
the protection of human rights.464 
 
Implementation in seven focus Member States 
 
Table 4: Overview of implementation of existing and envisaged criminal justice 
measures in seven focus MS 
 BE BG FR DE NL SK ES 
directing 
group 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
participating 
in group 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
incitement or 
provocation 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
aiding or 
abetting 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
attempting ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
recruitment ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
providing 
training 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
                                                 
 
461 Alegre, Susie, “Human Rights Concerns Relevant to Legislating on Provocation or Incitement to Terrorism and 
Related Offences”, Briefing Paper European Parliament’s committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs 
(March 2008). 
462 Council Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA of 28 November 2008 amending Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA 
on combating terrorism (2008/919/JHA), p. 5. 
463 European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), Foreign fighters – Member State responses and EU action 
(2016), p. 8. 
464 Bérénice, Boutin, Administrative measures against foreign fighters: in search of limits and safeguards, ICCT 
Research Paper, (December 2016), See also Paulussen, Christophe, Repressing the Foreign Fighters Phenomenon 
and Terrorism in Western Europe: Towards an Effective Response Based on Human Rights, ICCT Research Paper, 
(November 2016). 
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receiving 
training* 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
travelling* ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
facilitating 
travel* 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
 
In all seven focus Member States, all designated and envisaged offences are criminalised, 
although with various nuances, and not necessarily as a result of specific legislation or in 
implementation of EU measures. The following non-exhaustive remarks can be made 
regarding implementation in these Member States. 
Belgium has diligently implemented all EU measures in its legislation, often using language 
close to the one used in the Framework Decisions, for instance with regards to the 
definition.465 The latest amendments were brought in July 2015 and August 2016 with laws 
respectively criminalising travel abroad for terrorist purposes (as envisaged by the new 
Directive) and indirect provocation to commit terrorist offences (as required by Framework 
Decision 2008/919/JHA).466  
Bulgaria implemented EU measures requiring the criminalisation of terrorist offences in 
2011.467 In 2015, it adopted a law criminalising travel and training.468 This law also 
introduced art. 108a(7), which seems to address the transit of foreign fighters by 
criminalising the entry into Bulgaria of foreigners for the purpose of committing terrorism-
related acts including training in another country. 
Rather than introducing new very specific terrorist offences, France has made use of more 
general terrorist offences which allow to globally address preparatory acts, namely the 
participation in an individual or collective terrorist enterprise. The offence of participation in 
a “collective terrorist enterprise” (art. 421-2-1 Criminal Code, also referred to as “criminal 
association in relation to a terrorist enterprise”) exists since 1996 and has allowed France 
to prosecute a number of designated offences without necessarily enacting new legislation. 
In November 2014, it introduced the offence of participation in an “individual terrorist 
enterprise” (art. 421-2-6 Criminal Code), which criminalises various preparatory acts when 
committed alone, including training.469  
As of June 2015, Germany has a specific provision criminalising travel for terrorist purposes 
(Section 89a subsection 2a).470 Previously, travel could be addressed under more general 
provisions on preparatory terrorist acts.471 
                                                 
 
* EU instruments do not yet require to criminalise these offences, but it is envisaged in the proposed Directive, 
and required by other instruments (UNSC Resolution 2178, Riga Protocol).  
465 Loi relative aux infractions terroristes, 19 December 2003, Loi modifiant le livre II, titre Iter du Code pénal, 18 
February 2013, no 2013009097, [in French]. 
466 Loi visant à renforcer la lutte contre le terrorisme, 20 July 2015, no 2015009385; Loi portant des dispositions 
diverses en matière de lutte contre le terrorisme (III), 3 August 2016, no 2016009405, [in French].  
467 Committee of Experts on Counter-terrorism (CODEXTER), Profile on Counter-Terrorist Capacity of Bulgaria 
(2013), art.s 108 to 110, [in Bulgarian].  
468 ‘Bulgaria to Amend Criminal Code to Counter Threat of Terrorism’ (1 April 2015); Criminal Code, Bulgaria, art.s 
108 to 110, [in Bulgarian]. 
469 Loi n° 2014-1353 du 13 novembre 2014 renforçant les dispositions relatives à la lutte contre le terrorisme, [in 
French].  
470 Criminal Code, Germany, Section 89a, [in German]. 
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The Netherlands is envisaging to draft legislation criminalising the fact of spending time in 
an area controlled by terrorist groups,472 which goes further than what is called for by EU 
existing or envisaged measures and other international instruments. 
Slovakia implemented EU measures in 2005.473 In November 2015, it introduced a 
provision criminalising the participation in combat activities of organised armed groups in 
the territory of another State.474 
Spain implemented EU measures in 2010.475 In March 2015, it adopted a law criminalising 
training and travel.476 
 
Effectiveness of the measures and cooperation in practice 
 
Criminal justice measures are relatively effective, in the sense that they allow to intervene 
at an early stage and to apprehend new types of behaviours in relation to foreign fighters. 
For instance, the criminalisation of travel and various preparatory acts can be useful 
counter-terrorism tools. At the same time, these measures have raised a number of 
concerns in practice. Indeed, some interviewees find that the increasingly broad 
criminalisation of preparatory terrorist acts is problematic when acts far removed from the 
principal act are criminalised. Furthermore, interviewees expressed concerns about the 
adoption of an excessively broad definition of terrorism in the new Directive, which would 
not only raise serious concerns for human rights and fundamental freedoms, but also 
possibly have a counterproductive effect, as it could lead to unfocused prosecutions.  
Cooperation within the EU in the field of criminal justice matters is facilitated by EU-based 
tools. According to a Commission Report, the EAW provides an “efficient and effective 
surrender system”, and “is a very useful tool for Member States in the fight against crime”. 
It however noted that there was “room for improvement”, and that “[p]rotection of 
fundamental rights in particular must be central to the operation of the EAW system”.477 
Regarding mutual recognition and enforcement of criminal judgments, there seems to be 
more difficulties, as it appears that a number of Member States have not fully implemented 
Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA.478 Furthermore, interviewees noted that cooperation 
                                                                                                                                                            
 
471 Paulussen, C. and Entenmann, E., “National Responses in Select Western European Countries to the Foreign 
Fighter Phenomenon”, in A. de Guttry, F. Capone, and C. Paulussen (eds.), Foreign Fighters under International 
Law and Beyond (Springer: New York 2016), pp. 405-406. 
472 ‘Spending time in terrorist controlled areas to become a criminal offence’, DutchNews.nl (25 October 2016). A 
similar provision exists in Australia, see ‘Declared area offence’.  
473 Report from the commission based on art. 11 of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating 
terrorism (COM(2004)409), Report from the Commission based on art. 11 of the Council Framework Decision of 
13 June 2002 on combating terrorism (COM(2007)681); CODEXTER profile on Slovakia, (April 2007). 
474 Criminal Code, Slovakia, art. 419a, [in Slovak]. 
475 Ley Orgánica 5/2010, de 22 de junio, por la que se modifica la Ley Orgánica 10/1995, de 23 de noviembre, del 
Código Penal, [in Spanish]; CODEXTER profile on Spain, May 2013. 
476 Ley Orgánica 2/2015, de 30 de marzo, por la que se modifica la Ley Orgánica 10/1995, de 23 de noviembre, 
del Código Penal, en materia de delitos de terrorismo, [in Spanish]. 
477 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender 
procedures between Member States (2002/584/JHA), p. 8.  
478 European Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the 
implementation by the Member States of the Framework Decisions 2008/909/JHA, 2008/947/JHA and 
2009/829/JHA on the mutual recognition of judicial decisions on custodial sentences or measures involving 
deprivation of liberty, on probation decisions and alternative sanctions and on supervision measures as an 
alternative to provisional detention (COM(2014) 57 final); European Commission, Commission Staff Working 
Document, Tables ‘State of play’ and ‘Declarations’ accompanying the document: report from the Commission to 
the European Parliament and the Council on the implementation by the Member States of the Framework 
Decisions 2008/909/JHA, 2008/947/JHA and 2009/829/JHA on the mutual recognition of judicial decisions on 
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can be problematic not only across EU Member States, but also amongst various agencies 
within one country. 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
 
custodial sentences or measures involving deprivation of liberty, on probation decisions and alternative sanctions 
and on supervision measures as an alternative to provisional detention (SWD(2014) 34 final of 5.2.2014). 
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THEME G: PREVENTION AGAINST RADICALISATION 
One of the four pillars of the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy is the Prevent pillar. Policies in 
relation to ‘Prevention of radicalisation’ fall under that strand of the EU Counter-Terrorism 
Strategy. This theme comprises of a plethora of issues, varying from understanding and 
addressing underlying factors of radicalisation, developing de-radicalisation and 
rehabilitation programmes, disrupting violent extremist propaganda on the internet, and 
developing strategic counter-narratives. No binding decisions or regulations have been 
adopted with regard to this theme, meaning that it depends on the voluntary cooperation of 
Member States whether any of the policies or initiatives are implemented, or can work 
effectively as intended.  
 
Policy framework 
EU Strategy and measures 
Preventing radicalisation has since 2005 been part and parcel of the EU Counter-Terrorism 
Strategy and the EU Action Plan on Combatting Terrorism.479 A special EU Strategy for 
Combatting Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism (hereafter Prevention Strategy) 
has been adopted in 2005,480 as well as a related EU Action Plan on Combatting 
Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism (hereafter R&R Action Plan),481 and has been 
updated in 2008482 and 2014.483 
The focus of the Prevention Strategy of 2005 was on combatting radicalisation and 
recruitment of terrorism, with regard to the forms of terrorism inspired by Al-Qaida. The 
objective of the strategy was to reduce the threat  
“[b]y disrupting existing terrorist networks and by preventing new recruits 
to terrorism; [by] ensur[ing] that voices of mainstream opinion prevail over 
those of extremism; [by] promot[ing] more vigorously security, justice, 
democracy and opportunity for all; [and by] reduc[ing] vulnerability to 
attack by better protecting potential targets and improving consequence 
management capabilities.” 
The 2008 Strategy is more or less the same as the 2005 Strategy, except that it uses more 
neutral language, and refrains from any specific references to Muslim groups. The 2014 
Revised Strategy, first of all, takes into account the changing nature of the threat and the 
fact that radicalisation means and patterns are constantly evolving, and secondly stresses 
the importance of a “balanced approach between security-related measures and efforts to 
tackle those factors that may create an environment conducive to radicalisation and 
recruitment to terrorism.” The strategy also stresses the important role of communities, 
civil society, non-governmental organisations and the private sector. As the main objectives 
it highlights that they should resolve inter alia to: 
                                                 
 
479 Council of the European Union, The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 14469/4/05 Rev 4, (30 
November 2005). 
480 European Council, The European Union Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism 
(14781/1/05 REV 1), hereafter referred to as the Prevention Strategy. 
481 European Council, EU Action Plan on combating terrorism (15358/05); 4/5 December 2006, the Council took 
note of a report on the implementation of the R&R Action Plan revised at 12 February 2007), 
482 European Council, Revised EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism (15178/08) 
(14 November 2008). 
483 European Council, Revised EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism (9956/14) 
(19 May 2014). 
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“[p]romote security, justice, and equal opportunities for all; ensure that 
voices of mainstream opinion prevail over those of extremism; enhance 
government communications; support messages countering terrorism; 
counter online radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism; train, build capacity 
and engage first line practitioners across relevant sectors; support individuals 
and civil society to build resilience; support disengagement initiatives; support 
further research into the trends and challenges of radicalisation and 
recruitment to terrorism; [and] align internal and external counter-
radicalisation work.” 
The Commission in its communication to the European Parliament and the Council, entitled 
‘The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a more secure Europe’,484 
announced the creation of the EU Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), which was 
subsequently launched in September 2011 as an umbrella network connecting first line 
practitioners from the various EU Member States. In October 2015 the RAN Centre of 
Excellence (RAN CoE) was launched, following the ambition formulated in the Commission’s 
European Agenda on Security.485 The Commission has earmarked EUR 25 million for the 
period of 2014-2017 for its activities. Of the objectives in the latest Prevention Strategy 
mentioned above, RAN CoE’s objectives are particularly targeted towards training, building 
capacity and engaging with first line practitioners across relevant sectors, and supporting 
individuals and civil society to build resilience. 
Related to the Prevention Strategy is the Media Communication Strategy, which followed 
the adoption of the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy in 2005 and was later revised in 
2007.486 Objective of the Media Communication Strategy is inter alia a more effective 
delivery of the EU’s own message. Among those key messages are the underlying 
messages of the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, its four pillars and its guiding principle 
that the EU counter-terrorism policy is just, fair and inclusive, the objective of the EU’s 
integration and non-discrimination policies to be guided by the principle of equality before 
the law, the prohibition of non-discrimination, respect for cultural, linguistic and religious 
diversity and equality between men and women.  
In close relation to the Media Communication Strategy are the Check-the-Web project,487 
which the Council agreed to build, the EU Internet Referral Unit (IRU) at Europol488 as part 
of the European Counter-Terrorism Centre (ECTC, see Factsheet A), the EU Internet Forum 
launched in December 2015 in close cooperation with the industry,489 and the Syria 
Strategic Communications Advisory Team (SSCAT with two components: Countering Violent 
Extremism (CVE) and Counter-Terrorism (CT) communication campaigns to be delivered to 
Member States, and network for Member States to exchange best practices of CVE and 
                                                 
 
484 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, The 
EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a more secure Europe (COM (2010) 673). 
485 European Council, State of play on implementation of the statement of the Members of the European Council of 
12 February 2015, the JHA Council Conclusions of 20 November 2015, and the Conclusions of the European 
Council of 18 December 2015 (6785/16), p. 34; European Commission, “European Commission Boosts Efforts To 
Counter Violent Extremism” (2011), Commission Press Release. 
486 European Council, Revised Media Communication Strategy (5469/3/07 REV 3), (28 March 2007). 
487 European Council, Council Conclusions on cooperation to combat terrorist use of the Internet ("Check the 
Web") (8457/3/07 REV 3). 
488 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council 
and the Council, Delivering on the European Agenda on Security to fight against terrorism and pave the way 
towards an effective and genuine Security Union (COM(2016) 230 final), paragraph 2.2. 
489 Ibid. 
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counter-terrorism communications. SSCAT is now renamed the Strategic Communication 
Network).490 After the Paris attacks, a counter-terrorism communication hub was opened 
on the Integrated Political Crisis Response arrangements (IPCR) web platform491, with the 
aim to contribute to preparedness and to facilitate the political response in the event of 
terrorist attacks in the future. And finally, an initiative is developed to set up an EU-wide 
‘Empowering Civil Society-programme’492 to maximise the effectiveness of alternative 
narrative campaigns. 
Since prisons are considered to be hotspots for radicalisation,493 the Commission has also 
made funds available for the development of rehabilitation and de-radicalisation 
programmes inside and outside prisons, risk assessment tools and training for 
professionals.494 In order to prevent radicalisation through education and youth outreach, 
the Erasmus+ funds particularly give priority to projects fostering inclusion and promoting 
fundamental values.495 
Cooperation with international organisations 
The EU works with the UN, Council of Europe, Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (OSCE), and the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) on issues of countering and 
prevention of violent extremism. In the latter case, the EU provides support to the GCTF 
inspired institutions of Hedayah Center of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism, the 
International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law and the Global Community 
Engagement Resilience Fund (GCERF). 
 
Cooperation with third countries 
Various programmes are used to cooperate with third countries on issues of support to law 
enforcement and human rights compliant responses to prevent radicalisation, and on 
addressing root causes of radicalisation to violent extremism. The EU mainly uses its 
European Neighbourhood Policy and Instrument to Stability and Peace (ICSP). The EU-
funded package of Strengthening Resilience to Violence and Extremism (STRIVE)496 is 
particularly worth mentioning for its initiatives aimed at identifying drivers for youth 
extremism, empowering women, promoting community dialogue, strengthening local actors 
or improving the media and education capacities to counter radical ideologies. The EU 
further develops various regional Strategies with action plans that also address issues of 
radicalisation to violent extremism, such as for instance the Sahel Strategy (adopted in 
March 2011). In addition, several more counter-terrorism/CVE focused strategies, action 
plans or activities have been adopted and are being implemented, such as in Tunisia, Libya, 
Syria and Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, Sahel, Horn of Africa/Yemen, Pakistan, and South East 
Asia.  
                                                 
 
490 European Parliament, Answer given by Mr Avramopoulos on behalf of the Commission, EP Parliamentary 
questions (2011). 
491 European Commission, The EU Integrated Political Crisis Response Arrangements in brief, 2014, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/publications/2014/eu-ipcr/. 
492 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council 
and the Council, Delivering on the European Agenda on Security to fight against terrorism and pave the way 
towards an effective and genuine Security Union (COM(2016) 230 final), paragraph 2.2. 
493 See on this topic for instance European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy Department 
C, Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, Preventing and Countering Youth Radicalisation in the EU, Study for 
the LIBE Committee (2014), p. 14. 
494 Ibid. 
495 Ibid. 
496 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, The 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Supporting the prevention of 
radicalisation leading to violent extremism (COM (2016) 379 final), (14 June 2016), paragraph 7. 
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Lastly, the Commission is exploring possibilities to involve RAN in activities in key third 
countries, in particular in the MENA region, Western Balkans and Turkey. 
 
Implementation of these measures within the policies of the Member States 
Implementation of these policies within all Member States  
Implementation of the strategies on combatting radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism 
is mostly left to the EU Member States, as the general strategy is merely providing some 
guidance and encouragement. In that sense it is impossible to measure the ‘formal 
effectiveness’ of the objectives as formulated in the Prevention Strategy. The EU also does 
not have a reporting system in place that demands from Member States to send regular 
updates to the Commission on what actions they have taken to contribute to prevention of 
radicalisation. Instead, one would have to revert to projects like TerRa (Terrorism and 
Radicalisation, a European Network-based prevention and learning programme supported 
by the European Commission DG Home Affairs) and RAN itself who have respectively made 
an inventory of the best practices on de-radicalisation in the EU Member States, and an 
overview of prevention against radicalisation initiatives in the Member States.497  
RAN has been set up to assist Member States on the level of first-line practitioners, through 
its work in the RAN Working Groups. RAN Working Groups consist of: communication and 
narratives; education, EXIT (de-radicalisation and disengagement); youth, families and 
communities; local authorities, prison and probation, police and law enforcement, 
remembrance of victims of terrorism, and health and social care.  
The EU CTC regularly brings out ‘State of play’ reports. According to the report from March 
2016,498 national authorities can apply for tailor-made RAN support (training, workshops 
and advice) in Member States, funded by the Commission. The Commission also offers 
funding to Member States for the development of rehabilitation programmes. 
Since the establishment of the EU IRU 26 Member States have made a total of 144 
contributions. According to the ‘State of Play’ report of the EU CTC the EU IRU “has 
identified 3,351 items of potentially violent/extremis content, triggering 2,037 referrals and 
1,793 removals’’. Four Member States have yet to appoint an IRU national contact 
person.499 
According to the EU CTC report experts from 20 Member States participated in the first 
training session organised by SSCAT.500 
                                                 
 
497 TerRa, “Inventory of the best practices on de-radicalisation from the different Member States of the EU”; RAN, 
“Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism”, Approaches and Practices, (2016). 
498 Council of the European Union, EU Counter-terrorism Coordinator, State of play on implementation of the 
statement of the Members of the European Council of 12 February 2015, the JHA Council Conclusions of 20 
November 2015, and the Conclusions of the European Council of 18 December (6785/16).  
499 Ibid. 
500 Ibid. 
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Effectiveness of these policies and cooperation (in practice) among different 
organisations and between Member States 
Effectiveness of these measures and cooperation (in practice) among different 
organisations and between Member States - all Member States  
There is no clear procedure to monitor the implementation of the objectives as formulated 
in the Prevention Strategy. RAN offers good practices, but on a voluntary base. According 
to an anonymous survey conducted by RAN itself in August 2016 among 175 participants of 
the total of 2100 participants that had participated so far in events, 90% expected a 
positive impact of their participation to the event on their daily work in combating 
radicalisation in order to measure the impact of RAN events.501 In the same survey, 
approximately 75% indicated that they disseminated the lessons learned during the events 
within their own organisations. There is however not a structured instrument that monitors 
how participants disseminate the lessons learned during the events and workshops in their 
organisation, or that keeps count of what is done with what has been learned after 
participants return to their organisations. 
EU CTC took the initiative502 to implement particular projects mentioned in the Prevention 
Strategy and EU Action Plan on R&R by putting the lead for implementation for concrete 
work streams with certain Member States. These are: handbook on prevention of 
radicalisation in prisons (AU, DE, FR), media and strategic communication (UK), training of 
Imams (ES), community policing (BE, SE), working with local authorities (NL), de-
radicalisation (DK) and terrorism and the internet (DE). However, it seems that this 
remained a plan, and was never given any follow-up as such.  
In the 2010 Commission’s communication to the Parliament and the Council, entitled: ‘The 
EU Counter-Terrorism Policy: main achievement and future challenges’, it mentions that 
under the Prevent strand of the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy there is need for reinforcing 
prevent activities related to the way terrorists use the internet. Also the Stockholm 
Programme503 calls for reinforcement in the next five years. A more recent official 
evaluation of the implementation status and the effectiveness of the strategy and action 
plan does not exist. The newly appointed Commissioner for the Security Union, Sir Julian 
King,504 has, however, commissioned the Court of Auditors to conduct a performance 
audit on the Commission’s policy on prevention of radicalisation. 
The Commission is also investing in public-private partnerships in countering terrorist use 
of the internet.  
 
Effectiveness of these measures and cooperation (in practice) among different 
organisations and between Member States - seven focus Member States  
As mentioned above, it is not really possible to measure the ‘formal effectiveness’ of the 
EU’s objectives on prevention of radicalisation. Yet, this study has mapped the national 
strategies on countering radicalisation and the various specific prevention programmes in 
the seven focus Member States.  
                                                 
 
501 RAN, “Survey Results”, (August 2016). 
502 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, The 
EU Counter-Terrorism Policy: main achievements and future challenges (COM/2010/0386 final), pp. 4-5. 
503 Official Journal of the European Union, (C 115), (4 May 2010), p. 24. 
504 European Commission, “President Juncker consults the European Parliament on Sir Julian King as Commissioner 
for the Security Union”, Commission Press Release (2 August 2016). 
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Of the focus Member States only the following countries have developed dedicated 
comprehensive or specific counter-radicalisation strategies on state, regional level and/or 
local level, and/or installed specific task forces or coordinating bodies: Belgium,505 
Bulgaria,506 France,507 Germany,508 the Netherlands,509 and Spain.510   
What the research team knows in terms of prevention programmes in addition to the 
national policies in the seven focus countries is based on RAN Collection of approaches and 
practices and is in no way meant to be comprehensive (see table 5). These programmes 
have different objectives and focus themes: awareness raising on the process of 
radicalisation, understanding and research of radicalisation, community policing, citizen 
participation in community policing, training, train the trainer programmes, education, 
addressing issues of pluralism, citizenship and democracy, addressing issues related to 
identity and religion, gender issues, de-radicalisation, rehabilitation and reintegration, 
inter-religious dialogue, and skills training. The programmes furthermore target different 
audiences: law enforcement professionals, first-line responders, educators, students, 
youth, parents and families, and victims.  
                                                 
 
505 On a national level the plan in Belgium is called: National counter-radicalism plan, developed in 2005. In 
addition, many plans are also developed on regional and local level. In 2015, Belgium established a task force to 
create a national counterterrorism and counter-extremism strategy. See also the factsheet on Belgium of the 
Counter-Extremism Project. 
506 A Strategy for Countering Radicalisation and Terrorism was drafted in 2015 to update the outdated National 
Plan for Combatting Terrorism of 2008. See Van Ginkel, B. and Entenmann, E. (Eds.), “The Foreign Fighters 
Phenomenon in the European Union. Profiles, Threats & Policies”, The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism –
The Hague 7, no. 2 (2016), ANNEX, p. 11; see also Centre for the Study of Democracy, “Radicalisation in 
Bulgaria; Threats and Trends”, (2015), pp. 13-14. 
507 France adopted a National Action Plan against Violent Radicalisation and Jihadi Networks in 2014. See Van 
Ginkel, B. and Entenmann, E. (Eds.), “The Foreign Fighters Phenomenon in the European Union. Profiles, Threats 
& Policies”, The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague 7, no. 2 (2016). 
508 Germany adopted a comprehensive counter-terrorism Strategy and also adopted a Framework on Prevention 
Regarding Salafism in 2014. See Van Ginkel, B. and Entenmann, E. (Eds.), “The Foreign Fighters Phenomenon in 
the European Union. Profiles, Threats & Policies”, The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague 7, 
no. 2 (2016). 
509 In 2016, the Netherlands adopted an updated National Counter-Terrorism Strategy 2016-2020, 
https://english.nctv.nl/binaries/nationale-ct-strategie-2011-2015-uk_tcm92-369807_tcm32-90349.pdf; In 2014, 
the Netherlands also adopted the Netherlands comprehensive action programme to combat jihadism, 
https://english.nctv.nl/binaries/def-a5-nctvjihadismuk-03-lr_tcm32-83910.pdf. See further: Van Ginkel, B. and 
Entenmann, E. (Eds.), “The Foreign Fighters Phenomenon in the European Union. Profiles, Threats & Policies”, The 
International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague 7, no. 2 (2016). 
510 In 2015, Spain adopted a Strategic National Action Plan against Violent Radicalisation within the framework of 
the 2012 Comprehensive strategy. See Van Ginkel, B. and Entenmann, E. (Eds.), “The Foreign Fighters 
Phenomenon in the European Union. Profiles, Threats & Policies”, The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – 
The Hague 7, no. 2 (2016). 
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Table 5: Overview of prevention programmes for each of the seven Member States 
Country Main focus areas and 
target audiences 
Prevention programmes or events/ 
activities 
Belgium Community policing, 
awareness raising, training 
of frontline workers, 
education programmes, 
promoting democracy, 
counter-narratives 
CoPPRa – ISDEP – BOUNCE – Athena Syntax – 
Identity and communication training programme for 
school – Democracy Factory – P2P Challenging 
Extremism   
Bulgaria Community policing, 
awareness raising, training 
of frontline workers 
CoPPRa – ISDEP  
France Community policing, 
counter-narratives, support 
for victims, promoting 
democracy 
CoCoRa – C4C – Democracy Factory – P2P 
Challenging Extremism - Terrorism: How about 
listening to what victims have to say?  
Germany Awareness raising, training 
of frontline workers, 
gender issues, role of 
families, hotlines, exit 
programmes, 
rehabilitation, inter-
religious dialogue, counter-
narratives, youth, 
education, empowerment 
and skills training 
ISDEP – How do we want to live? – Maxime Berlin – 
WomEx - Praefix R – Nationwide institute for right 
wing extremism and family – HAYAT – Family 
counseling – CoCoRa – Acceptance-based youth work 
with right wing youth groups – Denkzeit –Taking 
Responsibility – Advice Centre Hesse – EXIT Germany 
– Jump – Fair Skills – Teachers empowered – Expert 
Center on Gender and Right-Wing Extremism – P2P 
Challenging Extremism – Donate the Hate – Nazis 
against Nazis – Muslim Jewish Dialogue – No-Nazi.net 
– What’s up? – AVE 
The 
Netherlands 
Community policing, train 
the trainer, awareness 
raising, training, family, 
hotlines, counter-
narratives, citizen 
participation in community 
policing 
CoPPRa – Training at Police Academy – RAN Train the 
Trainer – ReCoRa Institute – ISDEP – ALLIES – 
Second Wave “My city Real World” – INSPEC2T – The 
Peaceable School and Neighbourhood – To prevent is 
better than to cure – Expedition Friend & Foe – 
Democracy Factory – SMN Family hotline – P2P 
Challenging Extremism 
Slovakia Awareness raising, 
research, training 
De-radicalisation by mapping of regions and 
strengthen the local institutions – Teachers 
empowered – CENAA 
Spain Train the trainer, teachers, 
counter-narratives 
RAN Train the Trainer – P2P Challenging Extremism – 
Teachers empowered – INSPEC2T – The Map of 
Terror  
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ANNEX II: MAPPING OF MEASURES 
This Annex contains an overview of measures that have been referred to in the context of counter-terrorism. A more detailed description 
of the methodology informing the mapping can be found in Annex III. 
 
Table 6: Overview of measures that have been referred to in the context of counter-terrorism 
Full title Document 
reference 
OJ reference Status Date of adoption / 
proposal 
2001     
Council Decision of 23 October 2001 establishing a Community mechanism to 
facilitate reinforced cooperation in civil protection assistance interventions 
(2001/792/EC, Euratom)511 
Council Decision 
2001/792/EC, 
Euratom 
OJ 2001 L 297/7 Adopted 23 October 2001 
Directive 2001/97/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 
December 2001 amending Council Directive 91/308/EEC on prevention of the 
use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering 
Directive 2001/97/EC OJ 2001 L 344/76 Adopted 4 December 2001 
Council Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 of 27 December 2001 on specific 
restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view 
to combating terrorism512 
Regulation 2580/2001 OJ 2001 L 344/70 Adopted 27 December 2001 
2002     
Council Regulation (EC) No 334/2002 of 18 February 2002 amending 
Regulation (EC) No 1683/95 laying down a uniform format for visas 
Regulation (EC) No 
334/2002 
OJ 2002 L 53/7 Adopted 18 February 2002 
Council Decision of 28 February 2002 setting up Eurojust with a view to 
reinforcing the fight against serious crime (2002/187/JHA)513 
Council Decision 
2002/187/JHA 
OJ 2002 L 63/1 Adopted 28 February 2002 
Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 of 27 May 2002 imposing certain 
specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities 
associated with Usama bin Laden, the Al-Qaida network and the Taliban, and 
repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 467/2001 prohibiting the export of 
certain goods and services to Afghanistan, strengthening the flight ban and 
extending the freeze of funds and other financial resources in respect of the 
Taliban of Afghanistan514 
Regulation (EC) 
881/2002 
OJ 2002 L 139/9 Adopted 27 May 2002 
Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism Framework Decision 
2002/475/JHA 
OJ 2002 L 164/3 Adopted 13 June 2002 
                                                 
 
511 Recast by 2007/779/EC, Euratom. 
512 Updated numerous times, see http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32001R2580&qid=1481717140314. 
513 Amended by Council Decision 2003/659/JHA, Council Decision 2009/426/JHA. 
514 Updated numerous times, see http://eur- lex.europa.eu/legal- content/EN/ALL/?uri= CELEX:32002R0881&qid=1481716541281. 
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Full title Document 
reference 
OJ reference Status Date of adoption / 
proposal 
Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant 
and the surrender procedures between Member States 
Framework Decision 
2002/584/JHA 
OJ 2002 L 190/1 Adopted 13 June 2002 
Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on joint investigation teams 
(2002/465/JHA) 
Framework Decision 
2002/465/JHA 
OJ 2002 L 162/1 Adopted 13 June 2002 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1030/2002 of 13 June 2002 laying down a uniform 
format for residence permits for third-country nationals515 
Regulation (EC) No 
1030/2002 
OJ 2002 L 157/1 Adopted 13 June 2002 
Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 
July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of 
privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and 
electronic communications) 
Directive 2002/58/EC OJ 2002 L 201/37 Adopted 12 July 2002 
Council Decision of 28 November 2002 establishing a mechanism for 
evaluating the legal systems and their implementation at national level in the 
fight against terrorism (2002/996/JHA) 
Council Decision 
2002/996/JHA 
OJ 2002 L 349/1 Adopted 28 November 2002 
Regulation (EC) No 2320/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 16 December 2002 establishing common rules in the field of civil aviation 
security516 
Regulation (EC) No 
2320/2002 
OJ 2002 L 355/1 Adopted 16 December 2002 
Council Decision 2003/48/JHA of 19 December 2002 on the implementation of 
specific measures for police and judicial cooperation to combat terrorism in 
accordance with Article 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP 
Council Decision 
2003/48/JHA 
OJ 2003 L 16/18 Adopted 19 December 2002 
2003     
Commission Regulation (EC) No 622/2003 of 4 April 2003 laying down 
measures for the implementation of the common basic standards on aviation 
security 
Regulation (EC) No 
622/2003 
OJ 2003 L 89/9 Adopted 4 April 2003 
Council Decision 2003/659/JHA of 18 June 2003 amending Decision 
2002/187/JHA setting up Eurojust with a view to reinforcing the fight against 
serious crime 
Council Decision 
2003/659/JHA 
OJ 2003 L 245/44 Adopted 18 June 2003 
Council Framework Decision 2003/577/JHA of 22 July 2003 on the Execution 
in the European Union of orders freezing property or evidence 
Framework Decision 
2003/577/JHA 
OJ 2003 L 196/45 Adopted 22 July 2003 
Regulation (EC) No 2003/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 13 October 2003 relating to fertilisers 
 
 
Regulation (EC) No 
2003/2003 
OJ 2003 L 304/1 Adopted 13 October 2003 
2004     
                                                 
 
515 Amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 380/2008. 
516 Repealed by Regulation (EC) No 300/2008. 
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Full title Document 
reference 
OJ reference Status Date of adoption / 
proposal 
Regulation (EC) No 725/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 31 March 2004 on enhancing ship and port facility security 
Regulation (EC) No 
725/2004 
OJ 2004 L 129/6 Adopted 31 March 2004 
Regulation (EC) No 724/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 31 March 2004 amending Regulation (EC) No 1406/2002 establishing a 
European Maritime Safety Agency517 
Regulation (EC) No 
724/2004 
OJ 2004 L 129/1 Adopted 31 March 2004 
Commission Decision of 15 April 2004 on an Intra-Community transfer of 
explosives document (notified under document number C(2004) 1332) 
(2004/388/EC) 
Commission Decision 
2004/388/EC 
OJ 2004 L 120/43 Adopted 14 April 2004 
Council Regulation (EC) No 871/2004 of 29 April 2004 concerning the 
introduction of some new functions for the Schengen Information System, 
including in the fight against terrorism 
Regulation (EC) No 
871/2004 
OJ 2004 L 162/29 Adopted 29 April 2004 
Council Directive 2004/80/EC of 29 April 2004 relating to compensation to 
crime victims 
Directive 2004/80/EC OJ 2004 L 261/15 Adopted 29 April 2004 
Council Directive 2004/82/EC of 29 April 2004 on the obligation of carriers to 
communicate passenger data 
Directive 2004/82/EC OJ 2004 L 261/24 Adopted 29 April 2004 
Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 establishing a 
European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the 
External Borders of the Member States of the European Union518 
Regulation (EC) No 
2007/2004 
OJ 2004 L 349/1 Adopted 26 October 2004 
Council Regulation (EC) No 2252/2004 of 13 December 2004 on standards for 
security features and biometrics in passports and travel documents issued by 
Member States519 
Regulation (EC) No 
2252/2004 
OJ 2004 L 385/1 Adopted 13 December 2004 
2005     
Council Decision 2005/211/JHA of 24 February 2005 concerning the 
introduction of some new functions for the Schengen Information System, 
including in the fight against terrorism520 
Council Decision 
2005/211/JHA 
OJ 2005 L 68/44 Adopted 24 February 2005 
Council Framework Decision 2005/212/JHA of 24 February 2005 of 
Confiscation of Crime-Related Proceeds, Instrumentalities and Property 
Framework Decision 
2005/212/JHA 
OJ 2005 L 68/49 Adopted 24 February 2005 
Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA of 24 February 2005 on attacks 
against information systems521 
Framework Decision 
2005/222/JHA 
OJ 2005 L 69/67 Adopted 24 February 2005 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
establishing the European Union Solidarity Fund  
COM(2005) 108 final OJ 2002 C 
156/10 
Withdra
wn 
6 April 2005 
                                                 
 
517 Amended by Regulation (EC) No 100/2013. 
518 Amended by Regulation (EC) No 863/2007, Regulation (EU) No 1168/2011; Being repealed by COM(2015) 671 final. 
519 Amended by Regulation (EC) No 444/2009. 
520 Amended by 2006/758/EC. 
521 Repealed by Directive (EU) 2013/40. 
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Full title Document 
reference 
OJ reference Status Date of adoption / 
proposal 
Regulation (EC) No 648/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 13 April 2005 amending Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing 
the Community Customs Code 
Regulation (EC) No 
648/2005 
OJ 2005 L 117/13 Adopted 13 April 2005 
Council Decision 2005/671/JHA of 20 September 2005 on the exchange of 
information and cooperation concerning terrorist offences 
Council Decision 
2005/671/JHA 
OJ 2005 L 253/22 Adopted 20 September 2005 
Agreement between the European Union and the Government of Canada on 
the processing of Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name 
Record data  
n/a OJ 2006 L 82/15 Adopted 3 October 2005 
Directive 2005/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 
October 2005 on enhancing port security 
Directive 2005/65/EC OJ 2005 L 310/28 Adopted 26 October 2005 
Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 
October 2005 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the 
purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing522 
Directive 2005/60/EC OJ 2005 L 309/15 Adopted 26 October 2005 
Commission Decision of 23 December 2005 amending its internal Rules of 
Procedure (2006/25/EC, Euratom) 
Commission Decision 
2006/25/EC 
OJ 2006 L 19/20 Adopted 23 December 2005 
2006     
Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 
March 2006 on the retention of data generated or processed in connection 
with the provision of publicly available electronic communications services or 
of public communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC523 
Directive 2006/24/EC OJ 2006 L 105/54 Invalida
ted 
15 March 2006 
Commission Decision of 19 April 2006 setting up a group of experts to provide 
policy advice to the Commission on fighting violent radicalisation 
(2006/299/EC) 
Commission Decision 
2006/299/EC 
OJ 2006 L 111/9 Adopted 19 April 2006 
Commission Decision of 19 April 2006 establishing standard forms for the 
transmission of applications and decisions pursuant to Council Directive 
2004/80/EC relating to compensation to crime victims 
Decision 2006/337/EC OJ 2006 L 125/25 Adopted 19 April 2006 
Commission Directive 2006/70/EC of 1 August 2006 laying down 
implementing measures for Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council as regards the definition of 'politically exposed person' and 
the technical criteria for simplified customer due diligence procedures and for 
exemption on grounds of a financial activity conducted on an occasional or 
very limited basis524 
Commission Directive 
2006/70/EC 
OJ 2006 L 214/29 Adopted 1 August 2006 
                                                 
 
522 Repealed by Directive (EU) 2015/849. 
523 Invalidated by Court Decision on 8 April 2014, see http://eur- lex.europa.eu/legal- content/EN/TXT/?uri= CELEX:62012CJ0293. 
524 Repealed by Directive (EU) 2015/849. 
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Full title Document 
reference 
OJ reference Status Date of adoption / 
proposal 
Commission Decision of 22 September 2006 on amending the Sirene Manual 
(2006/758/EC) 
Commission Decision 
2006/758/EC 
OJ 2006 L 317/41 Adopted 22 September 2006 
Council Framework Decision 2006/783/JHA of 6 October 2006 on the 
application of the principle of mutual recognition to confiscation orders 
Framework Decision 
2006/783/JHA 
OJ 2006 L 328/59 Adopted 6 October 2006 
Regulation (EC) No 1781/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 15 November 2006 on information on the payer accompanying transfers of 
funds 
Regulation (EC) No 
1781/2006 
OJ 2006 L 345/1 Adopted 15 November 2006 
Council Decision of 18 December 2006 Concerning the Seventh Framework 
Programme of the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) for nuclear 
research and training activities (2007 to 2011) (2006/970/Euratom) 
Commission Decision 
2006/970/Euratom 
OJ 2006 L 400/60 Adopted 18 December 2006 
Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA of 18 December 2006 on 
simplifying the exchange of information and intelligence between law 
enforcement authorities of the Member States of the European Union 
Framework Decision 
2006/960/JHA 
OJ 2006 L 386/89 Adopted 18 December 2006 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 1875/2006 of 18 December 2006 amending 
Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 laying down provisions for the implementation 
of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs 
Code 
Regulation (EC) No 
1875/2006 
OJ 2006 L 360/64 Adopted 18 December 2006 
Council Decision of 19 December 2006 concerning the specific programme to 
be carried out by means of direct actions by the Joint Research Centre under 
the Seventh Framework Programme of the European Community for research, 
technological development and demonstration activities (2007 to 2013) 
(2006/975/EC)525 
Council Decision 
2006/975/EC 
OJ 2007 L 54/126 Adopted 19 December 2006 
Council Decision of 19 December 2006 concerning the Specific Programme 
'Cooperation' implementing the Seventh Framework Programme of the 
European Community for research, technological development and 
demonstration activities (2007 to 2013) (Text with EEA relevance) 
(2006/971/EC)  
Council Decision 
2006/971/EC 
OJ 2006 L 400/86 Adopted 19 December 2006 
Council Decision of 19 December 2006 concerning the specific programme 
'Cooperation' implementing the Seventh Framework Programme of the 
European Community for research, technological development and 
demonstration activities (2007 to 2013) (Text with EEA relevance) 
(2006/971/EC)526 
Council Decision 
2006/971/EC 
OJ 2007 L 54/30 Adopted 19 December 2006 
                                                 
 
525 Corrigendum to Council Decision 2006/975/EC. 
526 Corrigendum to Council Decision 2006/971/EC. 
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Full title Document 
reference 
OJ reference Status Date of adoption / 
proposal 
Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006 of the European Parliament and the Council of 
20 December 2006 on the establishment, operation and use of the second 
generation Schengen Information System (SIS II)527 
Regulation (EC) No 
1987/2006 
OJ 2006 L 381/4 Adopted 20 December 2006 
2007     
Council Decision of 12 February 2007 establishing for the period 2007 to 2013, 
as part of General Programme on Security and Safeguarding Liberties, the 
Specific Programme ‘Prevention, Preparedness and Consequence Management 
of Terrorism and other Security related risks’ (2007/124/EC, Euratom) 
Council Decision 
2007/124/EC, 
Euratom 
OJ 2007 L 58/1 Adopted 12 February 2007 
Council Decision of 12 February 2007 establishing for the period 2007 to 2013, 
as part of General Programme on Security and Safeguarding Liberties, the 
Specific Programme ‘Prevention of and Fight against crime’ (2007/125/JHA) 
Council Decision 
2007/125/JHA) 
OJ 2007 L 58/7 Adopted 12 February 2007 
Council Decision of 5 March 2007 establishing a Civil Protection Financial 
Instrument (Text with EEA relevance) (2007/162/EC, Euratom) 
Council Decision 
2007/162/EC, 
Euratom 
OJ 2007 L 71/9 Adopted 5 March 2007 
Council Decision 2007/533/JHA of 12 June 2007 on the establishment, 
operation and use of the second generation Schengen Information System 
(SIS II) 
Council Decision 
2007/533/JHA 
OJ 2007 L 205/63 Adopted 12 June 2007 
Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 11 July 2007 establishing a mechanism for the creation of Rapid Border 
Intervention Teams and amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 as 
regards that mechanism and regulating the tasks and powers of guest 
officers528 
Regulation (EC) No 
863/2007 
OJ 2007 L 199/30 Adopted 11 July 2007 
Council Decision of 8 November 2007 establishing a Community Civil 
Protection Mechanism (recast) (Text with EEA relevance) (2007/779/EC, 
Euratom) 
Council Decision 
2007/779/EC, 
Euratom 
OJ 2007 L 314/9 Adopted 8 November 2007 
Directive 2007/64/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 
November 2007 on payment services in the internal market amending 
Directives 97/7/EC, 2002/65/EC, 2005/60/EC and 2006/48/EC and repealing 
Directive 97/5/EC 
Directive 2007/64/EC OJ 2007 L 319/1 Adopted 13 November 2007 
Council Decision 2007/845/JHA of 6 December 2007 concerning cooperation 
between Asset Recovery Offices of the Member States in the field of tracing 
and identification of proceeds from, or other property related to, crime 
Council Decision 
2007/845/JHA 
OJ 2007 L 
332/103 
Adopted 6 December 2007 
                                                 
 
527 Being repealed by COM(2016) 882 final. 
528 Being repealed by COM(2015) 671 final. 
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reference 
OJ reference Status Date of adoption / 
proposal 
Commission Decision of 20 December 2007 amending Decision 2004/277/EC, 
Euratom as regards rules for the implementation of Council Decision 
2007/799/EC, Euratom establishing a Community civil protection mechanism 
(notified under document number C(2007) 6464) (Text with EEA relevance) 
(2008/73/EC, Euratom) 
Commission Decision 
2008/73/EC, Euratom 
OJ 2008 L 20/23 Adopted 20 December 2007 
2008     
Regulation (EC) No 300/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 11 March 2008 on common rules in the field of civil aviation security and 
repealing Regulation (EC) No 2320/2002 
Regulation (EC) No 
300/2008 
OJ 2008 L 97/72 Adopted 11 March 2008 
Directive 2008/20/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 
March 2008 amending Directive 2005/60/EC on the prevention of the use of 
the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist 
financing, as regards the implementing powers conferred on the Commission 
Directive 2008/20/EC OJ 2008 L 76/46 Adopted 11 March 2008 
Commission Directive 2008/43/EC of 4 April 2008 setting up, pursuant to 
Council Directive 93/15/EEC, a system for the identification and traceability of 
explosives for civil uses 
Directive 2008/43/EC OJ 2008 L 94/8 Adopted 4 April 2008 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 324/2008 of 9 April 2008 laying down revised 
procedures for conducting Commission inspections in the field of maritime 
security 
Regulation (EC) No 
324/2008 
OJ 2008 L 98/5 Adopted 9 April 2008 
Council Regulation (EC) No 380/2008 of 18 April 2008 amending Regulation 
(EC) No 1030/2002 laying down a uniform format for residence permits for 
third-country nationals 
Regulation (EC) No 
380/2008 
OJ 2008 L 115/1 Adopted 18 April 2008 
Directive 2008/51/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 
May 2008 amending Council Directive 91/477/EEC on control of the 
acquisition and possession of weapons 
Directive 2008/51/EC OJ 2008 L 179/5 Adopted 21 May 2008 
Council Decision 2008/615/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the stepping up of cross-
border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border 
crime 
Council Decision 
2008/615/JHA 
OJ 2008 L 210/1 Adopted 23 June 2008 
Council Decision 2008/616/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the implementation of 
Decision 2008/615/JHA on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, 
particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime 
Council Decision 
2008/616/JHA  
OJ 2008 L 210/12 Adopted 23 June 2008 
Council Decision 2008/617/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the improvement of 
cooperation between the special intervention units of the Member States of 
the European Union in crisis situations 
Council Decision 
2008/617/JHA 
OJ 2008 L 210/73 Adopted 23 June 2008 
Council Decision 2008/633/JHA of 23 June 2008 concerning access for 
consultation of the Visa Information System (VIS) by designated authorities 
of Member States and by Europol for the purposes of the prevention, detection 
and investigation of terrorist offences and of other serious criminal offences  
Council Decision 
2008/633/JHA 
OJ 2008 L 
218/129 
Adopted 23 June 2008 
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OJ reference Status Date of adoption / 
proposal 
Regulation (EC) No 767/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 9 July 2008 concerning the Visa Information System (VIS) and the 
exchange of data between Member States on short-stay visas (VIS 
Regulation) 
Regulation (EC) No 
767/2008 
OJ 2008 L 218/60 Adopted 9 July 2008 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 820/2008 of 8 August 2008 laying down 
measures for the implementation of the common basic standards on aviation 
security 
Regulation (EC) No 
820/2008 
OJ 2008 L 221/8 Adopted 8 August 2008 
Proposal for a Council Decision on a Critical Infrastructure Warning 
Information Network (CIWIN) 
COM(2008) 676 final OJ 2012 C 
156/10 
Withdra
wn 
27 October 2008 
Council Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA of 28 November 2008 amending 
Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism 
Framework Decision 
2008/919/JHA 
OJ 2008 L 330/21 Adopted 28 November 2008 
Council Directive 2008/114/EC of 8 December 2008 on the identification and 
designation of European critical infrastructures and the assessment of the 
need to improve their protection 
Directive 
2008/114/EC 
OJ 2008 L 345/75 Adopted 8 December 2008 
Council Decision 2009/426/JHA of 16 December 2008 on the strengthening of 
Eurojust and amending Decision 2002/187/JHA setting up Eurojust with a 
view to reinforcing the fight against serious crime 
Council Decision 
2009/426/JHA 
OJ 2009 L 138/14 Adopted 16 December 2008 
2009     
Commission Decision of 23 January 2009 amending Regulation (EC) No 
725/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council as far as the IMO 
Unique Company and Registered Owner Identification Number  Scheme is 
concerned (notified under document number C(2009) 148) (Text with EEA 
relevance) (2009/83/EC) 
Commission Decision 
2009/83/EC 
OJ 2009 L 29/53 Adopted 23 January 2009 
Council Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA of 26 February 2009 on the 
organisation and content of the exchange of information extracted from the 
criminal record between Member States 
Framework Decision 
2009/315/JHA 
OJ 2009 L 93/23 Adopted 26 February 2009 
Regulation (EC) No 219/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 11 March 2009 adapting a number of instruments subject to the procedure 
referred to in Article 251 of the Treaty to Council Decision 1999/468/EC with 
regard to the regulatory procedure with scrutiny Adaptation to the regulatory 
procedure with scrutiny — Part Two 
Regulation (EC) No 
219/2009 
OJ 2009 L 87/109 Adopted 11 March 2009 
Regulation (EC) No 219/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 11 March 2009 adapting a number of instruments subject to the procedure 
referred to in Article 251 of the Treaty to Council Decision 1999/468/EC with 
regard to the regulatory procedure with scrutiny Adaptation to the regulatory 
procedure with scrutiny — Part Two 
Regulation (EC) No 
219/2009 
OJ 2009 L 87/109 Adopted 11 March 2009 
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reference 
OJ reference Status Date of adoption / 
proposal 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 272/2009 of 2 April 2009 supplementing the 
common basic standards on civil aviation security laid down in the Annex to 
Regulation (EC) No 300/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
Commission 
Regulation (EC) No 
272/2009 
OJ 2009 L 91/7 Adopted 2 April 2009 
Council Decision of 6 April 2009 establishing the European Police Office 
(Europol) (2009/371/JHA)529 
Council Decision 
2009/371/JHA 
OJ 2009 L 121/37 Adopted 6 April 2009 
Council Decision 2009/316/JHA of 6 April 2009 on the establishment of the 
European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS) in application of 
Article 11 of Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA530 
Council Decision 
2009/316/JHA 
OJ 2009 L 93/33 Adopted 6 April 2009 
Directive 2009/16/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 
April 2009 on port State control 
Directive 2009/16/EC OJ 2009 L 131/57 Adopted 23 April 2009 
Regulation (EC) No 444/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 28 May 2009 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2252/2004 on 
standards for security features and biometrics in passports and travel 
documents issued by Member States 
Regulation (EC) 
444/2009 
OJ 2009 L 142/1 Adopted 28 May 2009 
Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 13 July 2009 establishing a Community Code on Visas (Visa Code) 
Regulation (EC) No 
810/2009 
OJ 2009 L 243/1 Adopted 13 July 2009 
Directive 2009/110/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
September 2009 on the taking up, pursuit and prudential supervision of the 
business of electronic money institutions amending Directives 2005/60/EC 
and 2006/48/EC and repealing Directive 2000/46/EC 
Directive 
2009/110/EC 
OJ 2009 L 267/7 Adopted 16 September 2009 
Council Regulation (EU) No 1286/2009 of 22 December 2009 amending 
Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 imposing certain specific restrictive measures 
directed against certain persons and entities associated with Usama bin 
Laden, the Al-Qaida network and the Taliban531 
Regulation (EU) No 
1286/2009 
OJ 2009 L 346/42 Adopted 22 December 2009 
2010     
Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on 
the processing and transfer of Financial Message Data from the European 
Union to the United States for the purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking 
Program 
n/a OJ 2010 L 195/5 Adopted 13 July 2010 
                                                 
 
529 Repealed by Regulation (EU) 2016/794. 
530 Being amended by COM(2016) 7 final. 
531 Regulation following the Kadi decision at the ECJ. 
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proposal 
Commission Decision of 29 July 2010 amending Decision 2004/277/EC, 
Euratom as regards rules for the implementation of Council Decision 
2007/779/EC, Euratom establishing a Community civil protection mechanism 
(notified under document C(2010) 5090) (Text with EEA relevance) 
(2010/481/EU, Euratom) 
Commission Decision 
2010/481/EU, 
Euratom) 
OJ 2010 L 236/5 Adopted 29 July 2010 
Directive 2010/64/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 
October 2010 on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal 
proceedings 
Directive 2010/64/EU OJ 2010 L 280/1 Adopted 20 October 2010 
Directive 2010/78/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 
November 2010 amending Directives 98/26/EC, 2002/87/EC, 2003/6/EC, 
2003/41/EC, 2003/71/EC, 2004/39/EC, 2004/109/EC, 2005/60/EC, 
2006/48/EC, 2006/49/EC and 2009/65/EC in respect of the powers of the 
European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), the European 
Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
Authority) and the European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and 
Markets Authority) 
Directive 2010/78/EU OJ 2010 L 
331/120 
Adopted 24 November 2010 
2011     
Agreement between the European Union and Australia on the processing and 
transfer of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data by air carriers to the 
Australian Customs and Border Protection Service 
n/a OJ 2012 L 186/4 Adopted 29 September 2011 
Regulation (EU) No 1168/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of  25 October 2011 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 
establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational 
Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European 
Union 
Regulation (EU) No 
1168/2011 
OJ 2011 L 304/1 Adopted 25 October 2011 
Regulation (EU) No 1077/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 25 October 2011 establishing a European Agency for the operational 
management of large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and 
justice 
Regulation (EU) No 
1077/2011 
OJ 2011 L 286/1 Adopted 25 October 2011 
Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 
December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or 
stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform 
status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for 
the content of the protection granted 
Directive 2011/95/EU OJ 2011 L 337/9 Adopted 13 December 2011 
Agreement between the United States and the European Union on the use and 
transfer of passenger name records to the United States Department of 
Homeland Security 
n/a OJ 2012 L 215/5 Adopted 14 December 2011 
2012     
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OJ reference Status Date of adoption / 
proposal 
Directive 2012/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 
May 2012 on the right to information in criminal proceedings 
Directive 2012/13/EU OJ 2012 L 142/1 Adopted 22 May 2012 
Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 
October 2012 establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and 
protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision 
2001/220/JHA 
Directive 2012/29/EU OJ 2012 L 315/57 Adopted 25 October 2012 
2013     
Regulation (EU) No 98/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
15 January 2013 on the marketing and use of explosives precursors 
Regulation (EC) No 
98/2013 
OJ 2013 L 39/1 Adopted 15 January 2013 
Regulation (EU) No 100/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 15 January 2013 amending Regulation (EC) No 1406/2002 establishing a 
European Maritime Safety Agency 
Regulation (EC) No 
100/2013 
OJ 2013 L 39/30 Adopted 15 January 2013 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
establishing an Entry/Exit System (EES) to register entry and exit data of 
third country nationals crossing the external borders of the Member States of 
the European Union532 
COM(2013) 95 final n/a (procedure 
reference: 
2013/0057/COD) 
Proposal 28 February 2013 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 as regards the use of the Entry/Exit 
System (EES) and the Registered Traveller Programme (RTP)533 
COM(2013) 96 final n/a (procedure 
reference: 
2013/0060/COD) 
Proposal 28 February 2013 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
establishing a Registered Traveller Programme534 
COM(2013) 97 final n/a (procedure 
reference: 
2013/0059/COD) 
Proposal 28 February 2013 
Commission Regulation (EU) No 389/2013 of 2 May 2013 establishing a Union 
Registry pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council, Decisions No 280/2004/EC and No 406/2009/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council and repealing Commission Regulations (EU) No 
920/2010 and No 1193/2011 
Regulation (EU) No 
389/2013 
OJ 2013 L 122/1 Adopted 2 May 2013 
Directive 2014/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
23 July 2014 on the comparability of fees related to payment accounts, 
payment account switching and access to payment accounts with basic 
features 
Directive 2014/92/EU OJ 2014 L 
257/214 
Adopted 23 July 2014 
                                                 
 
532 Withdrawn and replaced by COM(2016) 194 final and COM(2016) 196 final. 
533 Withdrawn and replaced by COM(2016) 194 final and COM(2016) 196 final. 
534 Withdrawn and replaced by COM(2016) 194 final and COM(2016) 196 final. 
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OJ reference Status Date of adoption / 
proposal 
Regulation (EU) No 526/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 21 May 2013 concerning the European Network and Information Security 
Agency (ENISA) and repealing  Regulation (EC) No 460/2004 
Regulation (EU) No 
526/2013 
OJ 2013 L 165/41 Adopted 21 May 2013 
Council Decision 2013/269/CFSP of 27 May 2013 authorising Member States 
to sign, in the interests of the European Union, the Arms Trade Treaty 
Council Decision 
2013/269/CFSP 
OJ 2013 L 155/9 Adopted 27 May 2013 
Regulation (EU) No 603/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 26 June 2013 on the establishment of 'Eurodac' for the comparison of 
fingerprints for the effective application of Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 
establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State 
responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in 
one of the Member States' law enforcement authorities and Europol for law 
enforcement purposes, and amending Regulation (EU) No 1077/2011 
establishing a European Agency for the operational management of large-
scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and justice (Recast version) 
Regulation (EU) No 
603/2013 
OJ 2013 L 180/1 Adopted 26 June 2013 
Proposal for a Council Regulation on the establishment of the European Public 
Prosecutor's Office 
COM(2013) 534 final n/a (procedure 
reference: 
2013/0255/APP) 
Proposal 17 July 2013 
Directive 2013/40/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 12 
August 2013 on attacks against information systems and repealing Council 
Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA 
Directive 2013/40/EU OJ 2013 L 218/8 Adopted 12 August 2013 
Decision No 1082/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
22 October 2013 on serious cross-border threats to health and repealing 
Decision No 2119/98/EC 
Decision No 
1082/2013/EU 
OJ 2013 L 293/1 Adopted 22 October 2013 
Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 22 October 2013 establishing the European Border Surveillance System 
(Eurosur) 
Regulation (EU) 
No 1052/2013 
OJ 2013 L 295/11 Adopted 22 October 2013 
Directive 2013/48/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 
October 2013 on the right of access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings and in 
the European arrest warrant proceedings, and the right to have a third party 
informed upon deprivation of liberty and to communicate with third persons 
and with consular authorities while deprived of liberty 
Directive 2013/48/EU OJ 2013 L 294/1 Adopted 22 October 2013 
Regulation (EU) No 1291/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 11 December  2013 establishing Horizon 2020 – the Framework Programme 
for Research and Innovation (2014-2020) and repealing Decision No 
1982/2006/EC 
Regulation (EU) No 
1291/2013 
OJ 2013 L 
347/104 
Adopted 11 December 2013 
2014     
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Regulation (EU) No 377/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 3 April 2014 establishing the Copernicus Programme and repealing 
Regulation (EU) No 911/2010 
Regulation (EU) No 
377/2014 
OJ 2014 L 122/44 Adopted 3 April 2014 
Directive 2014/42/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 
2014 on the freezing and confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds of 
crime in the European Union 
Directive (EU) 
2014/42 
OJ 2014 L 127/39 Adopted 3 April 2014 
Directive 2014/41/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 
2014 regarding the European Investigation Order in criminal matters 
Directive 2014/41/EU OJ 2014 L 130/1 Adopted 3 April 2014 
Regulation (EU) No 513/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 16 April establishing, as part of the Internal Security Fund, the instrument 
for financial support for police cooperation, preventing and combating crime, 
and crisis management and repealing Council Decision 2007/125/JHA 
Regulation (EU) No 
513/2014 
OJ 2014 L 
150/143 
Adopted 16 April 2014 
Council Decision of 24 June 2014 on the arrangements for the implementation 
by the Union of the solidarity clause 
Council Decision 
2014/415/EU 
OJ 2014 L 192/53 Adopted 24 June 2014 
2015     
Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 
March 2016 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons 
across borders (Schengen Borders Code) 
Regulation (EU) 
2016/399 
OJ 2016 L 77/1 Adopted 9 March 2016 
Regulation (EU) 2015/847 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 
May 2015 on information accompanying transfers of funds and Repealing (EC) 
No 1781/2006 
Regulation (EU) No 
2015/847 
OJ 2015 L 141/1 Adopted 20 May 2015 
Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 
May 2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes 
of money laundering or terrorist financing, amending Regulation (EU) No 
648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing 
Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and 
Commission Directive 2006/70/EC535 
Directive 
2015/849/EU 
OJ 2015 L 141/73 Adopted 20 May 2015 
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Council Directive 91/477/EEC on control of the acquisition and 
possession of weapons 
COM(2015) 750 final n/a (procedure 
reference: 
2015/0269/COD) 
Proposal 18 November 2015 
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 
2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism 
COM(2015) 625 final n/a (procedure 
reference: 
2015/0281/COD) 
Proposal 2 December 2015 
2016     
                                                 
 
535 Amended by COM(2016) 450 final. 
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proposal 
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Council Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA, as regards the 
exchange of information on third country nationals and as regards the 
European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS), and replacing Council 
Decision 2009/316/JHA 
COM(2016) 7 final n/a (procedure 
reference: 
2016/0002/COD) 
Proposal 19 January 2016 
Regulation (EU) 2016/429 of the European Parliament and the Council of 9 
March 2016 on transmissible animal diseases and amending and repealing 
certain acts in the area of animal health ('Animal Health Law') 
Regulation (EU) 
2016/429 
OJ 2016 L 84/1 Adopted 9 March 2016 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
establishing an Entry/Exit System (EES) to register entry and exit data and 
refusal of entry data of third country nationals crossing the external borders 
of the Member States of the European Union and determining the conditions 
for access to the EES for law enforcement purposes and amending Regulation 
(EC) No 767/2008 and Regulation (EU) No 1077/2011 
COM(2016) 194 final n/a (procedure 
reference: 
2016/0106/COD) 
Proposal 6 April 2016 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 as regards the use of the Entry/Exit 
System 
COM(2016) 196 final n/a (procedure 
reference: 
2016/0105/COD) 
Proposal 6 April 2016 
Directive (EU) 2016/681 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 
April 2016 on the use of passenger name record (PNR) data for the 
prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and 
serious crime 
Directive 
2016/681/EU 
OJ 2016 L 
119/132 
Adopted 27 April 2016 
Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 
April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing 
of personal data by competent authorities for the prevention, investigation, 
detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal 
penalties, and the free movement of such data, and repealing Council 
Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA 
Directive (EU) 
2016/680 
OJ 2016 L 119/89 Adopted 27 April 2016 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
establishment of 'Eurodac' for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective 
application of [Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 establishing the criteria and 
mechanisms for determining the Member States by a third-country national or 
a stateless person] , for identifying an illegally staying third-country national 
or stateless person and on requests for the comparison with Eurodac data by 
Member States' law enforcement authorities and Europol for law enforcement 
purposes (recast) 
COM(2016) 272 final n/a (procedure 
reference: 
2016/0132/COD) 
Proposal 4 May 2016 
Regulation (EU) 2016/794 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 
May 2016 on the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation 
and Training (Europol) and repealing Decisions 2009/371/JHA, 
2009/934/JHA, 2009/935/JHA, 2009/936/JHA and 2009/968/JHA 
Regulation (EU) No 
2016/794 
OJ 2016 L 135/53 Adopted 11 May 2016 
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proposal 
Agreement between the United States of America and the European Union on 
the protection of personal information relating to the prevention, 
investigation, detection, and prosecution of criminal offenses 
n/a n/a Signed 2 July 2016 
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the 
financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing 
and amending Directive 2009/101/EC 
COM(2016) 450 final n/a (procedure 
reference: 
2016/0208/COD) 
Proposal 5 July 2016 
Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 
July 2016 concerning measures for a high common level of security of network 
and information systems across the Union 
Directive (EU) 
2016/1148 
OJ 2016 L 194/1 Adopted 6 July 2016 
Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
14 September 2016 on the European Border and Coast Guard and amending 
Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council and 
repealing Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council, Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 and Council Decision 
2005/267/EC 
Regulation (EU) 
2016/1624 
OJ 2016 L 251/1 Adopted 14 September 2016 
Council Regulation (EU) 2016/1686 of 20 September 2016 imposing additional 
restrictive measures directed against ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaeda and natural 
and legal persons, entities or bodies associated with them536 
Regulation 2016/1686 OJ 2016 L 255/1 Adopted 20 September 2016 
Council Decision (CFSP) of 20 September 2016 concerning restrictive 
measures against ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaeda and persons, groups, 
undertakings and entities associated with them and repealing Common 
Position 2002/402/CFSP 
Council Decision 
(CFSP) 2016/1693 
OJ 2016 L 255/25 Adopted 20 September 2016 
Directive (EU) 2016/1919 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 
October 2016 on legal aid for suspects and accused persons in criminal 
proceedings and for requested persons in European arrest warrant 
proceedings 
Directive (EU) 
2016/1919 
OJ 2016 L 297/1 Adopted 26 October 2016 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
establishing a European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS) 
and amending Regulations (EU) No 515/2014, (EU) 2016/399, (EU) 2016/794 
and (EU) 2016/1624 
COM(2016) 731 final n/a (procedure 
reference: 
2016/0357/COD) 
Proposal 16 November 2016 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
use of the Schengen Information System for the return of illegally staying 
third-country nationals 
COM(2016) 881 final n/a (procedure 
reference: 
2016/0407/COD) 
Proposal 21 December 2016 
                                                 
 
536 Not updated yet, but can be expected. 
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proposal 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
establishment, operation and use of the Schengen Information System (SIS) 
in the field of border checks, amending Regulation (EU) No 515/2014 and 
repealing Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006 
COM(2016) 882 final n/a (procedure 
reference: 
2016/0408/COD) 
Proposal 21 December 2016 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
establishment, operation and use of the Schengen Information System (SIS) 
in the field of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, 
amending Regulation (EU) No 515/2014 and repealing Regulation (EC) No 
1986/2006, Council Decision 2007/533/JHA and Commission Decision 
2010/261/EU 
COM(2016) 883 final n/a (procedure 
reference: 
2016/0409/COD) 
Proposal 21 December 2016 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
mutual recognition of freezing and confiscation orders 
COM(2016) 819 final n/a (procedure 
reference: 
2016/0412/COD) 
Proposal 21 December 2016 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
controls on cash entering or leaving the Union and repealing Regulation (EC) 
No 1889/2005 
COM(2016) 825 final n/a (procedure 
reference: 
2016/0413/COD) 
Proposal 21 December 2016 
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
countering money laundering by criminal law 
COM(2016) 826 final n/a (procedure 
reference: 
2016/0414/COD) 
Proposal 21 December 2016 
2017 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on combating 
terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on 
combating terrorism537 
COM(2015) 625 n/a (procedure 
reference: 
2015/0281/COD) 
Adopted 16 February 2017 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Regulation No 562/2006 (EC) as regards the reinforcement of checks against 
relevant databases at external borders538 
COM(2015) 670 final n/a (procedure 
reference: 
2015/0307/COD) 
Adopted 16 February 2017 
 
 
                                                 
 
537 Adopted but not yet officially published at the close of this research. 
538 Adopted but not yet officially published at the close of this research. 
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ANNEX III: METHODOLOGY 
Phasing of the study and practical approach 
The study has four main phases: 
 
1. Inception phase, in which the methodology was finalised and subsequently 
discussed and agreed with the EP, based on the research team’s Inception Report 
2. Data collection phase, meaning document analysis and interviews to collect data 
in four steps, as presented in the below.  
 
3. Analysis phase: analysis and validation of findings and development of future 
policy options 
4. Reporting phase 
For this project, the research team has made use of desk research of EU documents, 
national legislation and policy documents, and literature, and semi-structured interviews to 
provide a comprehensive assessment of the EU’s counter-terrorism policy architecture, 
identifying gaps and overlaps and pinpointing good practices. The outcome of this 
assessment has been combined with the outcomes of a ‘Policy Lab’ Workshop to provide 
input for suggesting future policy options. 
The focus of this assessment and evaluation is on a) the degree of implementation of the 
EU’s counter-terrorism framework, b) the effectiveness of cooperation and information 
sharing, and c) on the cooperation with third countries. The overall question is whether the 
current EU counter-terrorism architecture, the degree of implementation and the various 
ways of cooperation and information sharing do provide an adequate response to the way 
in which the terrorist threat has developed over the years. To this end, this question has 
taken central stage in the interviews to be conducted. Focussing more specifically on the 
issues of cooperation and information sharing, the level of trust in the institutions and 
measures at hand, and in the Member States or third countries with whom cooperation is 
intended is of vital importance to the success and effectiveness of these measures. The 
interviewers have therefore paid specific attention to this element.  
Regarding implementation, this study has assessed the formal (legal-institutional) 
implementation of the EU’s counter-terrorism framework at national level, mainly based on 
document analysis, as well as the practical policy implementation at national level. The 
latter has been assessed based on perception interviews, i.e. key policy makers have been 
asked their perception of the national level policy uptake of the EU’s counter-terrorism 
framework.  
Overall, the research team has aimed to keep a balance between in-depth study and 
concise comprehensive overviews of the policies at hand. Through triangulation of the data 
collected through document analysis and interviews, the team has ensured a high level of 
validity in the assessments. 
Selection of Member States 
Part of this evaluation has concentrated on the manner in which EU Member States have 
implemented policies and measures in their national legislation or translated these into 
national policies. Taking into account the EP’s terms of reference and comments on the 
initial proposal, the research team has selected seven Member States as case studies. 
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Subsequently, the approach to each of these case studies will be outlined, aimed at 
collecting robust, comprehensive and comparable data for each of the seven cases. 
There are quite significant differences between EU Member States in the way they have 
been hit by terrorism, are dealing with radicalisation to violent extremism (VE), tackle 
financing of terrorism, regulate access to weapons and explosives, or are coping with 
Foreign (terrorist) Fighters.539 As to the latter topic: although this report has looked at 
terrorism more generally, it should be explained that there are clear links between the 
general counter-terrorism debate and the recent phenomenon of FTFs. An example is the 
new EU Directive on Countering Terrorism, which came into being because of the FTFs 
phenomenon.540 This is why the FTFs topic is of the utmost importance to understanding 
the current counter-terrorism debate in Europe and why it is frequently referred to in this 
report. A preliminary scan also shows that there are differences between the EU Member 
States in the way they feel the urgency to implement the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy 
and policies.541 Some countries have adopted comprehensive approaches, whereas others 
have not. With regard to the implementation of certain measures, it is also clear that there 
are differences in interpretation of the EU legislation. This is presumably the case for 
criminalising money laundering542 and the restrictions on firearms trafficking.543 
For the purpose of this project a selection of seven EU Member States has been made to 
assess the implementation of the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy and the various policies. 
The criteria that have been taken into consideration for making a selection include: 
 Geographical spread 
 Countries with high number of FTFs and serious issues of VE 
 Countries where terrorist attacks have taken place 
 Countries used as transit route of FTFs 
 Different levels of implementation of EU measures and EU Counter-Terrorism 
Strategy with its four pillars of Prevent, Protect, Pursue and Respond, as translated 
in comprehensive strategies.544 
Taking into account these criteria, the project team has selected the following seven 
Member States: Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Slovakia, and Spain.  
                                                 
 
539 See also http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/foreign-fighters.  
540 See European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
combatting terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism’, Brussels, 
2 December 2015, COM(2015) 625 final 2015/0281 (COD), Explanatory Memorandum, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-security/legislative-
documents/docs/20151202_directive_on_combatting_terrorism_en.pdf, p. 2. See for the interlinkage between the 
issue of terrorism and FTFs also European Council and the Council of the EU, ‘Response to foreign terrorist fighters 
and recent terrorist attacks in Europe’, available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-
terrorism/foreign-fighters/. 
541 Van Ginkel, B. and Entenmann. E. (Eds.), “The Foreign Fighters Phenomenon in the European Union. Profiles, 
Threats & Policies”, The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague 7, no. 2 (2016), 
http://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/ICCT-Report_Foreign-Fighters-Phenomenon-in-the-EU_1-April-
2016_including-AnnexesLinks.pdf, hereafter ‘ICCT FF report’. 
542 Communication from the commission to the European Parliament and the Council on an Action Plan for 
strengthening the fight against terrorist financing, COM(2016)50/2. 
543 Report: State of play on implementation of the statement of the Members of the European Council of 12 
February 2015 on counter-terrorism, 14734/15, 30 November 2015. 
544 See also the Riga Joint Statement, 29 and 30 January 2015, in which the Justice and Home Affairs Ministers of 
the EU Member States underlined the ‘need for a comprehensive cross-sectorial approach guaranteeing the 
involvement of all policies concerned’. 
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Figure 14: Selected Member States 
 
      Source: PwC and ICCT. 
 
Below follows a short narrative per country to explain the reason for their selection: 
 Belgium: Belgium has been hit by several terrorist attacks recently, and there were also 
linkages between the perpetrators of the Paris terrorist attack and people residing in 
Belgium. According to analysts, the (now defunct) organisation Sharia4Belgium has been 
a breeding ground for radicalisation of extremists. Despite the serious threat, Belgium 
does not have a single national strategy to deal with the problem, but has instead 
developed a patchwork of various plans and policies in relation to security, legislative 
and preventive measures.545 Belgium is one of the EU Member States with the highest 
absolute numbers of FTFs, and even has the highest percentage of FTFs per capita of the 
population.546  
 Bulgaria: the estimates on the number of FTFs that left from Bulgaria vary between 
zero-ten.547 The country assesses the threat of terrorism to be moderate, although 
Bulgaria did suffer from a suicide attack in 2012 on a bus with Israeli tourists. The 
authorities claim that “potentially vulnerable communities are relatively indifferent to the 
terrorist propaganda”.548 Bulgaria is, however, due to its geographical position, aware of 
                                                 
 
545 Ibid., Annex 3, pp. 5-9. 
546 ICCT FF report, pp. 50-51, Annex 3, pp. 4-5. 
547 Ibid., pp. 9-11. 
548 Ibid., pp. 10-11 
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the risk of becoming an easy transit country for returning FTFs. Yet, no specific security 
measures have been adopted to stem the flow of FTFs traveling to and from Syria/Iraq.  
 France: France has recently suffered multiple serious terrorist attacks, and as a result 
of the continued threat has declared a state of emergency. Since 2012, France adopted 
numerous counter-terrorism measures and policies, including a National Action Plan 
against Violent Radicalisation and Jihadi Networks in 2014, updated in 2016 by an Action 
Plan against Radicalisation and Terrorism.549 France, like Belgium, belongs to the EU 
Member States with the highest absolute numbers of FTFs, and ranks number five in the 
list of countries with the highest per capita number of FTFs.550 Moreover, the authorities 
estimate that approximately 2,000 French nationals or residents are radicalised or 
involved in jihadist networks.551  
 Germany: in terms of absolute numbers of FTFs, Germany ranks second among the EU 
Member States.552 A number of failed, foiled and succeeded terrorist attacks have taken 
place in Germany.553 Germany has adopted a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy, 
which includes security, legislative and preventive measures.554 As part of the preventive 
measures, Germany adopted, in 2014, a Framework on Prevention Regarding Salafism. 
Several of the federal states of Germany, moreover, have developed rehabilitation 
programmes for returnees, and de-radicalisation programmes in prisons.555 
 The Netherlands: the Netherlands belong to the intermediate category when it comes 
to numbers of FTFs.556 Although the Netherlands has not recently suffered any terrorist 
attacks, the threat level is kept on level four, out of a five-level scale, and considered to 
be “substantial”.557 A new counter-terrorism strategy has been adopted in 2016, which 
replaces the comprehensive strategy of 2011. The strategy comprises of five strands, 
namely, Procure, Prevent, Protect, Prepare, and Prosecute.  
 Slovakia: Slovakia belongs to the category of countries with hardly any FTFs.558 The 
country’s threat assessment has been raised in the aftermath of the Paris attack, mainly 
due to the lack of confidence in the Schengen border control system.559 In 2015, 
Slovakia adopted a National Action Plan on Combating Terrorism and a Strategy on 
Countering Extremism (both documents are only available online in the Slovak 
language).560 With respect to arms control and measures against arms trafficking, there 
is some controversy regarding the interpretation of Slovakia of EU regulations, which 
allegedly explains the many linkages of arms trafficking routes also used by terrorist 
networks to Slovakia. Slovakia, together with France and Germany (the Netherlands will 
also join) is involved a big research project to analyse these trafficking and trade 
practices.561  
                                                 
 
549 Plan d’action contre la radicalisation et le terrorisme (9 May 2016) http://www.gouvernement.fr/partage/7050-
plan-d-action-contre-la-radicalisation-et-le-terrorisme.  
550 ICCT FF Report, pp. 50-51, Annex 3, pp. 21-22. 
551 ICCT FF Report, Annex 3, pp. 21-22. 
552 ICCT FF Report, pp. 50-51. 
553 ICCT FF Report, Annex 3, pp. 26-27. 
554 Ibid., p. 27. 
555 Ibid., p. 28. 
556 Ibid., pp. 50-51. 
557 Ibid., Annex 3, pp. 36-37. 
558 Ibid., pp. 50-51. 
559 Ibid., Annex III, p. 42. 
560 Ibid., p. 43.  
561 Candea, Stefan, Dahlkamp, Jurgen, Schmitt, Jorg, Ulrich, Andreas and Wiedmann-Schmidt , Wolf, ‘Following 
the path of the Paris terror weapons’, Der Spiegel, 24 March 2016. 
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 Spain: Spain falls in the category with (relatively) very low numbers of FTFs.562 Spanish 
analysts have pointed to the mostly first generation immigrant population to explain the 
difference in radicalisation numbers compared to Northern European countries, which 
hold a larger population of second and third generation immigrants. Nevertheless, Spain 
keeps its threat level on four (“high”) on a scale of five.563 In 2012, Spain adopted a 
comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy. In 2015, a new Strategic National Action Plan 
against Violent Radicalisation was adopted as part of the comprehensive counter-
terrorism strategy.564  
Methodology for the mapping of measures 
Orientation 
The mapping of measures is based on the 2013 study by Hayes and Jones. This study has 
inventoried the following types of measures: Action plans and strategy documents, 
Regulations, Directives, Framework Decisions, Decisions, Joint Actions, Common Positions, 
Recommendations, Resolutions, Conclusions, and International agreements.565 In the 
mapping of the current study, the research team has tried to be exhaustive in terms of 
including the hard law measures as possible, although it cannot be ensured that all 
measures are present. Although the research team has aimed to be as complete as 
possible, it cannot ensure that all measures adopted in the EU context relating to counter-
terrorism have been covered. 
Inclusion and exclusion 
On the basis of the decision to inventory only hard law, this annex contains only the 
following types of measures: Framework Decisions, Decisions, Directives, Regulations, and 
International agreements. As part of a particular measure, the study by Hayes and Jones 
only includes several other types of supplementary documents. Associated documents such 
as Commission proposals and staff working documents, implementation reports, reports on 
transposition, European Parliament reports and studies, evaluations, and impact 
assessments have not been included since they are not hard law. 
The following supplementary documents have been included, the criterion being their hard 
law character: Council Decisions, Commission Regulations, implementing measures, 
corrigenda, and measures that have been recast. Amendments to the measures are 
included with two exceptions. First, Regulation (EC) No 1406/2002 (establishing Maritime 
Safety Agency) has been omitted because it did not bear any direct connection to counter-
terrorism at the time. Second, Regulations 2580/2001 (EC), 881/2002 (EC), and 
2016/1686 (EU) concern asset freezing and the first two have been updated many times 
since their adoption and mostly concern the addition or removal of individuals or groups 
to/from the list. As a result, only the initial measures have been included – with the 
exception of Regulation (EU) No 1286/2009 amending Regulation 881/2002 (EC) which 
introduced a review procedure for the de/listing following the influential ECJ decision in the 
Kadi case. 
Extension beyond 2013 
                                                 
 
562 ICCT FF Report, pp. 50-51. 
563 Ibid., Annex III, pp. 44-45. 
564 Ibid., pp. 45-46. 
565 Hayes, B. and Jones, C., “Report on how the EU assesses the impact, legitimacy and effectiveness of its 
counterterrorism laws”, Statewatch (2013. 
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The Hayes and Jones study runs until 2013 and includes proposed measures as well. The 
state of these proposals has been checked and they have been included according to their 
status at the time of writing in January 2017. 
In order to map the counter-terrorism agenda beyond 2013, the study has drawn on 
several documents. These are reports by the EU CTC and Council Conclusions.566 
 
                                                 
 
566 For reports by the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator and the Council, see 15799/14; 6891/15; 9418/1/15 
REV1; 9422/1/15; 12318/15; 12551/15; 14734/15; 6785/16; 8128/16; For the Council Conclusions, see the Riga 
Joint Statement of January 2015 at: https://eu2015.lv/images/Kalendars/IeM/2015_01_29_joint 
statement_JHA.pdf, 6048/15, 14406/15.  
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ANNEX IV: INTERVIEWS AND POLICY LAB WORKSHOP 
Experts interviewed for this report 
Interviews with, and the consultation of experts from EU and Member State-level 
organisations represent an important part of this research. In total, the research team has 
conducted 27 (telephone) interviews with 32 representatives/experts of EU-level and 
Member State-level organisations. In addition, the team has organised a workshop in which 
a total of 12 international experts have taken part, and shared their views on the EU 
counter-terrorism policy architecture with the research team (see Annex III and V for more 
information about the workshop). Taking into account the fact that two of the experts that 
attended the workshop have also provided the research team with an interview, the total 
number of individuals that have been consulted for the purpose of this research amounts to 
42. 
At the EU level, the research team has interviewed representatives from the EU Counter-
Terrorism Coordinator’s office, Europol, Eurojust, the European Commission, and Frontex. 
It has also interviewed scholars of the EUI and SciencePo, and a representative of the 
human rights organisation Amnesty International. At Member State level, it has conducted 
interviews with representatives of organisations from the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, 
Slovakia and Bulgaria. These experts include public prosecutors and staff from other 
governmental institutions that deal with counter-terrorism.  
The experts that have attended the workshop include counter-terrorism experts from the 
EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator’s office, the Permanent Representation of Estonia at the 
EU, the Radicalisation Awareness Network, and academic institutions from France, the 
Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom. The list of interviewees is included below 
and the participants list can be found in Annex E.  
Although the research team managed to interview/consult 42 experts on the subject of this 
evaluative study, the process of arranging these interviews has turned out to be lengthy 
and – admittedly – quite discouraging. Especially when it came to experts within the 
Member States of the focus countries- other than the Netherlands – it proved difficult, in 
times even impossible to arrange for interviews with staff from police, security services or 
counter-terrorism policy bodies. As a result, and despite numerous attempts, no interviews 
were conducted with French and Spanish experts. In addition, in the other Member States 
only some of the organisations that have been contacted have granted the research team 
their cooperation.  
In order to provide an impression of the efforts that has been put into this part of the 
research, as compared to the output, some numbers are presented. When it comes to the 
interviews that have indeed been arranged, a total of 355 e-mails have been exchanged 
between the team and the interviewees, which is an average of 13 e-mails per arranged 
interview. With regards to the interviews that the research team has not been able to 
realise, it has reached out (directly and indirectly) to 46 organisations at Member State 
level, amounting to approximately 75 outgoing e-mails and 55 outgoing calls to the 
targeted organisations and the research team’s network. The research team only received 
replies from 17 organisations and contacts within the team’s network. These replies have 
not led to any interviews.  
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What is interesting is that some organisations, even after sending formal letters at their 
request, still refused to grant the research team an interview. Other organisations insisted 
on a face-to-face-interview in their national language, which was unfortunately not possible 
within the constraints of the assignment. Although it was not made explicit, the research 
team got the impression that (1) many of the organisations and individuals contacted were 
already overcharged with requests for interviews and (2) there was some reluctance since 
the study was introduced as an evaluation. These concerns were also mentioned in the 
interviews with practitioners that did take place, and thus might have caused the general 
reluctance to cooperate as observed by the research team. The table below includes the 
names and organisations of the experts interviewed. 
Table 7: Experts interviewed for this study 
Interviews conducted 
EU-level organisations
Organisation Representative Date
EU Counterterrorism Coordinator Mr. Gilles de Kerchove 19-10-2016
Europol
Mr. Peter Kosters and Mr. Manual 
Navarrete
19-10-2016
Eurojust                                                                                                                                                                                    Ms. Michele Coninsx 20-10-2016
European Commission - DG Home
Ms. Alexandra Antoniadis and Mr. Hans 
Das 
28-10-2016
Frontex Mr. Jean-Pierre Berens 15-11-2016
Human Rights Organisations
Organisation Representative Date
Amnesty International                                                                                                                                      Ms. Doutje Lettinga 7-10-2016
Netherlands
Organisation Representative Date
Ministry of Finance Mr. J.C. Glimmerveen 26-10-2016
National Public Prosecutor's Office Mr. Simon Minks 1-11-2016
Openbaar Ministerie 
(Public prosecution service) 
Mr. Bart den Hartigh 
10-11-2016
AIVD Mr. Rob Bertholee 20-10-2016
NCTV Mr. Lodder and Mr. H.P. Schreinemacher 4-11-2016
Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) Ms. Marije Meines 24-11-2016
The Dutch National Bank (DNB) Mr. R.J. Hoff 16-11-2016
Germany
Organisation Representative Date
GBA Generalbundesanwalt
(Federal Public Prosecutor General) 
Mr. Lars Otte 
28-10-2016
Higher Regional Court Bayern (OLG) Mr. Manfred Dauster 11-10-2016
Bundeskriminalamt (BKA) 28-11-2016
Belgium
Organisation Representative Date
Openbaar Ministerie 
(Public prosecution service)
Ms. Wenke Roggen
Mr. Jan Kerkhoffs
6-12-2016
Flemish Peace Insitute Mr. Nils Duquet 7-11-2016
FOD Binnenlandse Zaken Mr. Waut Es 16-12-2016
Ufungu (RAN) Mr. Christophe Bush 16-12-2016
CTIF Mr. Hans van Hemelrijck 16-12-2016
Bulgaria
Organisation Representative Date
Center for the Study of Democracy Ms. Rositsa Dzhekova 12-10-2016
Deputy Minister of the Interior Mr. Philip Gounev 23-12-2016
Slovakia
Organisation Representative Date
Globsec (Thinktank) Mr. Daniel Milo 17-10-2016
Public Prosecutor’s office Dr. Juraj Novocky 7-12-2016
Other Experts
Organisation Representative Date
EUI
Mr. Martin Scheinin
Dean of EUI, Professor of International 
Law and Human Rights
14-10-2016
SciencesPo Paris Dr. Mara Wesseling 5-9-2016
Member state level organizations / experts
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Policy Lab workshop 
The following pages contain the results of the policy lab workshop, which took place on 9 
November 2016 in The Hague, the Netherlands. The results as communicated to the 
participants have been included in the original format. 
Location  
Leiden University 
Schouwburgstraat 2 
2511 VA The Hague 
The Netherlands 
 
Participants:  
 Prof. Tore Bjørgo Center for Research on Extremism (C-REX) - University of Oslo  
 Dr. Oldřich Bureš Dep. of International Relations and European Studies - 
Metropolitan University Prague 
 Prof. dr. Monica den Boer Dep. of Political Science and Public Administration - Vrije 
Universiteit (VU) 
 Anonymous  Independent researcher/consultant 
 Mr. Guenther Sablatting  EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator’s office - European Council 
 Mr. Tom Keatinge Centre for Financial Crime & Security Studies (CFCS) - RUSI  
 Ms. Lia van Broekhoven   Human Security Collective  
 Dr. Mara Wesseling  Centre de Sociologie des Organisations - SciencesPo Paris 
 Prof. dr. Marieke de Goede  Department of Politics - University of Amsterdam  
 Ms. Marije Meines RadarAdvies - Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) 
 Ms. Annika Talmar Permanent Representation of Estonia to the EU 
 Ms. Willemijn Aerdts  Institute of Security and Global Affairs - Leiden University 
 Dr. Bibi van Ginkel  ICCT & Clingendael  
 Mr. Stef Wittendorp ICCT & Leiden University  
 Dr. Christophe Paulussen  ICCT & Asser Institute 
 Mr. Wim Wensink PwC Advisory 
 Ms. Roos Haasnoot  PwC Advisory 
 Mr. Thomas Rijken ICCT & Clingendael  
 
Summary of the round-table discussion 
Facilitator: Dr. Bibi van Ginkel, ICCT & Clingendael 
 
Pre-set discussion topics 
 Can we speak of an EU policy architecture on countering terrorism? 
 How do you assess the current EU counter-terrorism policy architecture?  
 What are the strengths and deficiencies of the current EU counter-terrorism policy 
architecture?  
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 Which specific areas need improvement? 
 How do you assess the policy cycle dynamic (problem assessment, needs 
assessment, policy design, policy implementation, impact assessment, monitoring & 
evaluation, adjustment of policy)? 
 What (out-of-the-box) suggestions can be made to change and improve the current 
mechanisms? 
Overall summary of points discussed during the round table discussion with regards to the 
EU counter-terrorism policy architecture 
During the round table discussion, experts especially pointed out the challenges that rise 
because of the many actors involved in the design and implementation of policies and 
measures. They recommended that an evaluation of the policy architecture should 
therefore first of all focus on an analysis of the role of the various actors in this 
architecture. Furthermore, they emphasized there is a distinction between measuring effect 
and effectiveness, and that it might be debated which one should be evaluated. Overall, 
they lamented the lack of clear frameworks for impact assessments and policy evaluations 
on the EU level. 
General topics that have been discussed in relation to the EU counter-terrorism policy 
architecture 
 Coherence; 
 Competencies and role of the EU;  
o Mandate; 
o Legitimacy, actor vs actorness; 
o International vs. local perspective; 
 Impact and Effectiveness;  
o Formal effectiveness vs. material effectiveness; 
o Scope of EU counter-terrorism policy; 
o Cooperation. 
 Future of EU counter-terrorism policy 
Summary of the main points discussed 
 
Can we speak of an EU counter-terrorism policy architecture? 
 Counter-terrorism is a ‘dribbling area’. Counter-terrorism becomes the umbrella 
under which many other initiatives are pushed through 
 The term “architecture’’ is not defined. Is it about coherence, competencies, 
implementation, and effectiveness? 
 There are too many counter-terrorism actors. There is no clarity as to who is in 
charge of what. The mandates of the different actors should be better defined 
(looking at the problem from a multi-level governance perspective).  
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 Is the interaction between the different actors streamlined? Are there any rules on 
the distribution of power? Think of interaction between the CTC and Mogherini, the 
difference between formal and informal power/arrangements. 
 In the end the EU and EU counter-terrorism actors have very limited power; power 
lies with EU Member States. This is the central problem of EU-level counter-
terrorism policies; there is an implementation issue.  
 The EU seems to fail when it comes to impact, legitimacy and effectiveness.   
How can we measure the impact the EU counter-terrorism policy architecture? It 
is clear that in any case a distinction should be made between measuring ‘effect’ 
and ‘effectiveness’? 
Does the EU counter-terrorism policy actually counter terrorism? Does it do what 
it promises to do? 
 
 There isn’t a clear formalised framework that automatically will evaluate policies. Let 
alone an external actor to perform that job. 
 Currently it seems the EU is doing this job occasionally, and –if so- only partially, 
not using a set frame of factors to be evaluated. This means that on the occasion 
evaluations have been run, they have been criticized for not looking at for instance 
aspect of human rights compliance.   
 Think e.g. of the PNR, privacy issues etc. Also the EU Directive. This is where LIBE 
can make the difference. The idea of the UK Independent Reviewer is also an 
interesting one. Perhaps the CTC could follow the example of this model. 
 Ultimately, the biggest problem is the lack of proper threat assessment prior to EU 
counter-terrorism policy design. It is purely reactive. 
 In assessments of EU counter-terrorism architecture, the private sector is often the 
missing link. Cf. the field of financing (banks etc.).  
 There is a difference between effectiveness and effects. That the EU has impact does 
not mean it is effective. There have been evaluations of certain measures and 
effects but not on the effectiveness of certain policies. Does it actually work?  
 A policy architecture is something that comes together as a house. What is done in 
counter-terrorism at the EU level does not seem to come together in such a way; 
there are bits and pieces here and there but there is no coherence. 
 We currently only have a roof and a few building blocks. A proper plan or foundation 
for that matter, seems to be missing. 
 One should start with the foundations. On the other hand, it was also stated that the 
EU cannot build this house, as this is the prerogative of the Member States.  
 This is frustrating for the EU, which may explain the plethora of different plans it has 
initiated. So you either change the treaties, or you stick with what you have, with 
the possible death of Schengen as a result. 
 Terrorism is an area where states can show their power to act. Policy makers have 
been speaking about terrorism for fifteen years, telling citizens that many problems 
are caused by terrorists.  
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Is it feasible to aim for an architecture? Or should the role of the EU be different? 
 
 So far, the policies seem to have been driven mainly as a reaction to terrorist 
events. This does not contribute to the development of a long-term strategy. Also, 
the fact that every six months there is a new EU Presidency does not help: every 
country has its own policy priorities so there is short-term thinking. 
 There is a lack of public trust: People do not feel represented by the EU. There is not 
enough common ground within societies for EU counter-terrorism. First, the gap 
between regions on visions of counter-terrorism policy should be bridged, before it 
will be possible to consider a reshuffle of mandates between the EU and Member 
States with regard to dealing with the problem of terrorism and radicalisation to 
violent extremism. 
 The EU is well positioned to play a role in facilitating a system of information 
sharing, but for that to work to its full potential, Member States should also trust 
each other, as well as trust the EU.  
What is terrorism? What is EU counter-terrorism policy? 
 
 The effectiveness and effects of the policy or measure are not always in line with the 
original objective of the policy or measure. There is a risk of ‘mission creep’. In 
addition, the policy objective is not always very well-articulated when a 
policy/measure is adopted, making it impossible to measure its effectiveness (with 
regard to its objective), and only making it possible to assess certain effects.  
 The evolution of counter-terrorism policy: The net of counter-terrorism has become 
wider over the years since 9/11. The EU started with a common definition of 
counterterrorism and criminal laws to pursue terrorists; then they went after 
supporters of terrorism, financing, ideologies. This raises the question on whether it 
has become too big to succeed. 
 There is a huge growth area of measures that are to some extent connected to, but 
not limited to, terrorism, such as the criminalization of suspect travel.  
 The EU moves away further from the criminal act towards the ‘pre-crime space’. 
More and more people fall within the net of counter-terrorism. The experts do not 
consider this development beneficial for the overall effectiveness of counter-
terrorism policies. The question put to the table is: how do we narrow the net? 
 The EU is moving further away from the ‘core’ of counter-terrorism, i.e. the security 
services.  Instead of gathering more data, we should focus on enhancing data 
exchange.  
 On many recent occasions, it appeared that perpetrators of recent terrorist attacks 
were known to security services. So instead of doing more big data analyses to 
identify unknown terrorists, something is going wrong with the core of data 
exchange within countries and between countries. There is a lack of security service 
cooperation.  
 An issue that has been missing in many discussion is the root causes of terrorism. 
There is still a lack of understanding of what motivates people. There are many 
theories, but much more attention should be paid to this issue.  
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Currently there only seems to be counter-terrorism oversight on a national level. 
There is a lot of incrementalism in counter-terrorism policies, but oversight falls 
short of dealing with these new policies. Should there be an EU oversight body?  
 Adding up all the legislation on counter-terrorism over time, we see a huge 
infringement of privacy and potential for harming human rights, justifying EU 
oversight.  
Future of EU counter-terrorism policy? 
 The EU does not have the power to draw a ‘model house’. 
 We need a new language; we need architects, builders and visionaries. 
What is still missing?  
 We seem to be looking for the unknown, but we already know so much. 
 Cooperation between security services/data exchange is key. 
 MS unwillingness vs inability to implement measures. 
Summary of the Brain-writing exercise 
Facilitator: Dr. Bibi van Ginkel, ICCT  
As a second part of the policy lab workshop, a brain-writing exercise was held, with specific 
focus on financing of terrorism. Groups of 6 participants were invited to write down three 
ideas in 5 minutes, then pass this form to a group member and reflect on/ add to the three 
ideas of another group member. 
During this exercise approximately 120 ideas and thoughts were shared among the experts 
on the general question: How to improve (real) effectiveness and stay ahead of the curve 
in countering the financing of terrorism? These ideas were scored by the experts and this 
resulted in a top 5 of ideas and suggestions on How to improve (real) effectiveness and 
stay ahead of the curve in countering the financing of terrorism? 
Top 5 ideas/suggestions: 
 
Idea Number of votes 
1. What is the objective of the measures? 12 
2. Be clear on the underlying assumptions 9 
3. Oversight 8 
4. Take into account crime-terror nexus 8 
5. Sharing good practises > increase among MS and within 4 
 
In this Annex, all forms from all groups are included, so over 100 raw ideas and reflections 
of all experts are made available. 
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Form 1:  
Idea: Address the profit vs. 
security dilemma (bank’s 
over-reporting and de-
risking) + feedback to 
private sector (fusion 
centres?) 
Idea: Adjust the global UN 
“smart sanctions” and FATF 
anti-money laundering 
models to EU circumstances 
(how terrorism is financed in 
the EU) 
Idea: Acknowledge /Address 
the impact/assessment 
issue:  
- 100% prevention 
impossible;  
- impact on well-being of 
certain groups in EU and 
beyond;  
- possible push to informal 
banking problematic. 
Yes, but engage at the policy 
level sectors that are affected, in 
particular non-profits that are 
the only sector that are “at risk” 
as a sector of being abused for 
TF 
The EU tries hard to be the best 
student of the FATF so indeed 
the EU should be based on their 
more autonomous “sanctions”, 
e.g. terrorist list > remedies to 
get off the list etc. 
Good point: there is no zero risk. 
This is acknowledged in the 
typology papers of the FATF 
which is not part of “the core of 
their standard”. Ensure that zero 
risk becomes part of the 
standard, its preamble a free 
FATF evaluation methodology 
outcome 
 Let alone that people end up at 
the “lists” with no apparent 
reason 
Very good point + turn it 
around. Would there not be any 
attacks if there was no large 
amount of money. Focus on low 
budget terrorism. 
 I always opt for more security. 
So if you get on one of these 
lists, you probably did something 
wrong. You can always get off 
the list. 
 
 
Form 2:  
Idea:  
Systematic evaluations of the 
impact (including negative 
side effects) and 
effectiveness of CT policies 
  
Critical assessment of 
underlying assumptions on 
which policies are based. 
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Form 3:   
 
Idea: 
 Improve police and customs 
cooperation. Information 
exchange needs to improve 
in a lot of areas connected to 
terrorism financing. 
Idea:  
Illegal firearms trafficking as 
a major impact to terrorism 
financing needs to be taken 
under control 
Idea:  
Zero tolerance towards drugs 
trafficking as a means for 
terrorist financing 
Agree Agree, illegal firearms trafficking 
is probably more directly related 
to preparing terrorist attacks 
than moving money across 
borders 
Most terrorist attacks seem to 
be funded by petty crime rather 
than by large-scale donations 
Targeted (not dragnet)  
exchange of police data on 
actual suspects is needed 
Agree – shift focus to weapons 
trafficking 
It is not clear from research that 
drugs trafficking and terrorist 
financing are linked on a 
meaningful scale 
Agree, too many databases are 
not interoperable and not all 
actors have access. But also 
keep in mind private sector! 
Not sure how close are links 
between firearms trafficking and 
terrorist financing, but the 
former deserves attention on its 
own merits. 
Crime-terror nexus exists but 
differs from one terrorist cell to 
another. Many have been 
abusing legal banking as well. 
Oversight is required of private 
sector that provides commercial 
data from open source to banks, 
government, NGO’s, that have 
to do “due diligence” on their 
clients & partners 
  
 
Form 4: 
 
Idea:  
Review effectiveness of 
international CTFS standards 
(FATF & EU following FATF 
(does it work?)) & UNSCR, 
e.g. /373, /276, etc.  
Idea: 
Assess effectiveness of CTF 
standards by an independent 
body comprising public and 
private representations 
Idea: 
 Improve current CFT 
measures, implement actions 
through focusing on risk 
based assessment 
(proportionate, context-
specific measures) 
Look into info sharing & 
expertise sharing before 
reviewing effectiveness (you’ll 
need that first) 
No more independent EU bodies. 
Fund research of uni’s 
Risk based assessment will 
make sure focus & means is 
invested where it is needed! It 
will get support/can be 
explained. 
Probably not a bad idea [Review 
effectiveness of international 
CTFS standards]. Might be 
almost impossible to do, but in 
the end might give good results. 
Thumbs up for this [No more 
independent EU bodies. Fund 
research of uni’s] 
Hmm…but how? 
Critical evaluation of underlying 
assumptions and outcomes 
(desired as well as undesired) 
are needed 
Agree that independent research 
is needed, not another 
independent body 
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Form 5:  
 
Idea:  
Independent monitor of CTF 
in EU to assess effectiveness, 
consequences 
Idea:  
Central reporting function for 
CTF-related negative 
disrupting (ep. for NGO’s for 
monitoring purpose 
remittances) 
Idea:  
Propose definition of 
“suspicion” for reporting 
financial transactions. 
> Genuine suspicion, 
evidenced suspicion 
Great idea – maybe also give 
fundamental rights agency a 
mandate to address C-T! 
Great idea - should be linked to 
financial inclusion agenda and 
national financial ombudsperson 
office 
But sanctions for banks mean 
that they will also take the most 
suspicious, risk averse 
approach. – So how? Raise 
threshold? 
Make difference between effect 
and impact (goals or measures) 
> Oversight, not only monitor 
 - Starting point should be to be 
pro-active and try to think like 
your adversary (what will they 
do next to reach goals) 
- should be starting point for 
discussion 
Effectiveness of implementation 
is one side of the coin: what 
about legitimacy? I endorse the 
suggestion to expand FRA’s 
mandate, but also ombudsman, 
EP, etc. 
Financial ombudsman: did we 
have one at EU level? (and 
should we have one?) 
Currently very low levels of 
suspicion apply already due to 
AML directive and FATF-
recommendations 
Monitoring sounds again like 
producing paper - if monitoring 
then it needs to lead to change 
See < Yes 
 
Form 6:  
 
Idea:  
Clarify the problem.  
- terrorist masterminds 
funding: actions in EU 
member states? Evidence? 
- people in EU funding 
terrorism abroad? Evidence? 
Significance? 
Idea:  
Acknowledge the impacts 
- mass surveillance 
- de-risking (bank account 
closure, etc.) 
- discrimination (certain 
groups /sectors / countries 
affected) 
Idea:  
Provide redress / 
accountability 
- lots of people unjustifiably 
impacted but no possibility 
for  them to receive 
help/advice/assistance 
Be pro-active and think from 
your adversaries perspective 
> How will they fund in the 
future? 
> How will they counter certain 
measures? 
> says something about trust in 
institutions 
> don’t be afraid of specific 
groups/reactions/etc. > but 
make sure not to ignore them 
> public communication on 
measures 
 
- Be as open as you can be (why 
do you take certain measures), 
still acknowledge some secrecy  
> and again communication on 
measures + stakeholder debate 
(more broadly than usual) 
The problem is that the EU 
apparently means to define a 
common enemy / adversary to 
articulate its own identity: be 
mindful of language 
Very concerned about the 
impact of surveillance  (data-
mining) technology which is 
introduced into every segment 
of our lives under the banner of 
CT 
Judicial redress: yes! 
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Do we really want to criminalise 
remittances to developing 
states? 
Mass surveillance is a reality, 
needs (and has!) control 
> What we need, is tolerance 
towards things that are 
surveyed. 
No 
Indeed we have to be aware 
that the cure can be worse than 
the pain. Not to underestimate 
terrorist financing, but impact 
goes beyond the “bad guys” 
Yes Yes 
 
Form 7: 
 
Idea:  
Stop being reactive, and 
really put yourselves into the 
minds of your adversaries 
Idea:  
Think of a way to stay ahead 
of the development of the 
“merging”/collaboration of 
organised crime / terrorists 
Idea:  
Adequate oversight 
mechanisms 
Shared ownership! (= my 
translation). The EU is 
mismanaged, hence we should 
find a way to involve 
professionals, citizens and 
companies 
Agree, but with all the 
proactively oriented EU-
instruments like PNR, we are 
already anticipating (in)security  
Absolutely agree 
However: at what level 
(national, EU?), with what 
mandate (sanctions?) and with 
whom? (European Parliament?) 
Today, politics is governed by 
fear, therefore visionaries are 
rather unlikely: proactive 
approaches are an ideal scenario 
but unrealistic 
See < 
Generally, I agree 
Oversight yes but it should also 
have the actual power to 
influence change 
Yes. Considering terrorism as 
being produced by society rather 
than a threat infringed upon 
society 
See < Yes, oversight with power 
 OC / TF connection is under-
recognised; distinction may 
have been correct but is now 
false  & dangerously naive, ct. 
trade in illicit firearms   
Again: need independent 
reviewer as in UK 
 
Form 8: 
 
Idea: Increase effectiveness 
- first evaluate current 
impact and limitations 
Idea: To stay ahead of curve: 
take into account root causes 
to address the issue of lone 
wolves 
Idea: Take into account 
qualitative analysis to 
measure effectiveness 
- This argues for an independent 
EU reviewer (UK example); we 
need to understand 
effectiveness of status quo 
before making changes (e.g. 
why were limits on pre-paid 
cards reduced?)  
- Finance + lone wolves is 
challenge 
- we need to learn from new 
financing sources: benefits, 
payday loans? 
Should these be brought into 
CTF architecture? 
- Repeat idea 1 
- Big issue: does CTF actually 
work? 
- should focus be on using 
financial info to identify 
terrorists rather than trying to 
stop TF? 
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Agree with this. We need to 
understand impact as well (i.e. 
negative impacts – de risking 
etc.) + how to measure 
effectiveness of suspicious 
transactions, accounts closed, 
etc. tells us nothing 
Understand threat, it is 
impossible to mitigate all risks 
and maintain open societies + 
fundamental rights 
Agree with above  
– How does qualitative analysis 
help?  
– Of what, by whom etc.? 
 - Be proactive  
> try to think from your 
adversaries point of view  
> what will be next to reach 
their goals 
Helps to be more inclusive and 
not to take into account only 
quantitative point of view 
Will help you to prevent classic 
analysis pitfalls 
Where is the impact 
(assessment) of EMPACT? We 
need to look at what we have 
before starting a new 
mechanism or policy circle If it 
aren’t broke; don’t fix it! 
Root causes are an emphasis on 
engagement, diplomacy, 
capacity building. 
Radicalisation happens rapidly. 
 
 
Form 9:  
 
Idea: Low budget terrorism 
is the future 
> Focus on root causes & 
mini financing of crime 
Idea: Each member state 
sends 2-3 financial terrorist 
experts to Brussels for 2 
days a week, to let them 
solve the issue by drafting 
sound advice & sharing 
expertise 
Idea: Right wing terrorism 
financing has more “history”, 
conduct research to boil 
down towards key ways of 
financing > use this to look 
at financing jihadist acts 
Probably quite difficult to do. But 
in the case of low budget 
terrorism, finding the root 
causes is maybe the only way to 
go + criminal records 
information exchange 
Good idea to get a working 
group going. Probably already 
done in some format 
Interesting 
Most European terrorists are not 
dirt poor but clearly 
socioeconomically relatively 
marginalised. High proportion 
have a criminal record. General 
policies to reduce 
marginalisation may have an 
impact but only in a very long 
term. 
Do financial experts have the 
expertise on how terrorist 
projects are really financed? 
They are likely to recommend 
financial measures that do not 
fit reality. 
Most right-wing violence does 
not need any financing beyond 
the cost of buying a bottle and 
fill it with petrol. Even the large 
scale attacks in Norway in 2011 
were funded by selling fake 
university diplomas. 
Focusing on ever smaller 
amounts require ever more 
detailed attention to financial 
transactions. Are we prepared to 
go this far? 
Who would these be? Police, 
intel, finance ministry, national 
FCU or private sector? 
We know that jihadist financing 
also needs very little in terms of 
budgets 
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Structural costs of running a 
terrorist group are still 
substantial, despite low cost of 
individual attacks. 
 - Listing / delisting 
- Impact assessments 
- Banks: over reporting, de-
risking 
- Targeted police / customs data 
change 
- Support for EU doings? What & 
Why should be done by EU? 
 
Form 10:  
 
Idea: Fully recognise the 
Kadi direction + 
fundamentally reform and 
scale back blacklisting 
Idea: Recognise and deal 
with the major policy clash 
at the core of CTF and take 
responsibility for financial 
inclusion 
Idea: Evaluate 4th Directive 
on effects and effectiveness 
before discussion of 5th 
direction 
In addition, some issues with 
the OPMI case impact > both EU 
and UN sanctions listing 
procedures (Impact of 
September 2016 changes?) 
Indeed, private sector shares 
the bulk of burden in CTF and 
their current practices are 
problematic 
= profit vs. security dilemma 
Where is the focus? And does it 
really prevent new attacks, or 
disrupt existing networks, or is 
the move just a deterrence 
function? But using what 
criteria?  
> Account of frozen $? 
> Account of reported suspicious 
transactions? 
> People arrested? 
Yes > and revive the 
effectiveness of the UN 
ombudspersons for UN sanctions 
related to 1276 (blacklists) 
Indeed > EU should address the 
de-risking “hot potato” > the 
bulk of burden is with the 
private sector, including non-
profits and civil society, leading 
to humanitarian disasters, 
financial exclusion of poor … & 
countries. 
Focus is important, but also 
evaluate the incoherent, fast-
forward process whereby more 
and new measures 
(unthoughtful) are being 
suggested without evidence-
base 
If blacklisting, be more 
transparent. Why/How people 
and organisations end up on it. 
Scale down the reasons to be on 
the list. 
Ask private sector first what 
they think their added value 
could be in CT (and financing it) 
Ask again 
Not only look at focus but also 
towards what goal you are 
working with 4th and 5th 
directive with what means 
(balance?) 
 Good idea. The private sector 
needs to take responsibility. 
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Form 11:  
 
Idea: Systematic evaluations 
of this impact (including 
negative side effects) and 
effectiveness (desired 
outcomes) of CT policies. 
Idea: Critical assessment of 
underlying assumptions on 
which policies are based 
(e.g. terrorist financing) 
Idea: Develop policies on 
how to deal with 
disillusioned, returning 
Foreign Fighters. Prosecution 
or rehabilitation? 
Excellent idea – impact should 
be broadly defined to involve 
civil liberties + human rights 
effects 
Excellent idea – is EU CFT 
fighting the “last battle” in the 
face of a changing threat? Is it 
possible at all to fight terrorism 
through banks when all 
attackers need is a small line of 
credit  
Broader questions concerning 
Foreign Fighters can be 
reviewed + critical study of how 
we deal with the broader Syria 
issue if necessary 
Agree, but what criteria are we 
going to use to ensure impact? 
Number of prevented attacks? 
Number of suspicious 
transactions? And measuring 
impact in civil liberties? 
Indeed  
> shifts in terrorist financing, 
move to various informal 
banking methods 
> adjust to EU circumstances! 
Larger issue > of who is a 
foreign fighter and thus subject 
to CTF (and other CT 
measures)? 
Good point: assemble a group of 
M&E specialists that think 
differently to provide advice on 
which criteria & what to 
measure? Acknowledge there is 
no zero risk. 
De-risking by banks has reached 
boiling point. The WTO and 
ACAMS are organising 
roundtables to arrive at possible 
solutions Is the EU (and who) 
part of this process? 
Approach could be FTF & his/her 
immediate context, so 
prevention & risk assessment 
Be careful not to affect financial 
context of FTF family 
Great! Look into goal (the why) 
+ the means and their side 
effects 
  
 
 
Summary of the points put forward during the brain-writing exercise 
 
 Topics 
Number 
of Votes 
1 Oversight 8 
 Fundamental Rights Agency? (mandate)  
 EP?  
 independent review > power to improve = important  
 listing & delisting procedures  
 “do not blindly follow UN NATO directives”  
2 Take into account crime-terror nexus 8 
 overlap, take into account design policies  
 firearms directive  
 improve data exchange & align databases interoperability  
 connect the dot     
3 Sharing good practises > increase among MS and within 4 
 reverse of policy uptake  
4 “Hot potato” 1 
 who is responsible of de-risking financial institutions? EU?  
 fall out of de-risking?  
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5 Cooperation 3rd countries, Middle East 3 
 encourage them to get their house in order  
 as a block we do not know what money is coming into the EU  
 lack willingness  
6 Be clear on the underlying assumptions 9 
 do they reflect reality?  
 evidence-based policies?  
7 
Reporting on implementation instead of impact of 
measure 
0 
 this should be changed  
8 Returning Foreign Fighters 0 
 how to deal with them  
 negative side-effects  
 risk assessments + policies on the table  
9 Define subsidiarity / mandate of EU 0 
 what can and should the EU do?  
10 What is the objective of the measures? 12 
 strategy and mission  
 what are we trying to achieve with CTF?  
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ANNEX V: DATA FOR GRAPHS 
In this Annex, we present the data used to compile the graphs in the figures 2, 12 and 13. This data consists of a selection of most 
impact-full attacks in Europe and of counter terrorism measures, categorised by theme. To develop the graphs and make sure (a) we 
selected measures of a comparable relevance and (b) this resulted in graphs that are readable and self-explanatory, it was impossible to 
use all measures as presented in Annex II. The selection of measures is based on professional judgement and contains those measures 
referred to in the study that can be considered as most important, with the most impact or as exemplary for a specific theme. 
Table 8: Data used for compiling graphs 
Full name Short title Exact date Type of document Theme 
Commission Recommendation of 12 January 1996 supplementing recommendation 
93/216/EEC on the European firearms pass (96/129/EC) 
Supplement to EFP 
Recommendation 
12 January 1996 measures weapons 
Commission Recommendation of 25 February 1993 on the European firearms pass EFP Recommendation 25 February 1996 measures weapons 
EU Programme for preventing and combatting illicit trafficking in conventional arms Programme against illicit 
conventional arms 
trafficking 
17 December 1997 measures weapons 
EU Code of Conduct on Arms Export  5 June 1998 ambitions weapons 
Joint Action of 17 December 1998 on the European Union’s contribution to combating 
the destabilising accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons 
(1999/34/CFSP) 
Joint Action restricting small 
arms exports 
17 December 1998 ambitions weapons 
EU Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters  EU Conv Mut Ass 29 May 2000 International & 3rd 
country agreement 
cooperation 
Establishing Eurodac (Regulation 2725/2000 ) Eurodac 11 December 2000 measures data exchange 
2001 UN Protocol against the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their 
parts and components and ammunition, annexed to the Convention against 
transnational organised crime 
UN prot illicit 
manufacturing/trafficking FA 
31 May 2001 International & 3rd 
country agreement 
weapons 
Counter Terrorism Group CTG 1 September 2001 EU bodies/operational 
platform 
cooperation 
UN SC res 1373: criminalising financing of terrorism UNSC Res 1373 28 September 2001 International & 3rd 
country agreement 
financial 
Directive 2001/97/EC amending Council Directive 91/308/EEC on preventing of the use 
of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering 
2nd AML 4 December 2001 measures financial 
Council Common Position (2001/931/CFSP) (EU black list) Asset freezing (EU blacklist) 
- general 
27 December 2001 measures financial 
Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 on specific restrictive measures directed against certain 
persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism 
Reg Asset freezing (EU 
blacklist) - general 
27 December 2001 measures financial 
Eurojust (Council decision 2002/187/JHA) Eurojust 28 February 2002 EU bodies/operational 
platform 
cooperation 
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Full name Short title Exact date Type of document Theme 
Communication "Towards integrated management of the external borders" Integrated management 
External border  
7 May 2002 ambitions border 
South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and 
Light Weapons (SEESAC) 
SEESAC 8 May 2002 International & 3rd 
country agreement 
weapons 
Council Common Position (2002/402/CFSP) concerning restrictive measures against 
Usama bin Laden, members of the Al-Qaida organisation and the Taliban and other 
individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with them 
CP Asset freezing - specific 
UBL & AQ 
27 May 2002 measures financial 
Regulation (881/2002) imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against 
certain persons and entities associated with Usama bin Laden, the Al-Qaida network and 
the Taliban 
Reg Asset freezing - specific 
UBL & AQ 
27 May 2002 measures financial 
Establishing joint investigation teams (Framework Decision 2002/465/JHA)  JITs 13 June 2002 EU bodies/operational 
platform 
cooperation 
Establishing the EAW (Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA) EAW 13 June 2002 measures cooperation 
Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combatting terrorism, criminalising 
terrorist offences 
FD Combating terrorism 
2002 
13 June 2002 measures justice 
COUNCIL JOINT ACTION of 12 July 2002 on the European Union’s contribution to 
combating the destabilising accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons 
and repealing Joint Action 1999/34/CFSP 
Council Joint Action 
restricting small arms 
exports 
12 July 2002 ambitions weapons 
Council decision 2003/659/JHA, amendment concerning budgetary arrangements 
Eurojust 
 18 June 2003 EU bodies/operational 
platform 
cooperation 
Agreement on extradition between the European Union and the United States of 
America (2003) 
Extradition-US 19 July 2003 International & 3rd 
country agreement 
justice 
Agreement on mutual legal assistance between the European Union and the United 
States of America (2003) 
MLA-US 19 July 2003 International & 3rd 
country agreement 
justice 
European Security Strategy ESS 5 December 2003 strategy general 
Agreement between the EU and Iceland and Norway on Mutual Assistance in Criminal 
Matters (2003) 
MLA-Iceland/Norway 19 December 2003 International & 3rd 
country agreement 
justice 
Madrid Madrid 11 March 2004 attack attack 
API-Directive/Council Directive on the obligation of carriers to communicate passenger 
data (2004/82/EC)  
API 29 April 2004 measures border 
Establishing Visa Information System (VIS) (Council Decision 2004/512/EC) VIS 8 June 2004 measures border 
Implementation report on Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating 
terrorism (COM(2004)409) 
Impl monitor-FD Comb Terr 8 June 2004 Monitoring 
Implementation & 
Evaluation  
general 
Frontex (Regulation EC 2007/2004) Frontex 26 October 2004 EU bodies/operational 
platform 
cooperation 
Commission Recommendation of 28 December 2004 complementary to 
Recommendation 96/129/EC on the European firearms pass 
Complementary EFP 
Recommendaiton 
28 December 2004 measures weapons 
Common Position 2005/69/JHA on increasing sharing of data with SLTD Interpol 
database 
 24 January 2005 measures data exchange 
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Full name Short title Exact date Type of document Theme 
Council of Europe 2005 Convention on the prevention of terrorism  CoE Conv 16 May 2005 International & 3rd 
country agreement 
justice 
London London 7 July 2005 attack attack 
UNSC Res 1624 (incitement to terrorism) UNSC Res 1624 14 September 2005 International & 3rd 
country agreement 
justice 
3rd AMLD-Directive (2005/60/EC) 3rd AML/CTF 26 October 2005 measures financial 
Regulation on controls of cash entering or leaving the Community (1889/2005)  26 October 2005 measures financial 
EU Action Plan on Combatting Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism 2005 AP Prevention 11 November 2005 action plans/roadmaps prevention 
EU Counter-terrorism Strategy 2005  EU CT Strat 15 November 2005 strategy general 
EU Action Plan on Combatting Terrorism 2005 AP Combatting Terrorism 2 December 2005 action plans/roadmaps general 
Schengen Borders Code (Regulation 562/2006) SBC 15 March 2006 measures border 
Agreement from 2012 with Canada (OJ 2006 L 82/15) on exchanging PNR data PNR-Can 22 March 2006 International & 3rd 
country agreement 
border 
Regulation on information on the payer accompanying transfers of funds (1781/2006)  15 November 2006 measures financial 
Communication on reinforcing the management of the EU's maritime borders   30 November 2006 ambitions border 
Swedish decision/Framework decision on simplifying the exchange of information and 
intelligence (2006/960/JHA) 
Simplifying Intel exchange 18 December 2006 measures data exchange 
Establishing SIS II, border control cooperation (Regulation 1987/2006) SIS II - Border control 
cooperation 
20 December 2006 measures border 
Cooperation on vehicle registration (Regulation 1986/2006)  20 December 2006 measures border 
Revised Media Communication Strategy 2007 Rev Media Comm Strat 28 March 2007 strategy prevention 
Council Conclusions on cooperation to combat terrorist use of the Internet, introducing 
Check-the-Web project 
 29 May 2007 ambitions prevention 
Establishing SIS II, law enforcement cooperation (Council Decision 2007/533/JHA) SIS II - Law enforcement 12 June 2007 measures border 
Rapid Border Intervention Teams (Regulation EC 863/2007) RABBIT 11 July 2007 EU bodies/operational 
platform 
border 
Implementation report on Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating 
terrorism  (COM(2007) 681) 
Impl monitor-FD Comb Terr 6 November 2007 Monitoring 
Implementation & 
Evaluation  
general 
Communication "Preparing the next steps in border management in the European 
Union" 
Next steps border 
management 
13 February 2008 ambitions border 
Action Plan on Enhancing the Security of Explosives  AP Explosives 11 April 2008 action plans/roadmaps weapons 
Directive 2008/51/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 21 May 2008 (Consolidated) Firearms 
Directive 
21 May 2008 measures weapons 
Council decision on the improvement of cooperation between the special intervention 
units of the Member States 
 23 June 2008 EU bodies/operational 
platform 
cooperation 
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Full name Short title Exact date Type of document Theme 
Implementation of the Prüm Treaty (2008/615/JHA)  Impl Prüm 23 June 2008 measures general 
Council Decision 2008/633/JHA on access VIS for prevention, detection and 
investigation of terrorist offences and other serious criminal offences  
VIS - Law enforcement 
access 
23 June 2008 measures border 
Regulation (EC) No 767/2008 on exchange of data on short-stay visas   9 July 2008 measures border 
Revised EU Strategy for Combatting Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism 2008 Rev Strat on Prev 14 November 2008 strategy prevention 
Council Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA on the mutual recognition of judgments in 
criminal matters  
Mut rec crim mat 27 November 2008 measures cooperation 
Council Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA on combatting terrorism, criminalising 
additional offences 
FD Combating terrorism 
2008 
28 November 2008 measures justice 
Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing control of exports 
of military technology and equipment 
 8 December 2008 ambitions weapons 
Council decision 2009/426/JHA, amendment to enhance operational effectiveness 
Eurojust 
 16 December 2008 EU bodies/operational 
platform 
cooperation 
Council Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA on organisation and content of the exchange 
of information from criminal records 
 26 February 2009 measures data exchange 
Establishing Europol (Council Decision 2009/371/JHA) Europol 6 April 2009 EU bodies/operational 
platform 
cooperation 
Establishing ECRIS (Council Decision 2009/316/JHA) ECRIS 6 April 2009 measures cooperation 
Opening of Office of the Special Representative of INTERPOL to the European Union 
(SRIEU)  
 25 September 2009 measures cooperation 
Joint Action on support for EU activities in order to promote the control of arms exports 
and the principles and criteria of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP among third 
countries 
Join Action to promote 
control of arms control 
exports 
12 November 2009 ambitions weapons 
Agreement between the European Union and Japan on mutual legal assistance in 
criminal matters (2009) 
MLA-Japan 30 November 2009 International & 3rd 
country agreement 
justice 
Information Management Strategy (IMS) IMS 30 November 2009 strategy data exchange 
Stockholm Programme, framework for EU action for the period 2010–2014 Stockholm Prog 2 December 2009 action plans/roadmaps general 
EU Internal Security Strategy (ISS) (European Council March 2010) ISS 25 March 2010 strategy general 
Communication 'The EU Counter-Terrorism Policy: main achievements and future 
challenges’ (COM/2010/0386 final) 
Evaluation general CT 20 July 2010 Monitoring 
Implementation & 
Evaluation  
general 
Overview of information management in the area of freedom, security and justice Impl monitor-data exchange 20 July 2010 Monitoring 
Implementation & 
Evaluation  
data exchange 
EU-US Agreement on the Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme (TFTP) TFTP-US 27 July 2010 International & 3rd 
country agreement 
financial 
Communication "The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action", announcing RAN (COM 
(2010)673) 
RAN 22 November 2010 ambitions prevention 
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Full name Short title Exact date Type of document Theme 
EU action plan to strengthen air cargo security  AP border 2 December 2010 action plans/roadmaps border 
Implementation report on Council Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant 
and the surrender procedures between Member States 
Impl monitor-EAW 11 April 2011 Monitoring 
Implementation & 
Evaluation  
justice 
Breivik/Oslo/Utoya Breivik/Oslo/Utoya 22 July 2011 attack attack 
EU Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) RAN 11 September 2011 measures prevention 
Amendment Frontex Regulation  25 October 2011 EU bodies/operational 
platform 
border 
Communication "First Annual Report on the implementation of the EU Internal Security 
Strategy" 
Impl monitor-ISS 25 November 2011 Monitoring 
Implementation & 
Evaluation  
general 
Luik Luik 13 December 2011 attack attack 
Progress Report on the Implementation of the EU Action Plan on Enhancing the Security 
of Explosives  
Evaluation explosives 1 January 2012 Monitoring 
Implementation & 
Evaluation  
weapons 
FATF recommendations FATF recom 16 February 2012 International & 3rd 
country agreement 
financial 
Toulouse Toulouse 11 March 2012 attack attack 
Council Regulation to implement Article 10 of the 2001 Firearms Protocol (No 258/2012)  14 March 2012 measures weapons 
Communication on Stronger and Smarter Information Systems for Borders and Security Improving Info systems 6 April 2012 ambitions data exchange 
Agreement from 2012 with Australia (OJ 2012 L 186/4) on exchanging PNR data PNR- Aus 14 July 2012 International & 3rd 
country agreement 
border 
Agreement from 2012 with the United States (OJ 2012 L 215/5) on exchanging PNR 
data 
PNR-US 11 August 2012 International & 3rd 
country agreement 
border 
Communication on implementing European Information Exchange Model (EIXM) EIXM 7 December 2012 ambitions data exchange 
Council Regulation on the marketing and use of explosives precursors (REP) (98/2013) Reg on marketing and use 
explosives 
15 January 2013 measures weapons 
Amending Eurodac for law enforcement purposes (Regulation 603/2013) Eurodac - Law enforcement 26 June 2013 measures justice 
Establishing European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur) (Regulation 1052/2013) EUROSUR 22 October 2013 measures border 
Implementation report on Framework Decisions 2008/909/JHA, 2008/947/JHA and 
2009/829/JHA on the mutual recognition of judicial decisions 
Impl monitor Mutual recog 
judicial decisions 
5 February 2014 Monitoring 
Implementation & 
Evaluation  
justice 
Directive 2014/28/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 
2014 
Directive harmonisation MS 
laws explosives for civil use 
26 February 2014 measures weapons 
External Borders Fund (EBF) (Regulation (EU) No 515/2014) EBF 16 April 2014 measures border 
Revised EU Strategy for Combatting Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism 2014  Rev Strat on Prev 19 May 2014 strategy prevention 
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Full name Short title Exact date Type of document Theme 
Jewish Museum Belgium Jewish Museum Belgium 24 May 2014 attack attack 
European Commission, Study to Support an Impact Assessment on Options for 
Combatting Illicit Firearms Trafficking in the European Union 
 1 July 2014 Monitoring 
Implementation & 
Evaluation  
weapons 
Implementation report on Council Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA on combating 
terrorism (COM(2014) 554 final) 
Impl monitor-FD Comb Terr 5 September 2014 Monitoring 
Implementation & 
Evaluation  
general 
UNSC Res 2178 (FTFs), requiring criminalising the funding of foreign fighters UNSC Res 2178 24 September 2014 International & 3rd 
country agreement 
financial 
Renewed IMS Ren IMS 18 December 2014 strategy data exchange 
Syria Strategic Communications Advisory Team (SSCAT)  1 January 2015 measures prevention 
Charlie Hebdo Charlie Hebdo 7 January 2015 attack attack 
Parijs-Coulibaly Parijs-Coulibaly 8 January 2015 attack attack 
Deloitte report on the implementation of the European Information Exchange Model 
(EIXM) for strengthening law enforcement cooperation 
Impl monitor-EIXM 26 January 2015 Monitoring 
Implementation & 
Evaluation  
data exchange 
Riga joint statement of Ministers of Home Affairs and Justice urging for PNR directive Urge PNR 29 January 2015 ambitions border 
UNSC Res 2199, urging Member States to call to justice any person who participates in 
the financing of terrorist acts 
 12 February 2015 International & 3rd 
country agreement 
financial 
Counter-terrorism communication hub on IPCR web platform   1 April 2015 measures prevention 
European Agenda on Security  Agenda on Security 28 April 2015 action plans/roadmaps general 
4th AMLD-Directive (2015/849), replaces 3rd AMLD in 2017 4rd AML/CTF 20 May 2015 measures financial 
Regulation on information accompanying transfers of funds and repealing Regulation 
(EC) No 1781/2006 (2015/847) 
 20 May 2015 measures financial 
EU Internal Security Strategy (ISS) (2015) Ren ISS 10 June 2015 strategy general 
First set of common risk indicators concerning foreign terrorist fighters  Common risk indicators FF 15 June 2015 measures general 
EU Internet Referral Unit (IRU) at Europol  IRU 1 July 2015 measures cooperation 
Additional Protocol to the 2015 CoE Convention on the prevention of terrorism  Add Prot CoE Conv 22 October 2015 International & 3rd 
country agreement 
justice 
Bataclan Bataclan 13 November 2015 attack attack 
Commission Evaluation of Firearms Directive 2008/51/EC (COM(2015) 751 final ) Evaluation weapons 18 November 2015 Monitoring 
Implementation & 
Evaluation  
weapons 
UNSC Res 2249, urging Member States to prevent and suppress the financing of 
terrorism 
 20 November 2015 International & 3rd 
country agreement 
financial 
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Full name Short title Exact date Type of document Theme 
Payment Services Directive (2015/2366)  25 November 2015 measures financial 
Commission proposal for Directive on combating terrorism and replacing Council 
Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism 
Directive Combating 
terrorism 
2 December 2015 measures justice 
RAN Centre of Excellence  RAN CoE 2 December 2015 measures prevention 
EU Internet Forum   3 December 2015 measures prevention 
Comunication proposing amendment of Schengen Border Code and the reinforcement of 
checks against relevant databases at external borders 
Amendment Schengen 
external border check 
15 December 2015 ambitions border 
Comunication proposing a European travel document for the return of illegally staying 
third-country nationals 
 15 December 2015 ambitions border 
Commission Implementing Regulation to establish common guidelines on deactivation 
standards and techniques 
 15 December 2015 measures general 
FIU.net, new platform within ECTC for exchanging information on money laundering and 
terrorist financing  
FIU.net 1 January 2016 EU bodies/operational 
platform 
financial 
Commission Action Plan to strengthen the fight against terrorist financing AP CFT 2 February 2016 action plans/roadmaps financial 
EU CTC Report on progress of the measures on counter-terrorism set out in Council 
Conclusions of 12 February 2015, 20 November 2015 & 18 December 2015 
Evaluation general CT 1 March 2016 Monitoring 
Implementation & 
Evaluation  
general 
Maalbeek/Zaventem Maalbeek/Zaventem 22 March 2016 attack attack 
Joint statement of Ministers of Home Affairs and Justice following Brussels attacks Next steps combating 
terrorism 
24 March 2016 ambitions general 
Communication on Stronger and Smarter Information Systems for Borders and 
Security: proposal for entry/exit system 
EES 6 April 2016 ambitions border 
EU CTC report on systematic feeding and consistent use of European and international 
Databases (7726/16) 
Evaluation data exchange 14 April 2016 Monitoring 
Implementation & 
Evaluation  
data exchange 
Comunication "delivering on the European Agenda on Security to fight against terrorism 
and pave the way towards an effective and genuine Security Union" 
Next steps comating 
terrorism and Security Union 
20 April 2016 ambitions general 
Communication "delivering on the European Agenda on Security to fight against 
terrorism and pave the way towards an effective and genuine Security Union" 
Evaluation general CT 20 April 2016 Monitoring 
Implementation & 
Evaluation  
general 
Establishing EU Passenger Name Records (Directive (EU) 2016/681) EU PNR 27 April 2016 measures border 
Amendment of Council decision on Europol  11 May 2016 EU bodies/operational 
platform 
cooperation 
Roadmap to enhance information exchange and information management in the Justice 
and Home Affairs area (9368/1/16) 
RM info exchange 6 June 2016 action plans/roadmaps data exchange 
Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European 
Union's Foreign And Security Policy 
Global Strategy 28 June 2016 strategy general 
Proposal on 5th AMLD-directive (COM(2016)450) 5th AML/CTF 5 July 2016 measures financial 
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Full name Short title Exact date Type of document Theme 
Nice Nice 14 July 2016 attack attack 
Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1675, identifying high-risk third countries 
with strategic deficiencies 
 14 July 2016 measures general 
European Border and Coast Guard (Regulation (EU) 2016/1624) EBCG 14 September 2016 EU bodies/operational 
platform 
border 
Decision (CFSP) 2016/1693 concerning restrictive measures against ISIL (Da'esh) and 
Al-Qaeda and persons, groups, undertakings and entities associated with them and 
repealing Common Position 2002/402/CFSP 
Sanctions ISIL/Al Qaeda 20 September 2016 measures financial 
Regulation (EU) 2016/1686 imposing additional restrictive measures directed against 
ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaeda and natural and legal persons, entities or bodies associated 
with them 
Asset freezing - specific ISIL 20 September 2016 measures financial 
Roadmap to enhance information exchange - state of play and proposals for future SIS 
amendments 
RM info exchange/SIS 26 October 2016 action plans/roadmaps data exchange 
Study on a European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS)  Needs assessment ETIAS 16 November 2016 Monitoring 
Implementation & 
Evaluation  
travel 
Berlin Berlin 19 December 2016 attack attack 
Upcoming performance audit on the Commission’s policy on prevention of radicalisation  Evaluation prevention 1 January 2017 Monitoring 
Implementation & 
Evaluation  
prevention 

